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Firearms Policy and the Black Community:
An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON

The heroes of the modern civil rights movement were more than
just stoic victims of racist violence. Their history was one of
defiance and fighting long before news cameras showed them
attacked by dogs and fire hoses. When Fannie Lou Hamer revealed
she kept a shotgun in every corner of her bedroom, she was
channeling a century old practice. And when delta share cropper
Hartman Turnbow, after a shootout with the Klan, said “I don’t
figure I was being non-nonviolent, (yes non-nonviolent) I was just
protecting my family”, he was invoking an evolved tradition that
embraced self-defense and disdained political violence. The precise
boundaries and policy implications of that tradition had always been
debated as times and context changed. But the basic idea that the
community would support indeed exalt the man or woman who
fought back in self-defense, even with, nay, especially with arms, has
a far longer pedigree than the modern orthodoxy which urges
stringent supply controls as the clearly best firearms policy for black
folk. Full consideration of this black tradition of arms raises serious
questions about the practical wisdom and conceptual grounding of
that modern orthodoxy.
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Firearms Policy and the Black Community:
An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON∗
I. INTRODUCTION
“[A] Winchester rifle should have a place of honor in every Black home.”
–Ida B. Wells Barnett, 18921
“To get them you have to go through a bureaucracy that makes it
difficult . . . . Nobody thinks we would have fewer shootings and fewer
homicides if we had more relaxed gun laws.”
–Eleanor Holmes Norton, 20102
Guns are a scourge on the black community. That is the conventional
wisdom. Black-on-Black gun crime imposes terrible costs.3 So it is no
surprise that many in the Black community and most of the Black
leadership endorse stringent gun control measures. This translates into
broad support for the most aggressive supply restrictions and gun bans like
those recently overturned in Washington D.C. and Chicago.4
Black mayors of big cities and Black legislators have overwhelmingly
∗

Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Bob Kaczorowski, Shelia
Foster, Marc Arkin, Russ Pearce, Howie Erickson, Dave Kopel, George Mocsary, Dan Richmond, Jack
Krill, Nelson Lund, Bob Levy, Bob Cottrol, Don Kates, Steve Halbrook, Jack Krill, Alice Marie Beard,
Robin Lenhardt, Tanya Hernandez and to the participants in the Fordham Law School Faculty
Scholarship Retreat, for comments on drafts of this Article. Tammem Zainulbhai provided excellent
research and editing assistance.
1
IDA B. WELLS, Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases, in SOUTHERN HORRORS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 49, 70 (Jacqueline Jones Royster ed., 1997).
2
Gary Fields, New Washington Gun Rules Shift Constitutional Debate, WALL ST. J., May 17,
2010, at A1.
3
See, e.g., Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) at 1–2
[hereinafter NAACP Amicus Curiae], available at http://www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/docume
nts/07-29tsacNAACPLegal.pdf (stating and explaining that “[t]he effects of gun violence on AfricanAmerican citizens are particularly acute” and providing the example that how “all but two of the 137
firearm homicide victims in the District were African Americans”).
4
See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms for the purpose self-defense is applicable to state and local governments);
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573–75, 635 (2008) (holding that a District of Columbia
ban on handgun possession, as well as an effective ban on the use of firearms for defense in the home,
violated the Second Amendment right to armed self-defense).
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favored gun bans and restrictions that go substantially beyond prohibiting
guns to criminals and the untrustworthy.5 The National Urban League is a
sustaining member of the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, previously the
National Coalition to Ban Handguns.6 The NAACP pressed a stringent
gun control agenda in NAACP v. AccuSport,7 arguing that gun makers
negligently supplied and marketed firearms that ravage poor Black
communities. In Chicago, Jessie Jackson advanced the point with protests
of legal gun sales in the suburbs of Chicago.8
In an amicus brief in District of Columbia v. Heller,9 the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) urged the
5
In 1992, New York Congressman Major Owens introduced a joint resolution, “[p]roposing an
amendment to the Constitution of the United States repealing the Second Amendment to the
Constitution.”
H.R.J. Res 438, 102d Cong. (1992), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?d102:438:./list/bss/d102HJ.lst::. In 1993, Owens proposed a separate Bill, explaining:

Mr. Speaker, my bill prohibits the importation, exportation, manufacture, sale,
purchase, transfer, receipt, possession, or transportation of handguns and handgun
ammunition. It establishes a 6-month grace period for the turning in of handguns. It
provides many exceptions for gun clubs, hunting clubs, gun collectors, and other
people of that kind.
H.R. Res. 302, 103d Cong. (1993), 139 Cong. Rec. 28527, 28533 (Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Major Owens). In 1999, Illinois Congressman Bobby Rush revealed:
My staff and I right now are working on a comprehensive gun-control bill. We
don’t have all the details, but for instance, regulating the sale and purchase of
bullets. Ultimately, I would like to see the manufacture and possession of handguns
banned except for military and police use. But that’s the endgame.
Evan Osnos, Bobby Rush; Democrat, U.S. House of Representatives, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1999, at C3
(quoting Rep. Bobby Rush). Mayor of Detroit, Dennis Archer, brought suit against a number of
firearm manufacturers for negligent oversupply of guns in a manner injurious to the City of Detroit.
Archer v. Arms Tech., No. 99-912658 NZ, 2000 WL 35624356 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 16, 2000). This
claim was deemed barred by subsequent state legislation in Mayor of Detroit v. Arms Tech., Inc., 669
N.W.2d 845, 854–55 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). See Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary, 875 N.E.2d
422, 424–25 (Ind. App. 2007) (explaining that in a case known as “Smith & Wesson II,” the city of
Gary, Indiana alleged that the gun manufacturer Smith & Wesson knew that guns it sold to
intermediaries would ultimately be sold illegally). One of Gary’s early Black mayors, Richard Hatcher,
was a strong advocate of stringent gun controls. Hatcher stated in 1979 that he would not be approving
any citizens’ concealed carry applications. He said if they wanted to challenge his authority, they were
welcome to take him to court. Some of them did. Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 688 (Ind.
1990).
6
HARRY L. WILSON, GUNS, GUN CONTROL, AND ELECTIONS: THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF
FIREARMS 145 (2007) (describing how the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence “was founded in 1974 as the
National Coalition to Ban Handguns”); Member Organizations, COAL. TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE,
http://www.csgv.org/about-us/member-organizations (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
7
271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The NAACP contends that . . . large numbers
of handguns are available to criminals, . . . that their availability endangers the people of New York . . .
and that defendants negligently and intentionally failed to take practicable marketing steps that would
have avoided or alleviated the nuisance.”).
8
Rev. Jesse Jackson Arrested at Gun Shop Protest, FOXNEWS.COM (June 24, 2007),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,286412,00.html.
9
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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Supreme Court to uphold the District’s gun ban.
In the wake of the
Court’s ruling that the District’s regulations violated of the Second
Amendment, the author of the Association’s Heller brief has argued that
diminishing Heller should be part of “any civil rights agenda.”11 This
includes, for example, a proposal for limiting the constitutional right to
keep and bear arms to enable isolated de jure gun prohibition in Black
enclaves.12
Within the broader Black community general support for stringent gun
laws can be inferred roughly from party allegiance. The Democratic Party
has been a comfortable home for advocates of gun prohibition and
stringent controls.13 No group of voters has been more loyal to the modern
Democratic Party than Blacks.14
Gun bans and other aggressive control measures promise a solution to
the plague of gun violence, so in that sense, the modern orthodoxy is easy
to understand. But on reflection it is also quite odd. First, because it is
grounded on assumptions that are difficult to reconcile with the Black
experience in America. Second, because it directly contradicts traditional
practice, policy, and philosophy of the Black leadership and the broader
Black community.
The modern orthodoxy is very difficult to square with the historic and
well-earned Black distrust of the state. A competent and benevolent state
that supplants the need for self-help is a core assumption of stringent gun
laws.15 But the assumption of government competence and benevolence—
10

NAACP Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 4, 31.
Michael B. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v. Heller and Communities
of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133, 137 (2009).
12
See id.
13
For example, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 contained a
provision, commonly known as the Assault Weapon Ban, which made it “unlawful for a person to
manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic assault weapon.” H.R. 3355, 103d Cong.
§ 110102 (1994), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hr3355enr/pdf/BILLS103hr3355enr.pdf; Brad Plumer, Everything You Need to Know About the Assault Weapons Ban, in
One Post, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog
/wp/2012/12/17/everything-you-need-to-know-about-banning-assault-weapons-in-one-post/. The bill
passed with overwhelming Democratic support: 188 House Democrats voted for the bill, and 64
against, while only 46 Republicans voted for it, and 131 against. FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL
CALL 416 (1994), available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1994/roll416.xml.
14
Since 1964, the percentage of blacks identifying with the Democratic Party has been
consistently over 70%, and well over 80% of blacks have voted for the Democratic candidate in every
Presidential election during that time. Blacks and the Democratic Party, FACTCHECK.ORG (Apr. 18,
2008), http://www.factcheck.org/2008/04/blacks-and-the-democratic-party/. In the 2008 presidential
election, Barack Obama won 95% of the black vote. Reilly Dowd, Young African-Americans Support
President Obama, but Turnout Not a Guarantee, ABCNEWS.GO.COM (Sept. 23, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/african-american-youth-standing-presidentobama/story?id=17274120#.UUt9Mr8Zfww.
15
There are many manifestations of this. One of the most evident was the legislation overturned
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Heller invalidated armed self-defense by
11
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particularly competence and benevolence of state and local law
enforcement—is foreign to the Black experience. Blacks have justifiably
distrusted the state and have suffered more than most groups from state
failure and malevolence. Even today, the Black community complains
about the inability or unwillingness of state and local governments to serve
and protect Blacks. This includes biting criticism of local policing.16
Moreover, in terms of practice and policy, armed self-defense has been
an essential private resource for Blacks. Not only have many in the
leadership owned, carried, and used firearms for self-defense, as a matter
of policy, Blacks from the leadership to the grassroots have supported
armed self-defense by maintaining a crucial distinction between political
violence (which was condemned as counterproductive to group
advancement) and self-defense against imminent threats (for which there
was no substitute).17
This Article elaborates these critiques of the modern orthodoxy. Part I
shows that trusting the state for personal security is incompatible with the
Black experience. Part II shows that the modern orthodoxy is incompatible
with traditional practice and policy. Section A of Part II illustrates the
tradition of firearms ownership and armed self-defense in the Black
community. Section B shows how traditionally, Blacks in the leadership
and at the grassroots, sustained and supported armed self-defense as a
matter of policy by insisting upon a fundamental distinction between
private self-defense against imminent threats and collective political
violence that was considered damaging to group goals. Section B contends
that this traditional support for armed self-defense was fundamentally a
response to state failure and impotence which continues to this day. This
continuing state failure and impotence pose a fundamental challenge to the
modern orthodoxy.
The evident response to the arguments and implications of Part II is
that practice and policy formed in the context of Black Codes; that Jim
Crow and racist terrorism are no longer relevant. Black support for
stringent gun control, the argument goes, is dictated by modern concerns

outlawing handguns and requiring that sporting long guns be kept unloaded, disassembled and locked
away separately from the ammunition. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75, 635; see also H. Richard Uviller &
William G Merkel, Muting the Second Amendment: The Disappearance of the Constitutional Militia, in
THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 149, 176–77 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) (claiming that
the militia transformed into the National Guard); Dennis A. Henigan, Guns and the Judiciary, in GUNS
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE MYTH OF SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FIREARMS IN
AMERICA 1, 14, 19 (1995) (arguing that the federally controlled National Guard has obviated the need
the militia of the whole).
16
See infra notes 472–74.
17
See infra notes 269–70 and accompanying text (noting that Frederick Douglass advocated
armed resistance to slave catchers).
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about Black-on-Black violence in the urban underclass.
Traditional
worries about state failure or impotence, it is said, are outdated.
Part III engages the “things have changed” defense of the modern
orthodoxy. Section A charts the departure of modern orthodoxy from
traditional practice and policy. Section B argues that the failure and
inherent limits of government that fueled the traditional support for
firearms ownership and armed self-defense remain salient. Part III argues
that Black political advances have not diminished the problems of
imminent threats and finite resources that constrain government’s ability to
protect Blacks from criminal violence.19 Part III concludes that the modern
orthodoxy is philosophically at odds with the Black experience in America.
Part IV argues that the modern orthodoxy rests on dubious assumptions
about the risks and utilities of private firearms and submerges the
legitimate self-defense interests of the sober mature members of the
community. Part IV invites reassessment of the modern orthodoxy with a
keener focus on the interest of innocents.
II. STATE FAILURE AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE
We have done our level best . . . , we have scratched our head to figure out
how we can eliminate the last one of them. We stuffed ballot boxes. We
shot them. We ARE NOT ASHAMED OF IT.
–Ben “Pitchfork” Tillman,
United States Senator from South Carolina, 191020
The injustices endured by Black Americans at the hands of their own
government have no parallel in our history, not only during the period of
slavery but also in the Jim Crow era that followed.
Jim Webb
United States Senator from Virginia
July 201021
18
See de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 167 (“In the District, . . . the handgun ban was a means
chosen by an African-American electorate to prevent violence against its own members.”).
19
Daisy Bates was President of Arkansas Conference of NAACP Branches. DAISY BATES, THE
LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK 47 (1963). She and her husband were central figures in the 1957
Little Rock Integration crisis. They published a black newspaper, the Arkansas State Press, and
editorialized against violations of the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings. See id. at 33, 49–50
(describing how the Little Rock School Board resisted immediate integration despite the lack of
violence at institutions that had been integrated). Bates was advisor to the Little Rock Nine, when they
attempted to enroll at Little Rock Central High School. See id. at 62–65, 88–90 (Bates counseled the
parents of black children before their enrollment, and organized their travel to the school).
20
RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO: FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO
WOODROW WILSON 99–100 (1965) (alterations in original).
21
See James Webb, Diversity and the Myth of White Privilege, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at A17
(arguing that affirmative action cannot be justified despite the unparalleled injustices suffered by black
Americans).
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Advocates of stringent supply-side, gun control oppose armed selfdefense on the view that personal security is best provided to a disarmed
citizenry by armed agents of government.22 This dictates a dependency on
the competence and benevolence of government at odds with the Black
experience in America.
Black distrust of the state is well earned. The early parts of the story
are self-evident. There is general agreement that the enshrinement of
slavery is a stain on the Republic. It is a profound irony, that with so much
ink spilled by the founding generation about the reasons to distrust
government and the need for systemic restraints on government power, the
constituency with the most glaringly evident reason to distrust the state
was held in bondage.
22
The modern gun control movement has long argued that the only legitimate reasons for
firearms ownership is sport. While some have urged blanket disarmament, the primary focus has been
on handguns, deemed generally non-sporting, might be banned. Some organizations have urged a ban
on firearms of all types.

There is little sense in gun registration. What we need to significantly enhance
public safety is domestic disarmament . . . . Given the proper political support by the
people who oppose the pro-gun lobby, legislation to remove the guns from private
hands, acts like the legislation drafted by Senator John Chafee [to ban handguns],
can be passed in short order. . . . Domestic disarmament entails the removal of arms
from private hands.
AMITAI ETZIONI & STEVEN HELLEND, COMMUNITARIAN NETWORK, THE CASE FOR DOMESTIC
DISARMAMENT (1992), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/pop_disarm.html.
Many in the movement have advocated regulations of the type recently enforced in Washington
D.C. as a model of sensible gun control.
A gun-control movement worthy of the name would insist that President Clinton
move beyond his proposals for controls—such as expanding background checks at
gun shows and stopping the import of high-capacity magazines—and immediately
call on Congress to pass far-reaching industry regulation like the Firearms Safety
and Consumer Protection Act introduced by Senator Robert Torricelli, Democrat of
New Jersey, and Representative Patrick Kennedy, Democrat of Rhode Island. Their
measure would give the Treasury Department health and safety authority over the
gun industry, and any rational regulator with that authority would ban handguns.
Josh Sugarmann, Exec. Dir. of the Violence Pol’y Ctr., Dispense with the Half Steps and Ban
Killing Machines, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1999, at 45A.
For the counterpoint, see David B. Kopel et al., The Human Right to Self-Defense, 22 BYU J.
PUB. L. 43, 54–57, 159–164 (2007) (critiquing a report for the Human Rights Council prepared by
Special Rapporteur Barbara Frey claiming that people have a human right to gun control under the
theory that gun control legislation is part of the due diligence required by international law); see also
Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Prevention of Human
Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, 58th Sess., U.N Doc.
A/HRC/Sub.I/58/27 (July 27, 2006) (prepared by Barbara Frey), available at http://www.poaiss.org/CASAUpload/Members/Documents/11@Frey%20Final%20Report%202006.pdf (arguing that
self-defense is not a human right but that there is an international human rights law obligation to
prevent “reasonably foreseeable private sphere violations carried out with small arms” in which States
“must take steps to minimize armed violence between private actors”).
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Under the system of constitutionally endorsed slavery, government at
all levels was overtly hostile to Blacks. We are familiar with the
provisions of the original United States Constitution, the Supreme Court
cases, and a century of delay in making good the promise of
Reconstruction23 that might leave Blacks understandably ambivalent about
the suggestion to entrust their lives to the state.24 But it is the details of
physical threats to Black people at the grassroots that underscore the
point.25
23
See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks of the President to a Joint Session of Congress (Mar.
15, 1965), in THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 208, 212 (Henry
Steele Commager ed., 1972) (“A century has passed, more than a hundred years since equality was
promised. And yet the Negro is not equal. A century has passed since the day of promise. And the
promise is unkept.”); see also Clayton E. Cramer, Nicholas J. Johnson & George A. Mocsary, “This
Right Is Not Allowed by Governments that Are Afraid of the People”: The Public Meaning of the
Second Amendment When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 823, 852–
54 (2010) (discussing the post-war legislation restricting freedmen’s access to guns).
24
The validation of negro slavery in the “other Persons” and “such Persons” in Article I §§ 2 and
9 of the original Constitution are familiar. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. So is the Supreme Court’s work in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), which upheld the constitutionality of a state statute requiring separation of the
races in train travel) and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), which held that the black plaintiff
was not a citizen and therefore was not entitled to sue. Less well known are Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1, 9 (1906), which held that racist intimidation of Black laborers was outside the jurisdiction
of federal courts, Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883), which held the enhanced punishment for
interracial fornicators constitutional, Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1880), which held that
all-white juries for Black defendants was constitutional, and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542,
559 (1875), which remanded with instructions to discharge the defendants after indictment of members
of a white mob who attacked a largely unarmed group of freedmen.
25
For the view that state malevolence and neglect exacerbated intra group violence by Blacks
who were wary about entanglements with the white power structure, see, e.g., HORTENSE
POWDERMAKER, AFTER FREEDOM: A CULTURAL STUDY IN THE DEEP SOUTH 173–74 (1939). The
contemporary response to this neglect stands in notable contrast to the modern complaints about
incarceration of Black criminals. Consider for example the efforts of the Black leaders from the
Mississippi Delta on the Committee for Better Citizenship. The goal of the Committee was to “ensure
greater punishment for black criminals who committed offenses against blacks.” DAVID T. BEITO &
LINDA ROYSTER BEITO, BLACK MAVERICK: T.R.M. HOWARD’S FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND
ECONOMIC POWER 67–68 (2009). Physician, entrepreneur, and Delta civil rights leader, T.R.M.
Howard complained that failure of the state to punish Black-on-Black crime was another indictment of
separate but equal, arguing that the “greatest danger to Negro life in Mississippi is not what white
people do to Negroes but what the courts of Mississippi let Negroes of Mississippi do to each other.”
Id. at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted). Black-on-Black murder for example was likely to go
unaddressed if the perpetrator lived on “a big plantation and is a good worker and especially, if he is
liked by white people, the chances are that he will come clear of his crime.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). E. Franklin Frazier’s 1924 account strikes a similar cord.

The main difficulty in the South today is that white people have not attained a
conception of impersonal justice. In the South a Negro who is the favorite of an
influential white man can kill another Negro with impunity. On the other hand, a
white man can kill any Negro without any fear of punishment, except where he kills
out of pure blood-thirstiness a “good nigger.” The killing of a white man is always
the signal for a kind of criminal justice resembling primitive tribal revenge.
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The case for distrust was not so much different after slavery as before.
As Freedmen attempted to establish themselves politically, they
encountered violence at the hands of ex-confederates. The disappointing
government response is well chronicled. Episodes in Memphis and New
Orleans are illustrative. In 1866 Blacks and white Republicans attempted
to convene a state constitutional convention.26
[At the convention hall] they were attacked and slaughtered
by a mob led by the city police, a force largely made up of
militant Confederate veterans. . . . The United States Army
units stationed in New Orleans failed to take any effective
action to protect the convention, and the Johnson
administration in Washington ignored warnings that violence
was likely.27
Around the same time, white mobs in Memphis invaded the Black
community.28 In the lead were prominent whites including the Tennessee
Attorney General and a state judge. Forty-six Blacks and two whites were
killed.29
One of the factors motivating the protections under the Freedman’s
Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment was the deprivation of Black civil
rights, including the right of Blacks to arm themselves for personal
protection.30 There is some temptation to mark the Reconstruction Era as a
hinge point where Blacks could look to Washington for protection against
hostile state and local governments. But by 1877, the Reconstruction
experiment was nearly exhausted and compromised away.31 In the decades
E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro and Non-Resistance, 27 CRISIS 213, 213–14 (1924), reprinted in
HERBERT APTHEKER, 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES,
449, 451 (1973).
26
HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO
MONTGOMERY 5 (1988).
27
Id. at 6.
28
Id. at 7.
29
Id.
30
See Cramer, Johnson & Mocsary, supra note 23, at 855–59 (“There is solid evidence that both
supporters and opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the Second Amendment as an
individual right—and in some cases, the opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment was driven by fear
that it would preclude the Black Code provisions from disarming the freedmen.”).
31
As author David Levering Lewis observed:
[By March of 1877,] the Republicans had frantically bartered just enough electoral
votes in the bitterest, most corrupt election aftermath ever in order to hang on to the
White House. In accordance with a deal in large part struck at Wormley House, the
deluxe Washington hotel owned (ironically) by a black man, Rutherford Hayes’s
first act had been to call back most of the federal troops from the South while
northern capitalists smacked their lips in anticipation of Congress’s voting lavish
subsidies for more transcontinental railroads. Henceforth, the white South would
take care of its black people and the North would take care of most of the nation’s

2013]

FIREARMS POLICY AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY

1501

that followed, the party of Lincoln virtually abandoned Blacks, and LilyWhite Republicans curried favor with the former rebels.32
Racist assaults on the Black community in Wilmington, North
Carolina in 1898 illustrate that official complicity in racist violence could
be good politics. John Spenser Bassett of Trinity College in Durham noted
the irony that the prime instigator of the Wilmington violence, Alfred
Waddell, was subsequently elected mayor.33
The Sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia, in the period following the
Atlanta race riots of 1906, made clear his view of justice where Blacks
were concerned: “Gentlemen, we will suppress these great indignities upon
our fair wives and daughters if we have to kill every negro in a thousand
miles of this place.”34
Northern Blacks were not immune. In August of 1900, white mobs in
New York City rolled over Blacks with “police both encouraging and
participating in the violence, after a violent conflict between a plainclothes
policeman and the husband of a Black woman accused of soliciting.”35
In many instances of brutality by the mob policemen stood
by and made no effort to protect the Negros who were
assailed. They ran with the crowds in pursuit of their prey;
they took defenseless men who ran to them for protection and
threw them to the rioters, and in many cases they beat and
clubbed men and women more brutally than the mob did.36
In the Pulitzer Prize winning, Slavery by Another Name, Douglas
Blackmon details the southern system of convict labor under which the
state was a fundamental threat to Blacks.37 Blackmon captures the system
this way:
On March 30, 1908, Green Cottenham was arrested by the
sheriff of Shelby County, Alabama, and charged with
“vagrancy.” . . . After three days behind bars [he] was found
guilty . . . and immediately sentenced to a thirty-day term of
business. The Nation had said starkly what President Hayes had no need to say
publicly about the African-American: “Henceforth, the nation, as a nation, will have
nothing more to do with him.”
DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 163 (1993) (quoting ERIC FONER,
A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 245 (1990)).
32
KENNETH W. GOINGS, “THE NAACP COMES OF AGE”: THE DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER
21 (1990).
33
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 73.
34
JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1900–1920, at 131 (1977).
35
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 94.
36
Id.
37
DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK
AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II, at 8 (2009).
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hard labor. Unable to pay the array of fees assessed on every
prisoner[,] . . . Cottenham’s sentence was extended to nearly
a year of hard labor.
The next day, Cottenham, the youngest of nine children born
to former slaves in an adjoining county, was sold. Under a
standing arrangement between the county and a vast
subsidiary of the industrial titan of the North—U.S. Steel
Corporation—the sheriff turned the young man over to the
company for the duration of his sentence. In return, the
subsidiary, Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company, gave
the county $12 a month to pay off Cottenham’s fine and fees.
What the company’s managers did with Cottenham, and
thousands of other black men they purchased from sheriffs
across Alabama, was entirely up to them.38
Blackmon chronicles the horrific treatment of Black men forced into
this system throughout the south on charges like “idleness,” “using
obscene language,” “selling cotton after sun set” and “violating contract”
with white employers in places where true crime was “almost trivial.”39
By some modern sensibilities, the firearms charges that landed Blacks into
this system were not trivial. But that modern assessment is vexing here.
Across the South, but nowhere more intensely than in
Alabama, public campaigns were under way to ban the
possession of firearms by any African American. In an era
when great numbers of southern men carried sidearms, the
crime of carrying a concealed weapon—enforced almost
solely against black men—would by the turn of the century
become one of the most consistent instruments of black
incarceration. The larger implications of disarming black
men, at a time when they were simultaneously being stripped
of political and legal protections, were transparent.40
In this context, the state earned not just Black distrust but fear. As
much as any racist terrorist, the state was simply a menace.41 Indeed,
gauged by the number of direct victims of the convict labor system, the
state was an even greater threat than terrorist groups like the Klan.
[T]he records demonstrate the capture and imprisonment of
38

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 69, 79, 99.
40
Id. at 81–82 (emphasis added).
41
See id. at 99 (“At the end of the 1880s, thousands of black men across the South were
imprisoned in work camps only for violations of the new racial codes, completely subjective crimes, or
no demonstrable crime at all.”).
39
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thousands of random indigent citizens, almost always under
the thinnest chimera of probable cause or judicial process.
The total number of workers caught in this net had to have
totaled more than a hundred thousand and perhaps more than
twice that figure. Instead of evidence showing black crime
waves, the original records of county jails indicated
thousands of arrests for inconsequential charges or for
violations of laws specifically written to intimidate blacks—
changing employers without permission, vagrancy, riding
freight cars without a ticket, engaging in sexual activity—or
loud talk—with white women. . . . Hundreds of forced labor
camps came to exist, scattered throughout the south—
operated by state and county governments, large
corporations, small-time entrepreneurs, and provincial
farmers. . . . Where mob violence or the Ku Klux Klan
terrorized black citizens periodically, the return of forced
labor as a fixture in black life ground pervasively into the
daily lives of far more African Americans.42
The idea that the state was a menace rivaling the Klan tempts a false
dichotomy that obscures government complicity in the “private” terrorism
of the lynch mob. “Not only did sheriffs and jailers often willingly turn
Black victims over to the lynchers, but officers of the law frequently joined
the mob.”43 The record is tragically thick with examples of almost
unbelievable lynch mob barbarism and the striking failure of government
to intercede. A stark example is President William Howard Taft’s failure
in 1911 even to acknowledge the NAACP’s special message requesting
action in response to a particularly inventive lynching.44
The white
citizens of Livermore, Kentucky dragged a Black man accused of killing a
white from his jail cell to the town opera house, where the crowd paid
admission to fire shots at him. “Those who bought orchestra seats had the
privilege of emptying their six shooters at the swaying form above them,
but the gallery occupants were limited to one shot.”45
The shameful record of government institutions at every level on this
score is highlighted by the submission of the Universal Negro
Improvement Association to the 1919, Paris Peace Conference. In what
42

Id. at 7.
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 31. The claim that lynching was just a response to Black
criminality is unconvincing. Victims included the father of a boy who jostled white women, a man
who beat a white in a fight, and the wife and son of an accused rapist. See, e.g., DITTMER, supra note
34, at 131–40 (describing examples of lynchings that were not the result of Black criminality and the
effects the lynchings had on the communities).
44
GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865–1940, LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE,
AND “LEGAL LYNCHINGS” 118–19 (1990).
45
Id.
43
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sounds like the plea of modern refugees from barbaric, third world
governments, the UNIA representative, prayed for intervention by the
civilized world.
We of North America, beg to lay before you the awful
institutions of lynching and burning at the stake of our men,
women and children by the white people of the country,
which institutions are in direct contravention of the
established codes of civilization. We ask your help and
interference in the stopping of these outrages, which cannot
be regarded as national or domestic questions, but as
international violations of civilized human rights.46
Although official hostility to Blacks had often been a point of division
between political parties, in some cases the stance was entirely bipartisan.
In the run up to the 1921 Tulsa riots, Klansmen appeared on both the
Democratic and Republican slates.47
Black migration from the South to Northern industrial centers was
often met with official hostility and government sanctioned violence. The
infamous 1917 race riot in East St. Louis, Illinois, incited by employment
of Black strikebreakers, prompted investigation by a special congressional
committee.48 It concluded that the police had become “part of the mob by
countenancing the assaulting and shooting down of defenseless negroes
and adding to the terrifying scenes of rapine and slaughter.”49
A. Philip Randolph placed the failure of the state to protect Blacks in a
broader context. The root of the problem, he claimed, was capitalism
itself.50 “Lynching will not stop until Socialism comes . . . when the
46
1 THE MARCUS GARVEY AND UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION PAPERS 228,
308, 378–80 (Robert A. Hill ed., 1983).
47
SCOTT ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921, at 22
(1982) (“In the November 1922 elections . . . both the Republican and Democratic candidates for
county attorney and sheriff were Klansmen.”).
48
Ben Johnson et al., Report of the Special Committee Authorized by Congress to Investigate the
East St. Louis Riots, in THE POLITICS OF RIOT COMMISSIONS 1917–1970, at 59, 59 (Anthony Platt ed.,
1971) (the congressional committee was appointed “for the purpose of making an investigation of the
East St. Louis riots which occurred on May 28 and July 2, 1917”).
49
Id. at 70.
50
Randolph took a different approach from Black civil rights groups. For example, in an analysis
urging that lynching required an international response, the Messenger criticized,

No, lynching is not a domestic question, except in the rather domestic minds of
Negro leaders, whose information is highly localized and domestic. The problems
of the Negros should be presented to every nation in the world and this sham
democracy, about which American’s prate, should be exposed for what it is: a sham,
a mockery, a rape on decency, and a travesty on common sense. When lynching
gets to be an international question, it will be the beginning of the end.
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 171.
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motive for promoting race prejudices is removed, viz., profits.”51
Randolph argued that the reasons for government failure to protect Negros
were inherent and could not be resolved by more words claiming a change
in policy. “Don’t be deceived by any capitalist bill to abolish lynching; if
it became a law, it would never be enforced. Have you not the Fourteenth
Amendment which is supposed to protect your life, property, . . . and
guarantee you the vote?”52 Randolph’s short-term remedy was reciprocal
violence in self-defense.53 He reconciled this with the general program of
pacifism, noting that pacifism controlled “only on matters that can be
settled peacefully.”54
The familiar claim that government officials were complicit in lawless
violence against Blacks was underscored by the NAACP’s investigation of
a 1926 lynching in Aiken, South Carolina. The sheriff and the jailer had
assisted the mob in removing three Blacks from a local jail to a nearby
tourist camp, where, in front of a crowd of 2,000, they were killed.55 In
attendance were members of the state legislature and other local
politicians.56 The NAACP’s James Weldon Johnson argued that the
federal government bore part responsibility. The Senate’s refusal to act on
the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill he claimed, “was equivalent to serving notice
on the lynchers that they could pursue their pastime virtually
unmolested.”57 Johnson’s mentor, Charles W. Anderson, leveled a similar
criticism at Woodrow Wilson’s policy of segregating the federal
workforce. Wilson’s policy had “the reflex influence” of giving antiNegro elements across the country the feeling that they would not be
punished by federal authorities.58
The high-water mark of southern lynching is contestable. On one
view, it is measured by lynchings per year, with declining rates evidence of
progress. On another view, the impact is cumulative, with every new,
dangling, burned corpse an affirmation that Blacks lived in a state of terror.
The cumulative view reflects better the impact on the Black psyche and
expectations. “Translated from statistical abstraction, . . . perhaps most of
the southern Black population, had witnessed lynching in their own
51
A. Philip Randolph & Chandler Owen, Lynching: Capitalism Its Cause, Socialism Its Cure, in
BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 85, 90, 91 (August Meier et al. eds., 2d ed.
1971).
52
Id. at 91.
53
Id. at 96.
54
Id. at 97.
55
I.A. NEWBY, BLACK CAROLINIANS: A HISTORY OF BLACKS IN SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1895
TO 1968, at 242–45 (1973); Walter White, The Shambles of South Carolina, CRISIS, Dec. 1926, at 72–
75, CRISIS, Jan. 1927, at 141–42.
56
White, supra note 55, at 141–42.
57
Id.; see also NAACP Column, CRISIS, Jan. 1927, at 141–42.
58
1 CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE 166 (1967).
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communities or knew people who had, knew the terror that struck the
community when the mob was whipped to frenzy.”59 A cumulative
assessment of Black distrust of the state undercuts modern claims that the
tradition of distrust is no longer salient because things have changed.
While the stereotypical Southern sheriff was a common locus of Black
distrust, other officials contributed generously. Witness the arguments of
the prosecutor in the trial of Ward Rodgers, a white union activist arrested
in Arkansas on charges of anarchy and blasphemy. Rodger’s offense, the
prosecutor argued, was teaching “niggers” to read and calling Black men
“mister.”60
More striking is the 1935 report of Robert Reed, a white volunteer who
was arrested for attending a meeting of Black sharecroppers. The meeting
was broken up by armed whites. They took Reed before a local judge who
pressed him on why a white man was dealing with “niggers.”61
He told us about how they had a lot of black politicians in
Arkansas up until the turn of the century, and hundreds had
been driven into the Mississippi River, and that a lot of lives
were lost then, and the whole thing was likely to occur over
again if we persisted in the sort of activities we were in.62
As the United States entered World War II, Black soldiers found
themselves instruments of a government they still had ample reasons to
distrust and even fear. In some cases that fear was compounded by
hostility from white soldiers and superior officers.63 In other cases it was
instigated by state and local authorities enforcing racist local norms.64

59

SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 32.
DAVID EUGENE CONRAD, THE FORGOTTEN FARMERS: THE STORY OF SHARECROPPERS IN THE
NEW DEAL 157 (1965).
61
H.L. MITCHELL, MEAN THINGS HAPPENING IN THIS LAND 63 (1979).
62
Id.
63
For example, Black Soldiers stationed at Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania encountered a notice
from their white commander that “Any cases between white and colored males and females, whether
voluntary or not is considered rape and during time of war the penalty is death.” ROI OTTLEY, “NEW
WORLD A-COMING”: INSIDE BLACK AMERICA 314 (1943). At Fort Dix, New Jersey, a gun battle
between Black troops and MP’s intent on enforcing southern Jim Crow customs led to three dead and
five wounded. Id. at 312–13.
64
A Black member of the 94th Engineers Battalion stationed in Camp Custer Arkansas in 1941
reported that a group of Black soldiers from the units abandoned maneuvers and fled for safety after
being threatened by state troopers and armed civilians. Id. at 310.
60

As we were walking along the highway, . . . we saw a gang of white men with guns
and sticks and white state troopers were with them. They told us to get the hell off
the road and walk in the mud at the side of the highway. . . . [T]he trooper told [our
white Lieutenant] to get them blacks off the highway before [he] leave[s] ‘em [sic]
laying there. Then out of a clear blue sky the state trooper slapped the white
lieutenant.
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Florence Murray’s account of racial violence in the armed forces65
describes the concerns that prompted protests by the NAACP about
beating, mobbing, and lynching of Blacks in uniform on military bases and
in host communities.66
On the civilian front, Thurgood Marshall’s report of the government
response to the 1943 Detroit riots67 fueled continuing Black distrust of the
state.68 Marshall’s particular focus on the culture within the Detroit police
department highlights a recurring complaint that still resonates in Black
communities.69 A commission appointed by the Governor of Michigan
was unsympathetic to Marshall’s view.70 But an assessment by a coalition
including General William Gunther, the YMCA, and the Federal Council
of Churches confirmed and condemned widespread police misconduct and
abuse of Blacks.71
On another count, reaction to the Detroit riots, even at federal level,
was a source of worry. On July 15, 1943, Attorney General Francis Biddle
wrote to President Roosevelt,
[T]hat careful consideration be given to limiting, and in some
Id. at 310–11 (internal quotation marks omitted). After nightfall, the Black soldiers abandoned their
maneuvers and fled the area by a variety of means calculated to avoid contact with local whites. Id. at
311.
65
THE NEGRO HANDBOOK, 1946–1947, at 347–56 (Florence Murray ed., 1947) (describing, for
example, the Port Chicago mutiny in 1944, the Freeman Field disturbance in 1945, the mutiny at
Mabry Field in May 1944, the Fort Devens case in March 1944, and the disturbances in Guam).
66
Id.; Harvard Sitkoff, Racial Militancy and Interractial Violence in the Second World War, 58 J.
AM. HIST. 666, 674–79 (1971).
67
Frustration with a neglectful or malevolent state was reflected in the build up to the 1943
Detroit riots where “[a] slogan frequently heard among Blacks was ‘if you’ve got to die for democracy,
lets die for it at home.’” SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 312.
68
See Thurgood Marshall, The Gestapo in Detroit, in RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
140, 140–44 (Allen Day Grimshaw, ed., 1969) (“Much of the blood spilled in the Detroit riot is on the
hands of the Detroit police department.”); WALTER WHITE & THURGOOD MARSHALL, WHAT CAUSED
THE DETROIT RIOT? AN ANALYSIS 29–36 (1943) (“Some of the Negroes interviewed have refused to
give details, and others have refused to sign statements for fear of reprisals from the local Police
Department.”). Marshall argued that there was sufficient evidence to convene a grand jury to
investigate “the nonfeasance and malfeasance of the police as a contributing factor in the Detroit riots.”
Id. at 29. The actions of the police siding with white mobs to prevent Blacks form integrating the
Sojourner Truth housing project justified the belief of “[w]hite hoodlums . . . that the Detroit police
would act the same way in any future disturbances.” Id.
69
See, e.g., Evan Perez & Devlin Barrett, Police Officers Charged over Post-Katrina Deaths,
WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870451890457536524328
2608862.html?KEYWORDS=new+orleans+police+shooting+Katrina (reporting on a “racially charged
case” of white police officers in connection with shootings in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that
left mainly black victims dead or wounded, and which is viewed as “the most vivid and painful
example of the confusion and lawlessness that pervaded the city after the storm”).
70
See Marshall, supra note 68, at 141 (quoting Commissioner Witherspoon’s remarks defending
the police); see also WHITE & MARSHALL, supra note 68, at 13 (explaining that the “investigating
committee reported that there was no necessity of a Grand Jury investigation”).
71
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 318–19.
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instances putting an end to Negro migrations into
communities which cannot absorb them, either on account of
physical limitations or cultural background. This needs
immediate and careful consideration. . . . It would seem
pretty clear that no more Negros should move to Detroit.72
The particular worry about police culture is underscored by the 1946
police shooting of the Ferguson brothers in Freeport, Nassau County, New
York.73 The episode emphasizes the now familiar tension between Blacks
and police that cannot be explained simply by reference to racist traditions
of the Deep South. At the time, Freeport “like other Long Island towns
was an outpost of segregation and racial exclusion.”74 The Fergusons were
war veterans,75 and they had been denied service by the manager of a local
restaurant who called the police.76 By the time police arrived, the
Fergusons had left the restaurant.77 They were later apprehended and, by
some accounts, lined up and shot by police who claimed that one of the
brothers pretended to be armed.78 The Ferguson’s were not armed and the
aftermath precipitated a wave of protests, including the charge by the
NAACP that “it is difficult to classify this double killing as anything but
murder.”79 Prominent citizens called for an investigation, but no action
was taken against the officers.80 Herbert Shapiro observes that the
Freeport shooting, “demonstrated that responsible public officials would
not readily be moved to act to restrain racist police officers.”81
By 1947, President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights reported that
government involvement in the most egregious attacks on Blacks was
attributable to state and local officials in the South:
Punishment of lynchers is not accepted as the responsibility
of state or local governments in these communities.
Frequently, state officials participate in the crime, actively or
passively. Federal efforts to punish the crime are resisted.
Condonaton of lynching is indicated by the failure of some
local law enforcement officials to make adequate efforts to
72
Id. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also EARL BROWN, WHY RACE RIOTS:
LESSONS FROM DETROIT 3, 23 (1944) (criticizing Attorney General Biddle’s handling of the Detroit
riots); Biddle Denies Migration Ban, CRISIS, Sept. 1943, at 280 (discussing Biddle’s denial of any plans
to restrict “the migration of Negroes to war production centers”).
73
SHAPIRO supra note 26, at 356.
74
Id. at 355.
75
Id. at 356.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80
Id. at 356–57.
81
Id. at 357.
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break up the mob. It is further shown by failure in most
cases to make any real effort to apprehend or try those guilty.
If the federal government enters a case, local officials
sometimes actively resist the federal investigation.82
Still, the report acknowledged that the Federal Government had
important work left to do.83 It was explicitly critical of the Justice
Department’s civil rights Section, Criminal Division.84 Without intending
it, the Report “furnished evidence about the federal government’s
complicity in subjecting [B]lacks to the continued threat of lynching,
police brutality, and other forms of violence.”85 Later assessments of the
FBI would underscore this point.86
A multifaceted story of state malevolence unfolded in 1946
surrounding an altercation in the Black community of “Mink Slide” in
Columbia, Tennessee. The initial conflict was between a white radio
repairman, William Fleming, a Black woman customer, Gladys
Stephenson and her son.87 For reasons that are disputed, Fleming kicked
and slapped Stephenson.88 Her son came to her aid.89 Police arrived and
arrested Stephenson and her son.90 A lynch mob formed at the courthouse
but was thwarted when Stephenson and her son were secreted away.91
Fearing the boil-over, the local Black community took up arms and
prepared for an attack.92 The National Guard was called in.93 The Guard
arrested over one-hundred Blacks, two of whom died while in custody.94
Among the protests was the NAACP’s denunciation of the episode in The
Crisis magazine.95 The conflict was evidence “that Negroes, even in small
communities like Columbia where they were outnumbered almost three to
82
TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS
20–23 (Charles Erwin Wilson, ed., 1947).
83
See id. at 125–33 (explaining that the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice is “less
effective and less self-assured” than it needs to be to sufficiently fulfill its purpose); see also infra notes
84–87 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights
Section in failing to protect Blacks from continued violence).
84
See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 370–71 (describing the report’s assessment of the Justice
Department).
85
Id. at 371.
86
See, e.g., CHARLES EVERS & ANDREW SZANTON, HAVE NO FEAR: THE CHARLES EVERS STORY
113–14, 130, 137 (1997).
87
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 362.
88
See id. (stating that Fleming kicked and slapped Stephensen during a dispute without explaining
the cause of the dispute).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See id. (“Fearing attack, members of the black community prepared to defend themselves.”).
93
See id. (describing the conduct of the police and guardsmen).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 363

1510

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1491

one, do not intend to sit quietly and let a mob form, threaten, and raid their
neighborhood.”96
Thurgood Marshall, then an NAACP attorney, was assigned to
represent those arrested by the National Guard.97 By some accounts,
Marshall himself escaped lynching only because the Black community was
already mobilized against mob violence.98 Marshall was arrested “on
trumped-up charges of drunk driving.”99 Fearing for his life, fellow
NAACP lawyers followed the arrest vehicle and alerted the community to
the danger.100 Harry Raymond reported, “Thurgood Marshall was the
intended victim . . . the lynchers failed to carry out their plan because they
are [sic] cowardly men and they knew we had the entire Columbia Negro
community mobilized behind us.”101
Mississippi delta activist Reverend George Lee was less fortunate. In
1955, Lee was killed by a shotgun blast through his car window after
receiving a written death threat to drop his name from the voting roll. The
sheriff dismissed the death as a traffic accident.102 Two Black doctors
performed an autopsy and extracted lead buckshot from Lee’s face. The
sheriff insisted the lead was dental fillings torn loose by the crash.103 The
NAACP appealed to Governor White to launch an investigation. White
responded that he did not answer letters from the NAACP.104
Even after the Supreme Court declared “separate but equal”
unconstitutional,105 federal enforcement of that proposition against violent
opposition shows that Blacks were properly suspicious of the ability or
willingness of the federal government to protect or serve them. President
Eisenhower’s ambivalent reaction to Brown v. Board of Education,106 the
96

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 363–64 (explaining Marshall’s involvement in the case).
98
Id. at 364.
99
Id. The episode also fostered alliances with progressives; it prompted the formation of a
National Committee for Justice in Columbia, Tennessee, organized by Eleanor Roosevelt and a variety
of notable supporters. Id.; see also ROY WILKINS & TOM MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS 188–89 (1982).
100
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 364.
101
Id.
102
JACK MENDELSOHN, THE MARTYRS: SIXTEEN WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
3–6 (1966).
103
Id. at 6.
104
BEITO & BEITO, supra note 25, at 108.
105
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
106
Two years after Brown, Eisenhower said, “I think it makes no difference whether or not I
endorse [Brown].” RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 753 (1975). He did not, however,
explicitly oppose it, commenting that the important thing was to “help to bring about a change in spirit
so that extremists on both sides do not defeat what we know is a reasonable, logical conclusion to this
whole affair, which is recognition of equality of men.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939–1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS 120 (1980) (“Ike’s ominous silence on our 1954 decision gave courage to the racists who
97
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threat of violent resistance to integration by Arkansas Governor, Orval
Faubus,107 and Eisenhower’s initially tepid response to Faubus, left Roy
Wilkins to complain in a letter to Adam Clayton Powell,
I have great difficulty speaking calmly about the role of
President Eisenhower in this whole mess. He has been
absolutely and thoroughly disappointing and disillusioning
from beginning to end. . . . [T]he White House has
abandoned its own Supreme Court and has abdicated
leadership in a great moral crisis.108
America’s goodwill ambassador, Louis Armstrong made his views on
the matter public, calling Eisenhower gutless and informing a reporter that
“he had no intention of touring the Soviet Union for the State
Department.”109 “The way they are treating my people in the South, the
government can go to hell. . . . The people over there [would] ask me
what’s wrong with my country. What am I supposed to say?”110
Daisy Bates reports one common man’s rougher assessment of
Eisenhower’s belated proclamation authorizing the use of federal force to
restrain Faubus.
Proclamation be damned! We’ve had the Constitution since
1789 and I doubt whether those goons who took over our
town yesterday can read. Last night they came into our
neighborhood and rocked our houses, breaking windows, and
all that. We’ve taken a lot because we didn’t want to hurt the
chances of Negro kids, but I doubt whether the Negroes are
going to take much more without fighting back. I think I’ll
take the rest of the day off and check my shotgun and make
sure it’s in working condition.111
Later, Daisy Bates’ personal pleas for federal protection from
firebombing and cross burning at her home fell on deaf ears. Federal
decided to resist the decision ward by ward, precinct by precinct, town by town, and county by
county.”).
107
TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 103 (1984).
108
WILKINS & MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS, supra note
99, at 251. For a more extensive critique of presidential ambivalence, see EARL OFARI HUTCHINSON,
BETRAYED: A HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL FAILURE TO PROTECT BLACK LIVES 3–4 (1996) (“Some
presidents rationalized their hands-off policy by narrowly interpreting the federalist doctrine of state
and national power. Some blamed their inaction on a Congress dominated by southern Democrats and
northern Republican conservatives. . . . Some presidents merely said the statutes were too weak and
vague to permit sustained and successful prosecutions of racial terrorism.”).
109
TERRY TEACHOUT, POPS: A LIFE OF LOUIS ARMSTRONG 331 (2009).
110
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
111
DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK: A MEMOIR 99 (1962) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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officials declined to intervene on the argument that they had no
jurisdiction.112 Local law enforcement was hostile, and harassed the armed
men of the community who had gathered to guard the Bates home.113
Mississippi activist, Doctor T.R.M. Howard, received a similar
response after requesting protection from the FBI. The neglect here is
more galling because one of the threats to his life came while federal
agents were sitting in his office. The agents were investigating whether
Howard had been the target of extortion.114 The interview was interrupted
by a caller who threatened to kill him if he continued to press for
integration.115 The FBI rebuffed Howard’s request for protection,
suggesting that he contact local authorities.116
The Governor of
Mississippi already had refused the NAACP’s plea to investigate a
shooting (ignored by the sheriff) with the retort that he did not answer
letters from the NAACP.117 Not surprisingly, Howard kept “a small
arsenal” in his home.118
The reaction of the Eisenhower Administration to the daylight murder
of Lamar Smith on the courthouse lawn in Brookhaven, Mississippi
illustrates more of the same. Smith had been active in helping Black voters
complete absentee ballots. There were many witnesses to the murder, but
no one would testify. “The Eisenhower Administration showed little
interest. Arthur Caldwell, the chief of the Civil Rights Division, refused to
take jurisdiction because the killing involved a state and not a federal
election.”119
The voter registration efforts of the Congress of Racial Equality
(“CORE”) in the south were met hostility not just from the Klan but also
directly from local officials. When local police threatened to lynch
CORE’s National Director, James Farmer, local African Americans
smuggled Farmer out of town in a hearse.120 The failure by local
authorities in Jonesboro, Louisiana to protect CORE workers was one
impetus for formation of the Black self-defense group, the Deacons for
112

Id. at 162–63 (demonstrating the lack of response and action from federal officials).
Id. at 169.
114
BEITO & BEITO, supra note 25, at 109.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 108.
118
Id. at xiii.
119
Id. at 113.
120
JAMES FARMER, LAY BARE THE HEART: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 249–52 (1985); see also James J. Farmer, A Night of Terror in Plaquemine, Louisiana,
1963, in THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 134, 141–43 (Henry
Steele Commager ed., 1972) (providing James Farmer’s firsthand account of the plan to smuggle him
out of Plaquemine, Louisiana after he received threats from local police); Horse Troopers Scatter
Negroes: Charge into Throng of 150 Marching at Plaquemine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1963, at 41
(describing a police attack on a group of black marchers in Plaquemine, Louisiana).
113
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Defense.
In 1962, terrorists shot up the home of Ruleville, Mississippi voter and
registration activist, Hattie Sisson.122 Her granddaughter and a friend were
injured. At the hospital, the mayor laid the blame on Sisson. “You done
that yourself, trying to lay it on somebody else. You done that yourself,
get out of here, go on out of here.”123
When, in 1963, a bomb was tossed into a house down the street from
the childhood home of Condoleezza Rice, her father gathered the family
with the intent of heading to the police station, but was reminded by his
wife exactly who and where he was. “‘Are you crazy,’ she asked. ‘They
[the police,] probably set off the thing in the first place.’”124
In 1964, activists in Halifax County North Carolina expected little
assistance from the authorities after voter registration efforts prompted a
wave of cross burnings and arson.125 Bulletin boards at the county police
station regularly posted advertisements for local Klan rallies.126 John
Salter, a Native American activist working for the Southern Conference
Educational Fund, writes, “Fortunately we lived in the middle of a heavily
armed Black community, with neighbors . . . who were protective.”127
While the glib collective memory of the Civil Rights era may be one of
federal saviors and state and local villains, Simon Wendt reminds us,
Despite the disappearance of the three civil rights
workers . . . and the violent attacks on black homes and
churches, the federal government continued to claim that it
could provide no protection. While Attorney General Robert
Kennedy was deeply disturbed by the lawlessness in the
state, he publicly stated that [these situations were] a “local
matter for local law enforcement.” Since federal authority in
the state was “very, very limited,” the administration could
121
The Deacons originated in Jonesboro Louisiana during the turmoil of the Civil Rights
movement. LANCE HILL, THE DEACONS FOR DEFENSE: ARMED RESISTANCE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 10–11 (2004). They were a working class armed self-defense movement that protected
civil rights workers from Klan and police violence. SIMON WENDT, THE SPIRIT AND THE SHOTGUN:
ARMED RESISTANCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 67–68, 76 (2007) [hereinafter WENDT,
SELF-DEFENSE]. They established “twenty-one communities, seventeen in the South and four in the
North.” HILL, supra, at 167.
122
KAY MILLS, THIS LITTLE LIGHT OF MINE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE LOU HAMER 46–47 (1993).
123
Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
CONDOLEEZZA RICE, EXTRAORDINARY, ORDINARY PEOPLE: A MEMOIR OF FAMILY 92 (2010).
125
WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 190; see also JOHN R. SALTER, JACKSON,
MISSISSIPPI: AN AMERICAN CHRONICLE OF STRUGGLE AND SCHISM 240 (1979) (explaining that in
response to so many of the threats regarding election work carrying a revolver was necessary).
126
WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 190.
127
Hunter Gray, Material and Libertarian Well-Being—and Firearms, DEVELOPING ISSUES AND
CONTEMPORARY COMMENT (citing John R. Salter, Civil Rights and Self Defense, AGAINST THE
CURRENT, July–Aug. 1988, at 24).
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take no preventative police action against white terror.
Neither the repeated calls for federal intervention by civil
rights activists nor the official statement by a group of wellknown law professors that existing law actually gave the
administration the power to dispatch troops to Mississippi
could jolt President Lyndon B. Johnson into action.128
These and other episodes show that trusting the state has been an
absurd proposition during most of the Black experience in America.129
Governments at all levels have been equal malefactors. In fits and starts,
federal authority was extended to protect Blacks from abuse by state and
local governments. Reconstruction efforts were short lived and it took
another century before federal power was seriously redeployed to protect
Blacks. That alone might be enough to argue that Blacks still should
approach the recommendation to trust the state, with heavy skepticism.
It is plausible to argue that the radically transformative civil rights
legislation of the 1960’s signaled a change that justifies black reliance on
the Federal Government for a variety of needs including basic personal
security. But the glaring weakness of that view is that every day policing
is still firmly in the hands of state and local governments130 whose record
of delivery of services, and security comes up far shorter and is even more
deserving of black distrust.131
It is a peculiar irony that the modern orthodoxy urges Blacks to trust

128

WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 116–17 (footnotes omitted).
While I have focused here on direct physical threats, the state also menaced Blacks more
subtly as a propagandist of Black inferiority. An early example is the Post-Civil War work of the
Provost Marshal General’s Office. See JOSEPH T. GLATTHAAR, FORGED IN BATTLE: THE CIVIL WAR
ALLIANCE OF BLACK SOLDIERS AND WHITE OFFICERS 254 (1990) (discussing the Provost Marshal
General’s Office’s compilations that concluded that “interracial breeding resulted in an inferior being”).
Here, state agents purported to offer “scientific” corroboration for the full range of racist stereotypes
including that “[f]ull blacks had elongated heels . . . resembling those of apes” and that interbred
mulattoes were inferior beings less suited to the hardships of military service than full-blooded blacks.
Id.; see also JOHN S. HALLER, JR., OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL
INFERIORITY, 1859–1900, at 19–20, 34 (1971) (providing evidence that “scientific” studies the
government initiated during the Civil War worked toward institutionalizing racism against blacks and
thus creating a deeper divide with the government).
130
Charles Lane’s treatment of the story leading to United States v. Cruickshank illustrates the
point in vivid and gruesome detail. CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX
MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 20–22 (2008).
131
See EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 4 (“You knew you were a nigger the first time you
went driving with older Negros and they warned you to avoid the highway patrol.”); see also Nat’l
Advisory Comm’n on Civil Disorders, Detroit, in RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 205, 222
(Allen D. Grimshaw ed., 1969) (discussing how “alley courts,” was “police slang for an unlawful
attempt to make prisoners confess”); RODNEY STARK, POLICE RIOTS, COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT 98 (1972) (providing a description of police “fear [of] black people” and the fact
that some “openly express violent hostility and prejudice toward them”).
129
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government for one of their most fundamental needs.
This is especially
so considering the various recent episodes in which the state or its agents
have earned the continuing distrust of Black people.133
132
This is not to deny that the choices posed during some of the darkest days of the freedom
struggle provoked a similar irony. This is evident in Herbert Shapiro’s characterization of Walter
White’s 1929 lynching study as “[r]eflecting a sense of urgency coupled with confidence in white
liberalism.” SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 197. White decried the horror of the lynch mob but considered
the incremental changes in public opinion and development of a stronger liberal coalition against
lynching to be of immense importance. Id. at 197–98. White credited a variety of such organizations
with contributing to the anti-lynching effort including the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (an
island of southern liberalism headquarter in Atlanta), the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, and
the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Id. at 198.
133
See, e.g., William J. Barber, II et al., NAACP OF N.C., Stop the Epidemic of Police Shootings
of African Americans! Joint Statement on Charlotte Police Shootings (June 2008), http://
http://carolinajustice.typepad.com/ncnaacp/2008/06/stop-the-epidem.html#more (describing a revision
of a set of recommendations to address the issue of police-minority citizen contacts in light of the death
of a twenty-one year old African American by a Charlotte police officer); Victoria Cherrie, NAACP
Wants SBI to Look at Shootings, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 13, 2008),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2008/06/13/45145/naacp-wants-sbi-to-look-at-shootings.html
(explaining how NAACP leaders are pushing for legislation that would require the SBI to investigate
all shootings that involve a police officer instead of having victims’ families request the external
investigation); Charles Ellison, Tensions Persist in Portland Since Fatal Police Shooting of Unarmed
Man, POLITIC365 (Sept. 6, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://politic365.com/2010/09/06/tensions-persist-inportland-since-fatal-police-shooting-of-unarmed-black-man/ (providing an overview of the actions
considered against a Portland, Oregon police officer who shot and killed an unarmed black man);
Nikole Hannah-Jones, Black Experience Propels Anger in Police Shooting of Aaron Campbell,
OREGONIAN (Feb. 19, 2010, 8:26 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2010/02/Black_
experience_propels_anger.html (“[M]any people in Portland are perplexed that large segments of
Portland’s African American community see the shooting death of Aaron Campbell through a racial
lens. A white Portland police officer shot Campbell, an unarmed Black man, in the back during a
confrontation at an apartment building. Police and city leaders have come under intense criticism for
confusion at the scene. But Ingram and other African Americans who live here say the Campbell
shooting cannot be seen as a singular incident: It confirms a deep-seated distrust of police and a fear
that interaction with them has the potential to turn violent.”); Howard Witt, Race May Be Factor in
Police Shooting of Unarmed Elderly Man, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 13, 2009),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-race-shootings-webmar13,0,7686526.story
(“Throat cancer had robbed the 73-year-old retired electric utility worker of his voice years ago, but
family members said Monroe was clearly enjoying the commotion of a dozen of his grandchildren and
great-grandchildren cavorting around him in the dusty, grassless yard. Then the Homer police showed
up, two white officers whose arrival caused the participants at the black family gathering to quickly fall
silent. Within moments, Monroe lay dead, shot by one of the officers as his family looked on. Now
the Louisiana State Police, the FBI and the U.S. Justice Department are swarming over this
impoverished lumber town of 3,800, drawn by the allegations of numerous witnesses that police killed
an unarmed, elderly Black man without justification—and then moved a gun to make it look like the
man had been holding it. ‘We are closely monitoring the events in Homer,’ said Donald Washington,
the U.S. attorney for the Western District of Louisiana. ‘I understand that a number of allegations are
being made that, if true, would be serious enough for us to follow up on very quickly.’ Yet the Feb. 20
Homer incident was not an isolated case. Across the nation, in four cases in recent months, white
police officers have been accused of unprovoked shootings of African Americans in what civil rights
leaders say are illustrations of the potentially deadly consequences of racial profiling by police. In the
mostly white Houston suburb of Bellaire, a 23-year-old Black man sitting in his own SUV in the
driveway of his parents’ home was shot and wounded on New Year’s Eve by police who mistakenly
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The next section shows that this contradiction is not just an abstraction.
Long experience with state failure has produced very explicit and direct
Black support for armed self-defense in both practice and policy.
III. TRADITIONAL PRACTICE AND POLICY
This Part examines the Black community’s traditional approach to gun
ownership and armed self-defense and shows that the modern orthodoxy
contradicts traditional practice and policy. Section A details the tradition
of Black ownership and deployment of arms for legitimate self-defense.
Section B shows how that tradition translated into policy through the
development and maintenance of a strategic dichotomy that insisted on the
legitimacy of private self-defense while condemning political violence.
A. The Traditional Practice and Advocacy of Firearms Ownership and
Armed Self-Defense
Previous scholarship has argued that the “racist roots” of many gun
control laws are cause for apprehension about gun control in the modern
era.134 The modern orthodoxy responds that things have changed and in
many ways that is uncontestable. But there is a separate component to this
story that increases the burden on the modern orthodoxy. There is a robust
tradition of direct support for firearms ownership and armed self-defense in
the Black Community. That tradition poses a separate burden of
explanation and reconciliation on the modern orthodoxy.
On the heels of the Civil War the nascent Black establishment pressed
hard for the freedmens’ civil right to keep and bear arms. In stark contrast
to the modern era, they were joined by white progressives who saw the
denial of Blacks’ right to keep and bear arms for self-defense as continuing

believed he had stolen the vehicle. The case is under investigation. In Oakland, a transit police officer
has been charged with murder for allegedly shooting an unarmed black man in the back while he was
restrained and lying face down on a train platform on New Year’s Day. . . .The evidence is not merely
anecdotal. The most recent national analysis from the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics
shows that blacks and Hispanics were nearly three times as likely as whites to be searched by police—
and blacks were almost four times as likely as whites to be subjected to the use of force.”).
134
See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an AfroAmericanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 318–19 (1991) (providing an examination of how
Second Amendment rights have been shaped within “subcultures in American society who have been
less able to rely on state protection”); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to
Be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed
South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1309 (1995) (exploring the
extent to which white Southerners tried to restrict Blacks’ access to guns, even after the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 17, 17 (1995) (arguing that the historical record reveals a long line of racism underlying gun
control laws as “useful for keeping blacks and Hispanics ‘in their place’ and for quieting the racial fears
of whites”).
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infringement of the basic rights of citizenship. The Black press reflected
the sentiments of the community. The African Methodist Episcopal
Church editorialized in the Christian Recorder:
The Charleston (S.C.) Leader says: We have several times
alluded to the fact that the Constitution of the United States,
guaranties to every citizen the right to keep and bear arms.
Gen. Tilson, Assistant Commissioner, for Georgia has issued
a circular in which he clearly defines the right. . . . “Any
person, white or black, may be disarmed, if convicted of
making an improper and dangerous use of weapons; but no
military or civil officer has the right or authority to disarm
any class of people, thereby placing them at the mercy of
others. All men, without the distinction of color, have the
right to keep arms to defend their homes, families or
themselves.”
We are glad to learn that Gen. Scott, Commissioner for this
State, has given freedmen to understand that they have as
good a right to keep firearms as other citizens.136
A Black state convention petition to Congress strikes a similar cord.
We ask that, inasmuch as the Constitution of the United
States explicitly declares that the right to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed . . . that the late efforts of the
Legislature of this State to pass and act to deprive us or [sic]
arms be forbidden, as a plain violation of the Constitution.137
Practice among the budding black intellectual class suggests that
interest in the right to keep and bear firearms was more than philosophical.
By the mid-1880’s, with lynchings on the rise and even incidental
interracial encounters potentially hazardous, “[m]any [Fisk] students went
about armed when they left campus to go into [Nashville].138 Coming of
age a generation later, storied black writer Zora Neal Hurston, in a similar
assessment of her environment, “packed a chrome plated pistol” as she
traveled throughout the south collecting Negro folktales.139
Racist terrorism that wrested political power from North Carolina
blacks in the 1898 election raised the public call for black self-defense. At
a protest rally at the Fifth Avenue Baptist Church in Washington, D.C.,
135
See, e.g., Cramer, Johnson & Mocsary, supra note 23, at 831 (describing the concerns about
disarmament of freedmen animating reconstruction era legislation and the Fourteenth Amendment).
136
Editorial, Right to Bear Arms, CHRISTIAN RECORDER, Feb. 24, 1866, at 29–30.
137
2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840–1865, at 302 (Philip S. Foner &
George E. Walker eds., 1980).
138
LEWIS, supra note 31, at 67.
139
VALERIE BOYD, WRAPPED IN RAINBOWS: THE LIFE OF ZORA NEALE HURSTON 144–45 (2003).
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Colonel Perry Carson urged blacks to “[p]repare to protect yourselves; the
virtues of your women and your property. Get your powder and your shot
and your pistol.”140 The Washington Post expressed alarm that so sensible
a man as Carson had voiced such sentiments.141
Public statements by Black clergy and newsmen reflected the power of
the self-defense impulse, even where there was little hope of prevailing. In
the Cleveland Gazette, Reverend C. O. Benjamin celebrated the heroism of
a Black man in Mississippi who resisted his white assailants. “The Negros
should stand like men . . . if the White man uses the torch and the
assassin’s knife let the Negro do the same.”142 Speaking before the AfroAmerican Press Association in 1901, W.A. Pledger of the Atlanta Age
advised that whites “are afraid to lynch us where they know the black man
is standing behind the door with a Winchester.”143
The importance of armed self-defense was not lost on young Walter
White, later the famous spokesman for the NAACP. During the Atlanta
riots, with a mob encroaching, thirteen-year-old Walter waited with his
father, gun in hand, at the front windows of their home on Huston Street.144
Someone in the crowd shouted, “That’s where that nigger mail carrier
lives. Let’s burn it down! It’s too nice for a nigger to live in.”145 White’s
father calmed him, “Son, don’t shoot until the first man puts his foot on the
lawn and then—don’t you miss!”146 Shots from a nearby building
dispersed the crowd before White had to fire, but the episode was seared in
his memory and cemented his Negro identity.147
During the bleak days of the lynch era, “[p]ractically all outspoken
Afro-American leaders . . . advocated self-defense on some level.”148
Prominent Black editor Thomas Fortune explained, “‘We do not counsel a
breach of the law, but in the absence of law . . . we maintain that the
individual has every right . . . to protect himself. . . . We do not counsel
violence, . . . we counsel manly retaliation.’”149
140

SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 77.
See id. (stating that Carson’s remarks were clearly not “taken lightly” since the Washington
Post expressed its “alarm and surprise” in an editorial).
142
Id. at 78.
143
TIMOTHY B. TYSON, RADIO FREE DIXIE: ROBERT F. WILLIAMS AND THE ROOTS OF BLACK
POWER 211 (1999) (quoting “Bad Nigger with a Winchester”: Colored Editors Declare for Armed
Resistance to Lynch Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1901, at 4).
144
See WALTER WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHITE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WALTER WHITE 10–
12 (1948) (describing White’s childhood experience with a mob that was threatening the family home).
145
Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
146
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
147
Id. at 12.
148
CHRISTOPHER B. STRAIN, PURE FIRE: SELF-DEFENSE AS ACTIVISM IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA
20 (2005).
149
Emma Lou Thornbrough, T. Thomas Fortune: Militant Editor in the Age of Accommodation,
in BLACK LEADERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19, 22–23 (John Hope Franklin & August Meier
eds., 1982).
141
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Observing that “lynchings had been prevented by armed self-defense
in Jacksonville, Florida and Paducah, Kentucky,”150 Ida B. Wells Barnett
famously advised, “The lesson this teaches and which every AfroAmerican should ponder well, is that a Winchester rifle should have a
place of honor in every Black home.”151 Wells said, “[I]t should be used
for that protection which the law refuses to give.”152 This was no mere
flash of rhetoric. Wells was personally armed at least as early as 1892
when she “bought a pistol the first thing after Tom Moss was lynched.”153
W.E.B. Du Bois’s views can be discerned from his work as editor of
the Crisis.154 But his actions in response to the 1906 Atlanta riot are also
telling. The riot occurred while Du Bois was away in Alabama.155
Although Du Bois knew that many people owned and carried pistols, he
had never purchased or carried one.156 After the riot, Du Bois revealed, “‘I
bought a Winchester double-barreled shotgun and two dozen rounds of
shells filled with buckshot. If a white mob had stepped on the campus
where I lived I would without hesitation have sprayed their guts over the
grass.’”157
There were no illusions that armed self-defense offered any sort of
guarantee. This is evident in Tuskegee Institute President Robert Moton’s
1919 letter to President Woodrow Wilson lamenting the “‘account of the
lynching in Georgia, of an old coloured man seventy years of age who shot
one of two intoxicated white men in his attempt to protect two coloured
girls, who had been commanded to come out of their home in the night by
these two men.’”158
150

LINDA O. MCMURRY, TO KEEP THE WATERS TROUBLED: THE LIFE OF IDA B. WELLS 164

(1998).
151

Id.
IDA B. WELLS, SOUTHERN HORRORS AND OTHER WRITINGS: THE ANTI-LYNCHING CAMPAIGN
OF IDA B. WELLS, 1892–1900, at 70 (Jacqueline Jones Royster ed., 1997).
153
IDA B. WELLS, CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF IDA B. WELLS 62 (Alfreda
M. Duster ed., 1970); see also id. at 63 (indicating that Wells purchased a weapon after her friends
were lynched in March of 1892).
154
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 288–91 (discussing Du Bois’s writings on selfdefense).
155
Du Bois was in rural Alabama conducting a study of Lowndes County sharecropping when the
Atlanta riot broke out. LEWIS, supra note 31, at 354.
156
W.E.B. DU BOIS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 19 (Gerald Horne & Mary Young eds., 2001).
157
LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 317
(1998); see STRAIN, supra note 148, at 24 (“DuBois rushed home to guard his house and protect his
family: he did so by keeping watch on the porch with a rifle across his lap.”). This episode is recounted
slightly differently in three different sources. Strain gives the impression that Du Bois was defending
his home while the riot was in session. But other sources show that Dubois acquired the gun and
ammunition on his return, after the riots. See LEWIS, supra note 31, at 354 (stating that Du Bois was in
Alabama at the time of the Atlanta riot).
158
STEPHEN GRAHAM, CHILDREN OF THE SLAVES 263–64 (1920) (quoting Letter from Robert
Morton to Woodrow Wilson (Aug. 1919)); About Us, TUSKEGEE UNIV., http://www.tuskegee.edu/abou
t_us/legacy_of_leadership/robert_r_moton.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).
152
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Some of the earliest efforts of the NAACP were in support of
individuals prosecuted for acts of armed self-defense.
The NAACP undertook its first major legal case in 1910 by
defending Pink Franklin, a Black South Carolina
sharecropper accused of murder. When Franklin left his
employer after receiving an advance on his wages, a warrant
was sworn out for his arrest under an invalid state law.
Armed policemen arrived at Franklin’s cabin before dawn to
serve the warrant without stating their purpose and a gun
battle ensued, killing one officer. Franklin was convicted of
the murder and sentenced to death. The NAACP appealed to
South Carolina Governor Martin F. Ansel, and Franklin’s
sentence was commuted to life in prison. Eventually, he was
set free in 1919.159
In 1919, the NAACP defended Sergeant Edgar C. Caldwell, who was
prosecuted for killing a street car conductor in Anniston, Alabama.160
Following a dispute, Caldwell was kicked from the car. As he was getting
up, the conductor and the motorman advanced with weapons in their
hands. Caldwell drew his revolver and killed the conductor and wounded
the motorman. Leaders of the Anniston Branch of the NAACP, supported
by the national office and an array of lawyers, defended Caldwell, but
ultimately to no avail. He was executed on July 30, 1920.161 An editorial
in the Crisis concluded, “No person who is conversant with the facts in his
case feels that [Caldwell] was guilty of a crime when he fought to save his
own life. No red-blooded person would have done otherwise. Caldwell
has been sacrificed on the altar of prejudice.”162
The NAACP’s biggest case in the 1920’s was the defense of Dr.
Ossian Sweet, and several family members.163 They were charged with
murder for killing a member of a mob that attacked their home in a white
suburb of Detroit. Shortly after the Sweets moved in the mob gathered.
159
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, NAACP: A Century in the Fight for Freedom 1909–2009, the Pink
Franklin Case, http://myloc.gov/exhibitions/naacp/earlyyears/exhibitobjects/thepinkfranklincase.aspx
(last visited Mar. 7, 2013). Another example where the NAACP sought to protect individuals
prosecuted when acting in self defense involved the case of Steve Greene, a tenant farmer in Arkansas
who dared to seek out a better arrangement with another landowner. His jilted employer accosted
Greene at his new tenancy and shot him several times. Greene retrieved a gun and killed his attacker
and then fled to Chicago. He fought extradition with the help of Ida Wells-Barnett and later fled to
Canada. GOINGS, supra note 32, at 12.
160
Sergeant Caldwell Executed, CRISIS, Oct. 1920, at 282.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
See WILSON RECORD, RACE AND RADICALISM: THE NAACP AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN
CONFLICT 47 (1964) (identifying the Sweet case as “[p]erhaps the most important case” of NAACP
appellate challenges for gross injustice in the 1920s).
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On two successive nights the mob rocked the house and broke out
windows. On the second night shots were fired.164 The Sweets fired into
the crowd, killing a white man.165 All twelve people in the house were
charged with murder.166 The NAACP raised over seventy thousand dollars
to support the case167 and hired Clarence Darrow and Arthur Garfield Hays
to defend the Sweets.168 The Sweets were tried twice and ultimately found
not guilty.169
The New York Amsterdam News gave “all out support to upholding the
right of self-defense,”170 and called the Sweet case the “most important
court case the Negro has ever figured in in all the history of the United
States.”171 Editorials urged that the willingness of the Sweet family to
defend its home represented the spirit “the Negro must more and more
evidence if he is to survive.”172
Hubert H. Harrison’s public declaration in 1921 is equally explicit.173
“I advise you to be ready to defend yourselves. I notice that the State
Government has removed some of its restrictions upon owing firearms, and
one form of live insurance for your wives and children might be the
possession of some of these handy implements.”174
During the same period, Tuskegee Institute President, Dr. Robert
Moton, successor to the conservative legacy of Booker T. Washington,
took up arms when Tuskegee was menaced by the Klan.175 After the
Federal government decided to build a Negro veterans hospital on land
donated by Tuskegee, local whites and the KKK sought control of the
164
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AGE 307 (2004); see also RECORD, supra note 163, at 45 (claiming the NAACP spent $37,000).
Furthermore, “[t]he mayor and the district attorney’s office blamed the Sweets and their friends for
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enterprise and its jobs. When Blacks objected, the Klan paraded through
Tuskegee and then held a rally on the grounds.177 Walter White’s brother,
George, passing for white, gained access to the event and learned of plans
to kill Moton and torch the campus in order to force surrender of control
over the hospital.178 As the conflict boiled, Walter White traveled to
Tuskegee and found an extraordinary change in Dr. Moton.179
He was gentle man who hated conflict and violence.
Although he had incurred sharp criticism and even bitter
resentment for doing so, he had urged upon Negro soldiers in
France that they win the war first and then rely on gratitude
from their government for the abolition of injustices and
indignities. But the brazen attitude of the Ku Klux Klan and
the . . . threats to destroy Tuskegee Institute marked a turning
point in Dr. Moton’s philosophy. I sat with him in his home
at Tuskegee during the height of the trouble. He pointed to a
rifle and a shotgun, well oiled and grimly businesslike, that
stood in the corner of the room. Although his words in cold
print may sound overheroic, they did not sound so to me as
he said quietly, “I’ve got only one time to die. If I must die
now to save Tuskegee Institute, I’m ready. I’ve been running
long enough.”180
In the 1930s, Northern organizers supporting the Sharecropper’s Union
in Alabama181 found that the armed sharecropper was the norm. At a
meeting in Dadeville, Alabama, organizer Harry Haywood witnessed “a
small arsenal. . . . There were guns . . . of all kinds—shotguns, rifles and
pistols.”182
In 1939, John Lovell, Jr., Secretary of the Washington D.C. branch of
the NAACP commented on the efforts of a “militant Howard Professor”
who had moved into a restricted Washington D.C. neighborhood.
He was told to get out and get out fast. When he failed to
comprehend the warning, his new home was given a
battering. Others reported the matter to the police; the
professor merely took the pains to build a barricado that even
the Japanese would respect. . . . One [of his friends] got his
guns together and installed himself in the barricado. The
176
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two, fortified further by sandwiches and milk, quietly sat,
watched and waited. [Others] sent word . . . that when help
was needed, help would come. Evidently they got [the
message] over to the enemy, for absolutely nothing happened
after that.183
Later in the struggle, Dr. T.R.M. Howard emerged as an unapologetic
advocate of armed self-defense. His education paid for by a white sponsor,
Howard returned to the South in the early 1940s. “From the beginning,
armed self-defense was an important component of Howard’s civil rights
strategy. In this respect, he followed in a long tradition that later found
expression under the leadership of Robert Williams . . . and various civil
rights activists in the Deep South.”184 When Howard was denied a permit
to carry a concealed weapon under the racist administration of
Mississippi’s discretionary permit system, he exploited the allowance for
unconcealed weapons and kept a long gun in a rack in his car.185 also
claimed to have a secret compartment built into his car to hide his
handgun.186
In a long career of activism, Howard is most noted for his efforts
surrounding the investigation of the Emmett Till murder. Howard helped
search for witnesses, develop evidence and opened his home as a safe
haven for journalists, witnesses and visitors during the trial.187
Firearms were ubiquitous, including a pistol strapped to
Howard’s waist. When Cloyte Murdock of Ebony had
difficulty getting her luggage through the front door, she
looked around the corner and saw a cache of weapons on the
other side. Another visitor spied a magnum pistol and .45 at
the head of Howard’s bed, a Thompson submachine gun at
the foot and “a long gun, a shotgun or rifle, in every corner of
every room.” Each day, Howard escorted [Maime] Bradley
[Till’s mother] and [Representative Charles] Diggs [of
Michigan] . . . to . . . the trial . . . in an armed car caravan.188
Some contend that the acquittal of the men charged with Till’s murder
marked “the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement in Mississippi.”189
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Howard was propelled onto the national stage.
In speeches and
commentary, Howard presented armed self-defense as an essential private
resource. On several public occasions Howard recounted the story of his
friend George L. Jefferson, head of the Vicksburg NAACP. The Klan had
burned a cross in front of Jefferson’s funeral home. According to Howard,
Jefferson called to alert the Sheriff that some of the logistics of Jim Crow
required tending:
[T]hey have burned a cross in front of my funeral home. I’m
sure that you and everybody in Vicksburg knows where my
wife and my family lives. I understand that they are going
out there to burn a cross. And, Mr. Sheriff, I just want to tell
you that Mississippi laws requires [sic] separate ambulances
for transportation of colored and white persons and inasmuch
as the white hearse can’t carry a colored man or a colored
hearse can’t carry a white man, I’m telling you that when that
group comes out my home to burn a cross, I have already got
my colored ambulance standing by. I want you to send a
white hearse along because somebody’s going to be hauled
away.191
The punch line, rendered “[t]o loud applause” by Black audiences, was
that no cross was burned at Jefferson’s home.192 The white establishment
was less enthused. The Jackson Daily News reprinted the full text of
Howard’s speech, and in three separate editorials condemned his
“incendiary” language and his “[p]oison [t]ongue.”193
In other contexts, members of the leadership benefitted from the selfdefense preparations of the rank and file who had organized to protect their
communities. Describing her work with Thurgood Marshall to integrate
the University of Alabama, Judge Constance Baker Motley recalls:
When Autherine Lucy registered in February 1956 and was
finally on campus, a riot broke out . . . . We then went to
court with a motion to hold the dean of admissions and
members of the board of trustees in contempt for failing to
secure Miss Lucy’s peaceful attendance. . . . While in
Birmingham for this hearing, we stayed in Arthur Shores’s
spacious new home on the city’s outskirts. This house had
been bombed on several occasions, but because we could not
stay in a hotel or motel in Birmingham, we had to take up
190
Id. at 129 (“The Till case propelled Howard into the national black media and civil-rights
spotlight as never before.”).
191
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192
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193
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Shores’s offer of his bomb-prone abode . . . .
When Thurgood and I arrived, the garage door was wide
open. Inside were six or eight Black men with shotguns and
machine guns who had been guarding the house since the last
bombing. . . . When we went to court the next day, the driver
of our car and one other man in the front passenger seat
carried guns in their pockets.194
Judge Motley’s experience was no aberration. After Autherine Lucy
was pelted with eggs and gravel as she walked the gauntlet trying to attend
her first class, she retreated to a salon in the Black part of town where
beauticians washed her hair and cleaned her clothes.195 As a white mob
gathered outside, the owner of the shop, Nathaniel Howard, Sr., called for
help and a group of Black men armed with rifles and shotguns quickly
arrived.196 This show of force dispersed the crowd. The Black men then
gave Lucy an armed escort to Birmingham.197
In Birmingham, Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, a leader of the freedom
movement there, enjoyed armed protection of the “Civil Rights Guards”
after being threatened and attacked by white racists.198 After the 1963
bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham killed four
little girls, residents of the community of black strivers known as
“Dynamite Hill” set up a community guard system where “[a]rmed blacks
regularly patrolled their neighborhood.”199 Birmingham native, former
Secretary of State, and Second Amendment absolutist Condoleezza Rice
recalls the night in 1963 when a bomb was hurled through the window of a
house down the block from her home. Her family fled temporarily to the
home of friends in a neighboring town.200 When they returned home late
that night,
Daddy [Reverend Rice] didn’t say anything more about the
194
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bomb. He just went outside and sat on the porch in the
springtime heat with his gun on his lap. He sat there all night
looking for white night riders. Eventually daddy and the men
of the neighborhood formed a watch. They would take shifts
at the head of the two entrances to our streets. There was a
formal schedule, and Daddy would move among them to
pray with them and keep their spirits up. Occasionally they
would fire a gun into the air to scare off intruders, but they
never actually shot anyone.201
A similar defense squad was formed by war veterans in Tuscaloosa,
Alabama. The Tuscaloosa defense squad protected the homes of
movement activists, rescued teenage demonstrators from a mob, and
repelled a Klan attack.202
While the Deacons for Defense and Justice203 are the most widely
known, movement leaders in a variety of other places benefitted from the
organization and activities of armed defense groups. In Natchez,
Mississippi, armed men of the community guarded local NAACP leader
George Metcalf.204 In Meridian, Mississippi, a defense group guarded the
home of NAACP leader Claude Bryant.205 In Hattiesburg, Mississippi,
armed community men led by army veteran James Nix guarded the homes
of local black leaders Dr. C. E. Smith and J. C. Fairly.206 In Cambridge,
Maryland, several seasons of black protest fueled a backlash in 1963 when
white mobs roved through the city’s black neighborhoods. Black residents
responded with gunfire and a defense guard formed to protect the home of
local leader Gloria Richardson.207 Also in 1963, Korean War Veteran and
NAACP activist Robert Hayling organized a defense squad in St.
Augustine, Florida. Hayling’s voter registration efforts and protests of
201
Id. at 93. The experience, says Rice, affected her policy perspective to this day. “Because of
this experience, I’m a fierce defender of the Second Amendment and the right to bear arms. Had my
father and his neighbors registered their weapons, Bull Connor surely would have confiscated them or
worse.” Id.; see also Interview by Larry King with Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State, in Washington
D.C. (May 11, 2005), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0505/11/lkl.01.html
(discussing her concern about the abridgement of the Second Amendment because of her personal
experience in Birmingham, Alabama when her father and his friends defended her community with
arms during the Civil Rights movement).
202
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203
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at 357–58.
204
EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 185; Akinyele O. Umoja, “We Will Shoot Back”: The
Natchez Model and Paramilitary Organization in the Mississippi Freedom Movement, 32 J. BLACK
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continuing segregation prompted shotgun attacks on his home. He
responded by buying a cache of rifles and shotguns and organizing a group
to guard his home and the surrounding neighborhood.208 In October 1963
when a carload of Klansmen assaulted local activist Goldie Eubanks, the
defense squad repelled the attack and killed one white man.209
But this is not primarily a story of organized defense groups.
Movement leaders, as well as the rank and file, prepared for the fact that
often they would be solely responsible for their own safety. In South
Carolina, a solitary Reverend J. A. Delaine fired back with effect when
white terrorists shot up his home.210 The home of local activist Amzie
Moore of Cleveland, Mississippi, who mentored younger activists who
would rise to form the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(“SNCC”), was well-stocked with arms and ammunition. Not only was his
home well-fortified, “like most politically active Blacks in the Delta,”
Moore carried a gun when he traveled.211 A young white activist spending
the night at Moore’s home was startled when Moore placed a pistol on the
night table and suggested that he and his friends use it “in case of
emergency.”212
E.W. Steptoe, chairman of the Amite County NAACP “never went out
of the door unarmed”213 recollects one SNCC worker. Another recalled:
“Steptoe was always so wonderfully well armed. . . . It was just marvelous.
. . . You’d go to Steptoe’s and as you went to bed he would open up the
night table [and] there would be a large .45 automatic sitting next to you.
Just guns all over the house, under pillows, under chairs.”214
Rosa Parks verified the tradition of defensive firearms ownership she
first observed as a child:
By the time I was six, I was old enough to realize that we
were not actually free. The Ku Klux Klan was riding
through the Black community, burning churches, beating up
people, killing people. . . . [M]y grandfather kept his gun—a
doubled barreled shotgun—close by at all times. . . . I
208
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remember thinking that whatever happened, I wanted to see
it. I wanted to see him shoot that gun.215
Her adult experience confirms that the tradition remained vibrant. When
Parks and her husband began organizing activist meetings at their home the
participants were unfailingly armed. Parks recalled: “This was the first
time I’d seen so few men with so many guns.”216 After one meeting where
Parks had not thought to offer food, she realized: “[W]ith the table so
covered with guns, I don’t know where I would have put any
refreshments.”217
When the Freedom Summer project brought white volunteers to
Mississippi, “local activists used their guns to defend themselves, their
communities, and the volunteers they housed.”218 In some areas “a
majority of African-Americans . . . protected their property with guns.
Volunteers were required to honk a prearranged signal before approaching
Black farms. If they failed to do so, Black guards were likely to fire at
their car.”219 Consistent with the experience of northern labor organizers
thirty years earlier, SNCC workers in the modern movement found Black
sharecroppers in Alabama to be armed and unapologetic advocates of selfdefense.220
Although some civil rights scholars have characterized the
substantially male character of Black self-defense during the era as a
“gendered symbol of defiance,”221 Black women readily used guns to
defend themselves and others during the freedom struggle. During the
Freedom Summer project, one student volunteer was shocked to find that
her host, “Mrs. Fairly was armed to the teeth”. In a letter home the student
wrote, “I met Mrs. Fairly coming down the hall from the front porch
carrying a rifle in one hand [and] a pistol in the other.”222 In 1965, in
Bogalusa, Louisiana, the wife of local activist Robert Hicks used her pistol

215
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to fend off Klansmen who had followed a CORE worker to her home.223
In nearby Ferriday, another woman “returned fire when a group of
Klansmen shot into her home.”224
When asked how she survived so many years of racist aggression,
movement stalwart Fannie Lou Hamer responded, “I’ll tell you why. I
keep a shotgun in every corner of my bedroom and the first cracker even
look like he wants to throw some dynamite on my porch won’t write his
mama again.”225 In this approach, Hamer followed the example of her
mother, Lou Ella Townsend, who as a field worker at the turn of the
century had been threatened and raped several times.226 Unbowed,
Townsend continued to challenge the culture of racism and carried a pistol
hidden in a bucket while working in the cotton fields.227
In the turmoil of integrating the Little Rock school system, armed
Black men guarded the home of activist Daisy Bates228 and “[o]n one
occasion in 1958, the NAACP leader herself repelled an invader with a
volley of gunshots.”229 Firearms were a familiar tool. “In 1934 Daisy and
L.C. were stopped by the police in Monroe, Louisiana [and] arrested
. . . on a charge of ‘investigation.’ . . . [But police] had nothing more on
[L.C.] than the fact that he was carrying a pistol in his glove
compartment.”230 In this, L.C. Bates’ channeled both community and
family tradition. “At the end of his life [Bates] said his idol had been . . .
his grandfather in Mississippi, who had shot a white man who [assaulted

223
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231

two of his workers].”
Daisy Bates underscores the point in a 1959 letter
to Thurgood Marshall explaining that she and L. C. were under continuing
threat and “keep ‘Old Betsy’ well oiled and the guards are always on the
alert.”232 This would not have surprised Marshall, who found the Bates’
home “an armed camp” when he stayed there in September 1957 while
litigating the Little Rock School Board’s delay of court ordered
integration.233
In the early stages of his activism, Martin Luther King showed a keen
appreciation for the self-defense impulse. On January 30, 1956, about two
months into the Montgomery bus boycott, King’s house was bombed.234
Arriving home to find his wife and daughter unharmed and probably a
hundred angry, armed black men in front of the parsonage, King sent the
men away.235 But the next day he applied for a pistol permit at the sheriff’s
office.236 After his application was rejected and following a bombing of
the home of Montgomery NAACP leader E.D. Nixon, members of King’s
Dexter Avenue Baptist Church resolved to protect him.237 “[They] brought
guns and ammunition to the parsonage . . . and began guarding the house in
shifts.”238
Arriving at King’s home to assist in the local struggle, Bayard Rustin
recalled that the parsonage was “a virtual garrison.”239 When Rustin’s
friend, journalist William Worthy sat down on a pistol lying in a chair,
King assured the men that the weapons were only defensive precautions.240
Reverend Glenn Smiley, of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, visited Dr.
King’s home in 1956 and reported back to his employer:
[King] had Gandhi in mind when this thing started . . . . [He
was] aware of the dangers to him inwardly, wants to do it
right, but is too young and some of his close help is violent.
King accepts, as an example, a body guard, and asked for a
permit for them to carry guns. This was denied by the police,
but nevertheless, the place is an arsenal. King sees the
inconsistency, but not enough. He believes and yet he
231
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doesn’t believe. The whole movement is armed in a sense,
and this is what I must convince him to see as the greatest
evil.241
King, of course, became a leading advocate of nonviolent political
action.242 But as we will see, he still did not consider movement
nonviolence to be incompatible with private self-defense.243
Charles Evers, who succeeded his murdered brother Medgar as Field
Secretary of the Mississippi NAACP,244 writes candidly about members of
the Mississippi movement deploying firearms in the context of imminent
threats and state failure. Immediately following Medgar’s murder, Aaron
Henry retained an armed guard after being denied police protection.245
Police then arrested the guard and confiscated his gun.246 “That made the
Negroes of Clarksdale so mad they gave Aaron guns enough for ten
lifetimes.”247
During a particularly turbulent period in 1964, Evers wrote, “I kept a
gun in every corner of every room of my house. . . . I felt whites would
probably get me, but not like they had Medgar—not in the back, with no
return fire.”248 In this, Charles Evers followed the path of his father, who
in 1935 provoked the wrath of Mississippi racists by violating the custom
of “No niggers allowed in Decatur [Mississippi] around Christmas.”249
After his defiance led to an altercation with a white man, Jim Evers, his
sons, Medgar and Charles, and two neighbors determined, “We better set
up tonight.”250 With rifles deployed, they “set up a crisscross” and waited
for an attack that thankfully never came.251
Charles Evers was not dissuaded by the fact that being armed was no
guarantee of security. A willingness to deploy private firearms plainly had
not prevented his brother from being murdered. Medgar had followed the
241
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See infra Part II.B. (discussing King’s argument that political goals were best achieved by nonviolence).
243
See infra Part II.B. (explaining how Martin Luther King viewed violence in self-defense as
distinct from nonviolence for political goals).
244
EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 147.
245
Id. at 137.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 171.
249
Id. at 16; see also JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
MISSISSIPPI 1 (1995) (recounting a story of Charles and Medgar Evans being turned away by a crowd
of whites at a polling place and then returning with their guns).
250
EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 17.
251
Id.
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practice of his mentor and employer, Dr. T.R.M. Howard. Ruby Hurley,
NAACP Youth Program Director recalls, “[m]any times when Medgar and
I would be driving together, Medgar would tell about carrying his gun. . . .
He used to sit on it, under his pillow.”252 Medgar’s wife, Myrlie, later
recounted, that the family “had guns in every room of our house. I slept
with a small revolver next to me on the nightstand. He slept with a rifle
next to him. We had one in the hall, we had one in the front room.”253
Medgar’s murder shows that having a gun is no guarantee of safety and
some will argue only introduces new dangers in the sense that Black selfdefenders who survived attacks often were left to deal with racist local
authorities.254 But none of this diminished the Evers’ resolve to arm
themselves for self-defense.255
These and many other episodes show a practical and intimate
appreciation within the black community for the principle and practice of
armed self-defense. So it should be no surprise that, as a matter of policy
and philosophy, blacks from the leadership to the grassroots insisted upon
the legitimacy of private self-defense by distinguishing it from political
violence, and defended this distinction even at the risk that it would
impede the freedom movement. The next section details that effort.
B. The Strategic Dichotomy: The Black Community Upholds Firearms
Ownership and Armed Self-Defense as Policy
Coalition politics and alliances with white progressives have played a
major role in the black freedom struggle.256 This has posed a dilemma.
Blacks have rightly worried that vital coalitions would unravel if the
252

Raines, supra note 240, at 271.
HENRY HAMPTON ET AL., VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S, at 152 (1990); see also Interview by Orlando
Bagwell with Myrlie Evers (Nov. 27, 1985), available at http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb/eve0015
.0753.036myrlieevers.html.
254
See, e.g., WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 191 (relating story of a Black activist,
who pursued the perpetrators of a shotgun attack on a civil rights meeting, then being arrested by police
for carrying a concealed weapon, even though the gun was sitting in the open on the front seat, in
compliance with Mississippi law).
255
See EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 64, 154 (describing an incident where the Evers
brothers brandished guns in public, and Charles Evers later having “guns everywhere”). Compare the
modern response of NRA Board Member, Roy Innis (who lost a son to gun violence) to Pete Shields
founder of Handgun Control, Inc., (who lost a son to gun violence). Compare Nelson T. Shields Dies;
Gun Control Advocate, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1993, at D8, with Mr. Roy Innis, NRA BD. OF DIRS.,
http://nra.org/board/#INNIS (last visited Mar. 5, 2013). Innis followed the Charles Evers approach.
Shields and many others in the modern era have put their energy into gun control. Nelson T. Shields
Dies; Gun Control Advocate, supra.
256
See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY
1930–1970, at 4, 40 (1982) (advocating the political process model of social movement theory as
explanation for the insurgency of blacks in America, and noting “the political alignment of groups
within the larger political environment” to be crucial in the generation of that social insurgency).
253
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257

struggle became overtly violent.
On the other hand, real world threats
and state failure have made armed self-defense an essential private
resource.258 In response to this dilemma, the black community developed
and maintained a strategic dichotomy between private self-defense and
collective political violence.
Instinctively, we understand that minorities are unlikely to achieve
group political goals through violence. Absent some sort of technological
or tactical advantage,259 collective violence is a dubious strategy for people
who are outnumbered. Private self-defense, however, is another matter. It
fits easily within the long tradition of self-help in the private realm that is
not supplanted by group agendas.260
On the other hand, the leadership has rightly worried that vital
coalitions would unravel if the struggle became overtly violent or devolved
into insurrection. In response to this dilemma, blacks developed—and
until relatively recently maintained—a crucial distinction between private
self-defense and collective political violence. The development and
defense of that strategic dichotomy and its conflict with the modern
orthodoxy are the focus of this section.
The strategic dichotomy is evident early on in the words and deeds of
Henry Highland Garnet, a free black and Presbyterian minister in Troy,
New York.261 His 1843 “Address to the Slaves of the United States,” at the
National Colored Convention in Buffalo, was a call for open revolt.262
Reports of the speech angered southerners, strained abolitionist alliances,
and divided the delegates of the Convention.263 Many delegates feared
retaliation when they returned home and considered Garnet’s advocacy of
political violence entirely counterproductive.264 On the other hand, without
257

See WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 57 (1984) (discussing
Frederick Douglass’s initial preference of “moral and peaceful” means over “radical” measures in
attempting to abolish slavery).
258
STRAIN, supra note 148, at 9, 16 (recognizing the inconsistent application of law by courts with
regard to different races’ exercise of self-defense and the sentiment of abolitionists that armed response
is appropriate when forced to protect civil liberties).
259
See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 74–80
(1997) (describing the roles advanced technology, exploitation of political divisions, and speed of
communication played in permitting a small number of Europeans to conquer an empire of native
South Americans).
260
See EDWARD PEEKS, THE LONG STRUGGLE FOR BLACK POWER 15 (1971) (“Although it is
spotty and uneven in certain periods of the Negro struggle, the tradition [of self-help] is nonetheless a
vital element in the history of black Americans. It encompasses mutual aid, education, business
ventures, employment, voting, and housing. These fields have claimed individual and group efforts of
Americans of color in a long, unbroken campaign ever since before the Civil War.”).
261
PEEKS, supra note 260, at 43.
262
See id. at 43–44 (detailing Garnet’s call for “every slave throughout the land” to “arise” and
resist their “lordly enslavers”).
263
Id. at 44.
264
See id. at 44–45 (stating that in addition to personal retaliation, the Black delegates feared that
“the nearly 400,000 free Negroes in the country” would suffer “further restrictions on what remained of
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his earlier use of private violence in self-defense, Garnet’s life and
activism might never have blossomed. Attacked by a mob after attempting
to integrate the Noyes Academy in New Hampshire, Garnet returned fire
when a mobber shot into the house where he and other black students were
barricaded.265 This staunched the attack and allowed the students to flee. A
classmate reported, “Garnet doubtless saved our lives.”266
Frederick Douglass articulated the danger of using political violence to
advance black interests, taking issue with those who argued that blacks
should take up arms in order to secure the vote. He knew better than to
dismiss the opposition as just “a few midnight assassins.”267 Political
violence, he warned, would confront “trained armies, skilled generals of
the Confederate army, and in the last resort we should have to meet the
Federal army.”268
Still, Douglass faced difficulty translating the entirely pacifist views of
his early white allies into a message that would resonate for blacks.
Douglass’s early mentor and fellow abolitionist, William Lloyd Garrison,
considered all violence evil and thought moral suasion and non-resistance
to be the only proper tools of reform.269 Douglass, however, acknowledged
the rights and privileges” they were allowed).
265
Id. at 45.
266
Id.
267
4 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDRICK DOUGLASS 491–523 (Philip S. Foner, ed., International
1955).
268
Id.
269
See JOHN STAUFFER, GIANTS: THE PARALLEL LIVES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS & ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 78 (2008) (discussing the Garrison-edited Liberator and its advocacy of nonviolence and
moral suasion as influential to Douglass).
While Douglass sought and depended on white alliances, fitting him into this model is
complicated by the fact that his views changed over time. Douglass developed under Garrison, whose
evangelical abolitionism demanded nonviolence and even nonvoting. See id. at 144 (describing the
frustration of Black abolitionists with Garrison’s “insistence” on these two practices). By the 1850s,
Douglass had moved to a more radical abolitionism. “Douglass and Radical Abolitionists . . . defined
slavery as a state of war. This meant that Congress and the president were obliged to free the slaves
right now . . . . But since they did nothing, it was the ‘highest obligation’ of the people of the free states
to make war on slavery in order to preserve the peace and save the Union.” Id. at 156. This was
certainly more extreme than Garrison’s pacifism, but still different from black political violence under
the strategic dichotomy in that it anticipated a national conflict whose combatants were primarily white.
To a limited extent, however, Douglass did seem to advocate black political violence. Following
the Dred Scott decision, Douglass engaged with John Brown in planning a “Subterranean Pass Way”—
a more radical rendition of the Underground Railroad. Id. at 158. The plan was for a network of armed
warriors to raid plantations and ferry fugitive slaves to Canada and thereby diminish the value of slave
property in Maryland and Virginia. Id. at 158–59. Stephen Oates writes that Douglass was
sympathetic to Brown’s Subterranean Pass Way as early as 1847. See STEPHEN B. OATES, TO PURGE
THIS LAND WITH BLOOD: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN BROWN 61–63 (1984) (describing a meeting between
the two during which they discussed the Pass Way and “Douglass conceded that Brown’s plan had
much to commend it” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Douglass drew the line, however, at largescale confrontations that would launch blacks into a doomed confrontation against white America.
When John Brown supplanted the Subterranean Pass Way for an even grander plan to foment fullblown insurrection through a raid on Harpers Ferry, Douglass refused Brown’s plea to join such raid,
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the importance of individual self-defense in building his own early sense of
self and commitment to attaining basic justice for blacks.270 Douglass
found it “increasingly difficult . . . to express convictions plausible to most
black folks yet consistent with Garrison.”271
As blacks took up arms to resist the Fugitive Slave Act and the
principles enshrined in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution,272
Douglass became an open advocate of armed resistance to slave catchers.
In a speech in 1857, Douglass celebrated recent acts of armed self-defense:
The fugitive Horace, at Mechanicsburg, Ohio, the other day,
who taught the slave catchers from Kentucky that it was safer
to arrest white men than to arrest him, did a most excellent
service to our cause. Parker and his noble band of fifteen at
Christiana, who defended themselves from kidnappers with
prayers and pistols, are entitled to the honor of making the
first successful resistance to the Fugitive Slave Bill. But for
that resistance, and the rescue of Jerry, and Shadrack, the
man-hunters would have hunted our hills and valleys, here
with the same freedom with which they now hunt their own
dismal swamps.273
In response to the slave hunter, Douglass recommended “[a] good
revolver, a steady hand, and a determination to shoot down any man
attempting to kidnap.”274 Douglass’s praise of the utility of a good
revolver was earnestly practical. In 1851, in Christiana, Pennsylvania,
reasoning that an attack on the federal government “would array the whole country against us.”
STAUFFER, supra note 269, at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted). While Brown’s strategy seemed
like folly, Douglass wrote subsequently, “I am ever ready to write, speak, publish, organize, combine,
and even to conspire against slavery, when there is a reasonable hope for success.” Id. at 165 (internal
quotation marks omitted). This practical assessment reflects the kinds of decisions Blacks would
continue to make within the strategic dichotomy.
270
See MARTIN, JR., supra note 257, at 11, 13 (describing Douglass’s encounter with—and defeat
of—Edward Covey, “the Negro Breaker” who had been hired to beat the insolence out of him, and his
realization that “[i]t recalled to life my crushed self-respect, and my self-confidence, and inspired me
with a renewed determination to be a free man” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ronald T.
Takaki, Not Afraid to Die: Frederick Douglass and Violence, in VIOLENCE IN THE BLACK
IMAGINATION: ESSAYS AND DOCUMENTS 17, 22–23 (1993) (“Douglass’[s] act of violence liberated
him psychologically. It completed his rebellion against his slavish hatred of himself and his slavish
fear . . . . In the process of violent struggle against the oppressor, [he] had . . . suddenly realized more
deeply than ever before [a] sense of selfhood and consciousness of freedom . . . .”).
271
STRAIN, supra note 148, at 13–14. For a detailed treatment of the scholarship and divided
views about Douglass’s position on violence means to abolition, see id. at 14.
272
“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or
Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
273
Frederick Douglass, Speech on West India Emancipation (Aug. 4, 1857), in TWO SPEECHES BY
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 3, 22–23 (C.P. Dewey ed., 1857).
274
STRAIN, supra note 148, at 15.
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escaped slaves and black and white abolitionists deployed revolvers, rifles,
and shotguns to fight off slave catchers:
The fugitive slaves escaped. They ended up going across
upstate New York. Two of them ended up in Frederick
Douglass’s house in Rochester, New York. Douglass drove
them personally in a carriage to the wharf on Lake Erie. And
when he bid them goodbye, one of them gave him the
revolver that he had used at Christiana, a memento that
Douglass kept the rest of his life.275
While Douglass saw little promise in large-scale political violence,276
he did not deny the potential for self-defense or preparation for it to have
group benefits, acknowledging, “[t]he practice of carrying guns . . . would
be a good one for the colored people to adopt, as it would give them a
sense of their own manhood.”277 He further stated, “Every slave-hunter
who meets a bloody death in his infernal business, is an argument in favor
of the manhood of our race.”278
275
Transcript of David W. Blight, OPEN YALE COURSES, The Civil War and Reconstruction Era,
1845–1877: Lecture 7—“A Hell of a Storm”: The Kansas-Nebraska Act and the Birth of the
Republican Party, 1854–55, at 6 (Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://oyc.yale.edu/transcript/548/hist-119
(emphasis added).
276
Douglass resisted John Brown’s appeals to join in sparking a slave revolt with a raid on the
federal arsenal at Harpers Ferry. Douglass’s reaction reflects a continuing skepticism about the utility
of large-scale political violence:

[I]n early 1858 [Brown] spent one full month living in the attic apartment of
Frederick Douglass’s home in Rochester, New York. We have only one . . . letter
they exchanged during that time. It says, “John, come down to dinner.” . . . But
what we do know, that in that attic of Frederick Douglass’s house, John Brown
wrote his so-called Provisional Constitution for the State of Virginia. When he took
over Virginia he was going to announce a new Constitution. . . .
[Brown] desperately wanted Douglass to join him, and had he joined them Douglass
would’ve been dead in 1859. But Douglass did have a final meeting with John
Brown at an old stone quarry outside of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in late August
of 1859. He went down from New York with a fugitive slave Douglass had helped
to his freedom named Shields Green. . . . They met at this old stone quarry and in
Douglass’s testimony they had a long conversation. Brown tried one last time to
talk Douglass into coming with him, and Douglass, in his recollection, famously
said, “I can’t do it. You’re going to be trapped in a”—how does he put it—“you’re
going to be surrounded in a trap of steel. You will never get out. But if you must
go, go.”
Transcript of David W. Blight, OPEN YALE COURSES, The Civil War and Reconstruction Era, 1845–
1877: Lecture 9—John Brown’s Holy War: Terrorist or Heroic Revolutionary?, at 8–9 (Feb.12, 2008),
available at http://oyc.yale.edu/transcript/550/hist-119.
277
STRAIN, supra note 148, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
278
2 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Is It Right and Wise to Kill a Kidnapper?, in THE LIFE AND
WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850–1860, at 284, 287 (Philip S.
Foner ed., 1975); see also Takaki, supra note 270, at 24 (“Violence as Douglass viewed it was a way
for blacks to assert their humanity.”).
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The strategic dichotomy is evident in commentators’ critiques of the
Reconstruction Era.279 Black response to racist terrorism, Herbert Shapiro
argues, was shaped by three considerations: “the need to maintain links to
white allies both within the South and in the national government, the right
of self-defense when actually confronted with violence, and the imperative
that black unity and the articulation of a common program were necessary
means of rallying national support.”280
The risk of upholding the strategic dichotomy was substantial. There
was a real and continuing danger that private self-defense would spill over
into collective political violence. This spillover is illustrated by an episode
in Kansas City in 1904. An altercation between black and white school
boys resulted in a crippled black boy shooting a white attacker, allegedly in
self-defense.281 Reports characterize the aftermath as a race riot when the
private altercation escalated to include more than one hundred
combatants.282
A similar spillover is illustrated in a lynching story reported by that
staunch advocate of the Winchester rifle, Ida B. Wells-Barnett.283 The
victims’ offense was to operate a grocery store in competition with white
businesses.284 A white competitor, joined by twelve police officers in
civilian clothes, raided the Black grocery.285 Under assault, the Blacks
fired back, wounding three officers.286 They were arrested, then taken
from the Memphis jail and lynched.287
279
Compare the similar assessment about the failed alliance between blacks and white Populists
in the late nineteenth century: “[A]s with most . . . interracial movements in the South, the Populists
were red-shirted with the cry of ‘black supremacy’ by the Democrats. . . . [B]y the early 1890s white
‘progressives’ in the South disdained the cause of black advancement.” GOINGS, supra note 32, at 1.
280
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 19. There were notable variations on this theme. For example, A.
Phillip Randolph argued, “the Negro peoples should not place their problems for solution down at the
feet of their white sympathetic allies which has been and is the common fashion of the old school
Negro leadership, for, in the final analysis, the salvation of the Negro, like the workers, must come
from within.” Id. at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted).
281
See High School Boy Killed, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 12, 1904 (describing the incident in
which a group of white boys advanced on a group of black boys after a verbal exchange, prompting the
gunshot); STRAIN, supra note 148, at 23.
282
See Cold Blooded Murder, WYANDOTTE (KAN.) HERALD, Apr. 12, 1904 (documenting the
“[g]reat excitement” between “a mob of armed negroes” and “a number of whites” that followed the
shooting incidenct); STRAIN, supra note 148, at 23.
283
See IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT, SOUTHERN HORRORS: LYNCH LAW IN ALL ITS PHASES (1892),
reprinted in ON LYNCHINGS 1, 23 (William Loren Katz ed., 1969) (“[A] Winchester rifle should have a
place of honor in every black home . . . .”).
284
See id. at 18 (describing the lynching of three young African American men who “owned a
flourishing grocery business in a thickly populated suburb of Memphis” across the street from a white
man’s corner store).
285
See id. (“When [the white competitor] came he led a posse of officers, twelve in number, who
afterward claimed to be hunting a man for whom they had a warrant.”).
286
Id.
287
Id. at 19.
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This danger of spillover did not diminish the commitment to private
firearms ownership and armed self-defense. And one wonders how much
of this was overt strategic calculation and how much visceral surrender to
the self-defense impulse. Witness how W.E.B. Du Bois’s reactions to the
terror of lynching alternate between outrage and strategic calculation: In
the Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois argued that violence is counterproductive
noting that, “[t]he death of Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner proved long
since to the Negro the present hopelessness of physical defence [sic].”288
At the same time, his chapter “Of the Coming of John,” a tale of violence
and private honor, shows an appreciation for the distinction between
foolish political violence and essential private self-defense.289 It happens
again in Du Bois’s response to a 1916 lynching in Florida:
No colored man can read an account of the recent lynching at
Gainesville, Fla., without being ashamed of his people. . . .
Without resistance they let a white mob whom they
outnumbered two to one, torture, harry and murder their
women, shoot down innocent men entirely unconnected with
the alleged crime, and finally to cap the climax, they caught
and surrendered the wretched man whose attempted arrest
caused the difficulty.
No people who behave with the absolute cowardice shown
by these colored people can hope to have the sympathy or
help of the civilized folk. . . . In the last analysis lynching of
Negroes is going to stop in the South when the cowardly mob
is faced by effective guns in the hands of people determined
to sell their souls dearly.290
Writing after the 1919 Chicago race riot Du Bois again deployed the
strategic dichotomy, acknowledging––indeed encouraging––lawful selfdefense but warning against violence as a political strategy:
Today we raise the terrible weapon of Self-Defense. When
the murderer comes, he shall no longer strike us in the back.
When the armed lynchers gather, we too must gather armed.
When the mob moves, we propose to meet it with bricks and
clubs and guns.
But we must tread here with solemn caution. We must never
let justifiable self-defense against individuals become blind
288

W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks, in THREE NEGRO CLASSICS 207, 347 (1965).
See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 127 (describing the story of John Jones, an educated black
man, who would face a lynch mob for his “suicidal” act of killing a white man when he observed the
man attempting to rape Jone’s sister).
290
Id. at 91 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
289
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and lawless offense against all white folk. We must not seek
reform by violence.291
The power of the self-defense impulse was not lost on the Black
clergy. Bishop John Hurst called on Blacks to exercise Christian virtue but
if assailants persist then “do what self respecting people should do—
namely use his gun with effect and impose respect.”292 Some in the Black
press even urged armed self-defense without explicit concern for the spill
over into collective violence. “‘Let every Negro arm himself . . . and
swear to die fighting in defense of his home, his rights and his person,’”
editorialized the New York Commoner.293
Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association presents
an interesting variation on the theme. Garvey openly advocated the most
extreme form of political violence arguing that, “‘All peoples have gained
their freedom through organized force. . . . These are the means by which
we as a race will climb to greatness.’”294 Garvey’s hedge was that this
violence would not be carried out in America or Europe, but in Africa
291
W.E.B. Du Bois, Let Us Reason Together, 18 CRISIS 231, 231 (1919). By the late 1940s, Du
Bois saw the fortunes of Blacks better served by more left leaning radical affiliations. While the
leadership of the NAACP cast its lot with Truman and the Democratic Party, Du Bois joined Paul
Robeson and more radical Black activist to Henry Wallace of the Progressive Party. SHAPIRO, supra
note 26, at 388–89. These more radical affiliations gave Du Bois new opportunities to engage the
question of political violence. In a 1946 speech to the radical Southern Negro Youth Congress, Du
Bois would not claim “that the uplift of mankind never calls for force and death” even though his core
skepticism about the utility of political violence shone though in the conclusion that “we ought to be
the last to believe that force is ever the final word.” Id. at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
1957, Du Bois, reflecting on his earlier assessments of violence as a political tool acknowledged:

There was a time . . . when I thought that the only way in which progress could be
made in the world was by violence. I thought that the only way that the darker
people were going to get recognition was by killing a large number of white people.
But I think that most of us are beginning to realize that it is not true, that the
violence that accompanies revolution is not the revolution. The revolution is the
reform, is the change in thought, is the change of attitude on the people who are
affected by it.
Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted). In 1959, Du Bois again suggested a greater tolerance for
violence as a political tool, in his expression of ambivalence about King’s criticism of Robert F.
Williams: “[I]t is a very grave question as to whether or not the slavery and degradation of Negroes in
American has not been unnecessarily prolonged by the submission to evil.” W.E.B. DU BOIS, Crusader
Without Violence, NAT’L GUARDIAN, Nov. 9, 1959, in W.E.B. DU BOIS: A READER 361, 361 (David
Levering Lewis ed., 1995).
292
Lawrence Levine, Marcus Garvey and the Politics of Revitalization, reprinted in BLACK
LEADERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 105, 113 (John Hope Franklin & August Meier eds., Univ. Ill.
Press 1982).
293
Id.
294
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Negro must now
organize all over the world, 400,000,000 strong to administer to our oppressors their Waterloo.”
Marcus Garvey, Editorial Letter, NW (Chicago, IL), 11 Oct. 1919, reprinted in 2 THE MARCUS
GARVEY AND UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION PAPERS 41–42 (Robert A. Hill ed.
1983).
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where organized Blacks would retake what was properly theirs.
But Garvey also deployed the strategic dichotomy, pressing the
distinction between political violence, which he seemed to admit could not
succeed in the United States, and private self-defense against imminent
threats. Garvey challenged the Klan: “They can pull off their hot stuff in
the south, but let them come north and touch Philadelphia, New York or
Chicago and there will be little left of the Ku Klux Klan. . . . Let them try
and come to Harlem and they will really have some fun.”296
A. Philip Randolph deployed the strategic dichotomy in his two stage
“immediate program” to combat lynching.297 The second stage depended
on Blacks developing economic power.298 But the first was physical action
in self-defense. In an editorial in the Messenger, Randolph argued that
there was no tension between the avowed pacifist views of the Messenger
and his advocacy of self-defense: He argued that self-defense was
“universal law”299:
Always regard your own life as more important than the life
of the person about to take yours, and if a choice has to be
made between the sacrifice of your life and the loss of the
295
See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 167–68 (“At the 1924 UNIA convention Garvey favored and
secured the adoption of a somewhat equivocal resolution regarding the Klan. On the one hand, the
resolution stated that the ‘alleged’ attitude of the Klan toward blacks was fairly representative of the
feelings of whites toward blacks and so the only solution was establishment of a black government in
Africa.”). Garvey’s views were still sufficiently immoderate that the movement was continuously the
target of surveillance by British and American intelligence services and police:

J. Edgar Hoover recorded that Garvey was particularly active “among the radical
elements in New York City in agitating the negro movement” and expressed his
regret that Garvey had “not yet” violated any federal law and so could not be
deported as an undesirable alien. Hoover suggested, however, that it might be
possible to prosecute Garvey on fraud charges. Ultimately . . . the federal
government succeeded in convicting Garvey of mail fraud and, upon President
Coolidge’s commutation of the sentence in 1927, deported him from the United
States.
Id. at 167 (footnote omitted); see also PEEKS, supra note 260, at 192–93 (describing Garvey’s meeting
with Klan leaders).
296
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 167 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Later Garvey actually met with Edward Young Clark, imperial Wizard of the Klan and advised that it
“will not help us to fight it or its program” because the solution was creation of a Black government in
Africa.” Id. Garvey embraced “racial purity” and social separation of the races. Along with claims
that the Fascists had borrowed their ideology from him, these views diminished Garvey’s appeal. Id.
297
JERVIS ANDERSON, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT 115 (1986).
298
Id. (“When no profits are to be made from race friction no one will longer be interested in
stirring up race prejudice. . . . When you make a thing unprofitable you make it impossible.” (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
299
CORNELIUS L. BYNUM, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 95
(2000). But see SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 228 (noting the “southern phenomenon” in which any
individual act of Black resistance to oppression and intimidation became transformed into a mass
assault upon the Black community as a whole).
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lyncher’s life, choose to preserve your own and to destroy
that of the lynching mob.300
Roy Wilkins grappled openly with the strategic dichotomy in a 1936
article in Crisis, recounting the lynching in Gordonsville, Virginia of
William Wales and his sister Cora.301 The Wales’ had resisted the town’s
attempt to buy their property for expansion of a cemetery. Officials sought
to pressure William with the charge that he had threatened a white woman.
When the sheriff came to serve the warrant, William shot him.302 The next
day a crowd of 5,000 surrounded the house. The Wales resisted with
shotgun and rifle fire until nightfall when the home was torched.303
Noting that members of the mob entered the smoldering building and
hacked up the bodies for souvenirs, Wilkins acknowledged the rage of
Blacks living under lynch law with bitter sarcasm:
If the tradition of American lynchers was faithfully followed,
there reposes now on the mantelpieces of many a Virginia
home a bit of flesh or a bone preserved in a jar of alcohol to
remind children and grandchildren of the indomitable
courage of a brother, father or son of the family who battled
to the death to prevent two Negros from overcoming 5,000
white Virginians.304
Then, recognizing the political risk of the implication, Wilkins asked,
“Does The Crisis mean to imply by this article that its policy is to defend
colored people who kill sheriffs?”305 On this question, Wilkins contended
that Blacks had to support the existing legal structure.306 But he was
clearly conflicted: He acknowledged the pull of the self-defense impulse
and the private pressures that motivated individuals like William Wales
who “saw his people hanged, roasted and mutilated by mobs while
legislators called points of order and an aspirant to the Presidency fiddled
with clauses, periods and commas in the so-called Bill of Rights.”307 On
the explicit point of the utility and legitimacy of armed self-defense,
Wilkins said this:
If one has a fancy for words, this killing was not a lynching.
It was sport-sport on a grand scale. . . . Hunting possum
300

SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 228.
Id. at 288.
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Id. at 289.
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Roy Wilkins, Two Against 5,000, CRISIS, June, 1936, at 169, 170, reprinted in HERBERT
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compared to this is tiddlywinks. . . . There was a slight flaw
in the set-up however. The man and woman had arms and
they were not afraid to shoot. They had killed a sheriff and
wounded five others. The leaders of the five thousand
looked about and took counsel together. They had numbers.
They had machine guns. They had sulphur bombs. . . . But
the two in the house had rifles, shotguns and perhaps a pistol
or two. Not so good. Not half as good as a lone Negro with
nothing but his bare hands. . . . No this was a different
proposition . . . .
Yes, the Crisis defends William and Cora Wales.308
The restrictive leg of the strategic dichotomy is evident in the case of
the Scottsboro boys.309 Early on, the Communist Party used the case as the
centerpiece of a recruiting focus in the American South.310 This prompted
conflicts between Communists and the NAACP over strategy and mutual
denunciations highlighting their competing approaches of coalition
building and radical upheaval. In the candidly titled The Right to
Revolution for the Negro People, communist spokesman James W. Ford
underscored the revolutionary heritage of insurrection, exalting Nat Turner,
Gabriel Prosser and Denmark Vesey “and scores of other Negro
revolutionary leaders.”311
The NAACP had hired Clarence Darrow as counsel for the Scottsboro
appeal “in a belated effort to compensate for the association’s rather slight
attention to the case at the beginning.”312 Darrow conveyed the
Association’s position that the Communists’ radical strategy, including
threats to “officials and citizens of Alabama if the verdict of death should
be carried out,” were counter-productive. 313
During the modern civil rights era the strategic dichotomy was
deployed repeatedly and debated publicly. Though the stakes were
tremendous, the leadership upheld the fundamental utility and legitimacy
of armed self-defense. This is vividly illustrated by the Robert F. Williams
controversy. After service in the Marines, Williams returned home to
Monroe, North Carolina where he was elected President of the Monroe
branch of the NAACP.314 In 1957, he began organizing a group of armed
308

APTHEKER, supra note 307, at 241–44.
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 210.
310
Id. at 211.
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Id. at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. at 211.
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
314
Julian Mayfield, Challenge to Negro Leadership: The Case of Robert Williams, in REPORTING
CIVIL RIGHTS: PART ONE AMERICAN JOURNALISM 1941–1963, at 550, 560 (2003) [hereinafter
Challenge to Negro Leadership].
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315

men to defend Monroe’s Black community.
In October 1957, Williams
led an armed group to protect Dr. Albert Perry from a Klan attack.316
But it was Williams’ apparent endorsement of political violence that
prompted the NAACP to suspend him from leadership of the Monroe
branch.317 In widely circulated reaction to the acquittal of a white man for
the rape of a pregnant Black woman, Williams said this:
We cannot take these people who do us injustice to the court
and it becomes necessary to punish them ourselves. In the
future we are going to have to try and convict them on the
spot. We cannot rely on the law. We can get no justice
under the present system. If we feel that injustice is done, we
must right then and there, on the spot, be prepared to inflict
punishment on these people. Since the Federal government
will not bring a halt to lynching in the South, and since the
so-called courts lynch our people legally, if it’s necessary to
stop lynching with lynching, then we must be willing to resort
to that method.318
Williams’ statement confirmed the perennial worry about advocacy of
political violence. National headlines blazed, “N.A.A.C.P. Leader Urges
‘Violence’”.319 The Carolina Times called it the biggest civil rights story
of 1959.320 Southern editorials attributed Williams’ “bloodthirsty remark”
directly to the National office.321 Thomas Waring of the Charleston News
and Courier, ranted, “Hatred is the stock in trade of the NAACP. High
315
316

TYSON, supra note 143, at 87.
Challenge to Negro Leadership, supra note 314, at 560–61.
It was just another good time Klan night, the high point of which would come when
they dragged Dr. Perry over the state line if they did not hang him or burn him first.
But near Dr. Perry’s home their revelry was suddenly shattered by the sustained fire
of scores of men who had been instructed not to kill anyone if it were not necessary.
The firing was blistering, disciplined and frightening. The motorcade of about
eighty cars, which had begun in a spirit of good fellowship, disintegrated into chaos,
with panicky, robed men fleeing in every direction. Some abandoned their
automobiles and had to continue on foot.

JAMES FORMAN, THE MAKING OF BLACK REVOLUTIONARIES 167 (1972) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
317
N.A.A.C.P. Leader Urges ‘Violence’: North Carolina Aide Makes Statement—Association
Quickly Suspends Him, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1959, at 22 [hereinafter N.A.A.C.P. Leader].
318
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 459 (emphasis added); see also TYSON, supra note 143, at 87–89
(describing how men from the NAACP defended Dr. Perry’s home from an attack by the Ku Klux
Klan); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, NEGROES WITH GUNS 62 (Wayne St. Univ. Press ed., 1998) (1962)
(discussing how African Americans in Monroe had to resort to arming themselves in order to prevent
“mass bloodshed”).
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N.A.A.C.P. Leader, supra note 317, at 22.
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TYSON, supra note 143, at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted).
321
Id. at 150.
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officials of the organization may speak in cultivated accents and dress like
Wall Street Lawyers, but they are engaged in a revolutionary enterprise.”322
As soon as word of Williams’s statement reached NAACP
headquarters in New York, National Director Roy Wilkins called
Williams. Wilkins recorded the call.323 Hearing that Williams was
planning to make a follow-up statement on national television, Wilkins
warned, “You know, of course . . . that it is not the policy of the NAACP to
advocate meeting lynching with lynching. You are going to make it clear
that you are not speaking for the NAACP?”324 After a tense conversation,
and realizing that Williams already had been inexorably linked with the
NAACP, Wilkins dispatched a telegram to Williams, suspending him as
branch president.325
Williams appealed his dismissal to the membership at the 1959 annual
convention.326 The representatives upheld the decision to suspend
Williams but added an important caveat: “[W]e do not deny but reaffirm
the right of an individual and collective self-defense against unlawful
assaults.”327 The report of the Resolutions Committee that brought the
issue to the floor noted in its Preamble, the NAACP’s long support of the
right of self-defense, “by defending those who have exercised the right of
self-defense particularly in the Arkansas Riot Case, The Sweet case in
Detroit, the Columbia, Tenn., Riot cases and the Ingram case in
Georgia.”328
This public engagement of the strategic dichotomy is underscored and
systematized by Martin Luther King’s separate assessment of the Williams
controversy.329 In a widely reprinted exchange of essays with Williams,
King articulated three distinct categories of response to violent attacks and
political oppression. The first, pure nonviolence, is difficult, King said.
It “cannot readily or easily attract large masses, for it requires
extraordinary discipline and courage.”330 The second response, said King,
322
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TYSON, supra note 143, at 150.
324
Id. at 150–51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
325
Id. at 151; WILKINS & MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS,
supra note 99, at 265. Wilkins’s account is quoted in Challenge to Negro Leadership, supra note 314,
at 552.
326
WILLIAMS, supra note 318, at 28–30. For full text of the resolutions see Gloster B. Current,
Fiftieth Annual Convention: A Jubilee for Civil Rights, CRISIS (Aug.–Sept. 1959), at 400, 408.
327
Current, supra note 326, at 409–10 (emphasis added).
328
Id. at 408–09 (emphasis added).
329
LIBERATION, Sept.–Oct. 1959. Both Essays are printed in SOUTHERN PATRIOT 18, No. II (Jan.
1960) at 3. An edited version of the essay appears in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER.
Martin Luther King, Jr., “The Social Organization of Non-Violence”, in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL
RIGHTS READER 112, 112–14 (Clayborn Carson et. al. eds., Penguin 1991); see also WILLIAMS, supra
note 318, at xxvi–vii (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr.).
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King, Jr., supra note 329, at 112.
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was implicit in the freedom struggle and should not discourage outsiders
from supporting the movement:
Violence exercised merely in self-defense . . . [in] all
societies, from the most primitive to the most cultured and
civilized, accept as moral and legal. The principle of selfdefense, even involving weapons and bloodshed, has never
been condemned, even by Gandhi. . . . When the Negro uses
force in self-defense . . . he does not forfeit support—he may
even win it, by the courage and self-respect it reflects.331
This explicit endorsement of armed self-defense, contrasted with
King’s third assessment, puts the strategic dichotomy in high relief. The
third approach, Williams’s approach, said King, advocated “violence as a
tool of advancement, organization as in warfare . . . [and posed]
incalculable perils.”332 Political goals, King argued, were best achieved by
nonviolent, “socially organized masses on the march.”333
Anne Braden reprinted the King and Williams essays in the Southern
Patriot and her summary succinctly captured King’s engagement of the
strategic dichotomy. No one disputes the right to defend home and family
she explained, “What the nonviolent movement says is that the weapons of
social change should be nonviolent.”334
King’s assessment was only one aspect of a robust community
engagement of the strategic dichotomy. Louis Lautier of the Baltimore
Afro-American argued that Williams had not advocated political violence,
but merely that “colored people should defend themselves if and when
violence is directed at them.”335 In the Arkansas State Press, Daisy and
L.C. Bates were equivocal on Roy Wilkins’ contention that Williams had
crossed the line into advocacy of political violence. But they were firm on
the importance of private self-defense, warning “nonviolence never saved
George Lee in Belzoni, Miss., or Emmett Till, nor Mack Parker at
Poplarville, Miss.”336
The National office also received protests from the branches.337 The
Brooklyn Branch of the NAACP wired Wilkins in protest of the “illegal
and arbitrary removal from office of Robert E. Williams for expressing

331
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King, Jr., supra note 329, at 113.
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Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Bates responding to blandishments from Wilkins
ultimately supported the suspension of Williams. See id. at 164.
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338

sentiments to which we subscribe.”
This and other unqualified support
for Williams arguably ranged over the line into advocacy of political
violence.339
But the thoughtful establishment support, was exhibited by John
McCray, in a Baltimore Afro-American, article titled, “There’s Nothing
New About It.” McCray engaged the strategic dichotomy in candid,
practical terms. On issues of social change he said, “A minority group
cannot hope to win in campaigns of violence”.340 On the other hand,
McCray acknowledged, without criticism, that Black self-defense had deep
roots. “Today, thousands of our people have secured ‘protection’ in their
homes, mostly with the intent to repel night riders who, years ago, were
terrors to their forbearers.”341
With debate raging, Wilkins defended his position with a succinct
deployment of the strategic dichotomy. In a pamphlet entitled The Single
Issue in the Robert William’s Case, Wilkins argued, “There is no issue of
self-defense . . . The charges are based on his call for aggressive,
premeditated violence. Lynching is never defensive.”342 In this, Wilkins
articulated a philosophy dating back to Fredrick Douglass. While
condemning political violence as a hazard to the movement, he
unequivocally recognized armed self-defense as a crucial private resource.
At a June 1959 fundraising dinner in Chicago, Wilkins emphasized, “Of
course, we must defend ourselves when attacked. This is our right under
all known laws.”343
338

Id. at 156.
Adams wrote to Wilkins, “I support Williams one million percent . . . . Why can’t we do like
the Indians did down in Carolina last year.” Id. at 157. This is an apparent reference to 1957 the
routing of a Klan rally near Maxton, North Carolina by a group of several hundred Lumbee Indians.
The event was the culmination of the efforts of James “Catfish” Cole to rebuild his Klan following after
being run off from Monroe, North Carolina by Robert Williams.
After the altercation with Williams, Cole retreated to Robeson County where the population was
equal parts white, Black and Lumbee Indians. TIMOTHY TYSON, BLOOD DONE SIGN MY NAME 56
(2004). Cole held a series of Klan Rallies. The final event was supposed to draw five thousand armed
Klansmen with the aim of showing the Lumbees “their place”. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Lumbee leader, Simeon Oxendine, who had flown thirty missions against the Germans in World War
II, planned the Indian’s response. As Cole’s rally began, five hundred armed Lumbee gathered in the
surrounding darkness. Id. at 57. When Cole started to speak, one of the Lumbees swooped in, dousing
the single light illuminating Cole. Id. The other Lumbees gave a war cry and fired their guns into the
air. The Klansmen dropped their guns and ran for their cars. Id. Cole fled into the swamp, leaving his
wife, Carolyn, behind. Carolyn tried to flee in Cole’s Cadillac, but got stuck in a ditch. After setting
fire to the Klan’s cross, hanging Cole in effigy, the Lumbees helped push Carolyn out of the ditch.
“Draped in Klan regalia, they celebrated into the night. The cover of Life magazine featured a playful
photograph of a beaming Simeon Oxendine wrapped in a confiscated Ku Klux Klan banner.” Id. Four
people were injured, apparently by falling bullets. Id.
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Wilkins reiterated this position throughout his life. In his 1982 his
memoir, Wilkins confirmed, “Like [Robert] Williams, I believe in selfdefense. While I admire Reverend King’s theories of overwhelming
enemies with love, I don’t think I could have put those theories into
practice myself. But there is a difference between self-defense and murder,
and I had no intention of getting the NAACP into the lynching
business.”344
The Williams case is remarkable for the detail in which it elaborates
the strategic dichotomy. But it is not unique. On at least two other
occasions, Roy Wilkins defended the strategic dichotomy against
statements he worried blurred the line between self-defense and political
violence. In 1959, an angry Charles Evers made provocative statements
after a car bomb attack on Natchez, Mississippi NAACP leader, George
Metcalf. Like Robert Williams before him, Evers generally rejected
political violence as fruitless, declaring, “The only way we have is through
nonviolence, there’s no other way.”345 But following the attack on
Metcalf, Evers channeled the mood of the community, “We’re not going to
take it any longer. We’re not going to start any riots, but we’ve got guns
and we’re going to fight back.”346 A day later, after Governor Paul
Johnson ordered guardsmen to Natchez, Evers was urging the community
that group violence would be counterproductive.347
From the National office, Roy Wilkins responded in a September 3,
letter, “We have never authorized you, as our representative, to state either
privately or publically, ‘we are armed, we have taken all we will take, we
will fight . . . or any sentiments approximating that language. [We cannot]
afford these damaging statements in a nationally syndicated newspaper
column.”348 Wilkins demanded that Evers clarify his statements by
September 10. After a follow-up statement by Evers in the New York Post,
that Wilkins considered unsatisfactory, he drafted but never sent a letter
demanding Evers resign by September 15.349 The reasons for Wilkins’
retreat are unclear.350 But the episode shows again vigorous engagement
and defense of the strategic dichotomy.
Wilkins already had experienced a similar conflict with St. Augustine,
Florida activist, Robert Hayling, a Black dentist who had led local voter

344
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351

registration and desegregation efforts.
After a shotgun attack on his
home, Hayling organized an armed defense squad.352 He warned the Klan
publicly that his guards would “shoot first and ask questions later.”353 Roy
Wilkins responded as he had to Robert Williams, and Hayling broke ties
with the NAACP.354 But in a familiar turn of the strategic dichotomy,
when Martin Luther King came to St. Augustine in 1964 he consented to
Hayling’s deployment of armed guards for protection.355
CORE Chairman, James Farmer, pressed the strategic dichotomy
aggressively when responding to questions about the militancy of the
Deacons for Defense, who were protecting CORE workers in the South.
Farmer made a clear distinction between armed self-defense “outside” the
movement and CORE’s nonviolent demonstrations.
“You must
understand, when a man’s home is attacked that’s not the movement, that’s
his home.”356
Simon Wendt comments, “[CORE’s] legitimacy as an acceptable Civil
Rights organization as well as its financial wellbeing depended almost
exclusively on white Northern liberals, who easily confused the
acknowledge right of self-defense with the specter of ‘Black violence.’”357
Pressed on the point that CORE demonstrations involving the Deacons for
Defense happened in the streets not the home, Farmer stubbornly insisted
that armed self-defense and political violence were fundamentally
different.358
Committed pacifists within CORE considered members who advocated
violent self-defense traitors to the cause.359 But nonviolence in the face of
imminent threats was easier in theory than in practice.360 In response to
351
Robert W. Hartley, A Long Hot Summer: The St. Augustine Racial Disorders of 1964, in ST.
AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, 1963–1964: MASS PROTEST AND RACIAL VIOLENCE 3, 17 (David J. Garrow ed.,
1989).
352
Id. at 20–21.
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354
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355
See DAVID R. COLBURN, RACIAL CHANGE AND COMMUNITY CRISIS: ST. AUGUSTINE,
FLORIDA 1877–1980, at 84–85 (1985) (discussing Dr. King’s reluctant acceptance of Hayling’s guards
and the FBI as protection in St. Augustine and the tensions between the two groups); see also DAVID J.
GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 317–34 (1986) (discussing security concerns at St. Augustine).
356
Simon Wendt, Urge People Not to Carry Guns: Armed Self-Defense in the Louisiana Civil
Rights Movement and the Radicalization of the Congress of Racial Equality, 45 LA. HIST. 261, 280
(2004).
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Id. at 279.
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Id. at 280.
359
Id. at 277.
360
“Pacifist CORE worker Meldon Acheson found himself the last representative of an
insignificant minority. ‘Nearly everyone in the community is armed to the teeth’ he wrote in a letter to
his parents . . . all but one are [sic] committed to nonviolence only as a tactic.” Id. His attempts to
convert the local Black population to philosophical nonviolence soon fizzled. Id. In West Feliciana
Parish, CORE worker Mike Lesser was less conflicted: “We are preaching non-violence, but we can
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reports that local Blacks were arming against private threats, the national
leadership of CORE pressed its field staff, “Urge the people not to carry
guns.”361 These instructions prompted tensions and defiance.362 In a staff
meeting at the end of 1963 two activists angrily responded “to hell with
CORE, we’re with the people.”363 Some CORE field staff began carrying
guns themselves.364
CORE’s National Office wrestled with the perennial concern of Black
civil rights groups that have depended on alliances with white
progressives.
National Director James Farmer had to be more cautions in
dealing with the issue of armed resistance. . . . The
organization’s legitimacy as an acceptable Civil Rights
organization as well as its financial wellbeing depended
almost exclusively on white Northern liberals, who easily
confused the acknowledged, right of self-defense with the
specter of “Black violence.”. . . Letters by white CORE
sympathizers to James Farmer served as an additional
reminder about the fragility of Northern support. “Although
only a small percentage of whites will help actively,” a white
man from New Jersey wrote in 1963, “the majority feel
guilty and will not oppose the Negro’s advance as long as it
is nonviolent,” and only if CORE maintained its nonviolent
image would “sympathetic bystanders” continue to support
the organization.365
The subsequent history and radicalization of CORE perhaps confirms
the assessment that advocacy of political violence would destroy interracial
alliances.366 While CORE continued to espouse nonviolence and to
only preach non violence. We cannot tell someone not to defend his property and the lives of his
family and let me tell you, these 15–20 shotguns guarding our meetings are very reassuring.” Id.
361
Id. at 278.
362
Id.
363
Id.
364
FRED POWLEDGE, FREE AT LAST? THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE PEOPLE WHO
MADE IT 573 (1991).
365
Wendt, supra note 356, at 279.
366
The assumption, that political violence was an entirely losing strategy also is complicated by
mounting challenges to the view that the successes of the Civil Rights movement were entirely rooted
in nonviolence. Studies of the Civil Rights movement have matured, beyond the early treatments that
focused on organizations and leaders like Martin Luther King. Id. at 263. “In the mid 1980’s the focus
of the literature began to shift toward the study of local movements and the contribution of ordinary
Black citizens . . . . [S]ome of the most recent studies suggest that . . . armed self-defense was more
than a mere footnote to the history of the Black freedom struggle.” Id.; see also Christopher B. Strain,
“We Walked Like Men”: The Deacons for Defense and Justice,” 38 LA. HIST. 43, 43–62 (1999)
(providing a historical account of the rise of the Deacons for Defense and CORE’s eventual aligning
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distance itself from the publicity the Deacons for Defense were attracting,
the realities of imminent threats eroded the commitment to non-violence in
the field.367 The work of the Deacons underscored the fundamental
necessity of self-defense and drew CORE field workers and members to
more openly advocate resistance against violent attacks.368
The Deacons made a firm rhetorical commitment to the strategic
dichotomy. In 1965, Deacon spokesman Charles Sims emphasized, “I
believe nonviolence is the only way. Negotiations are going to be the main
point in this fight. . . . As a Deacon, you cannot fire on a man unless
you’ve been attacked.”369 For the Northern, white, middle-class pacifists
who had been the backbone of CORE, the idea of armed violence, even
tempered by the strategic dichotomy, was anathema.370 CORE leadership
attempted to keep the Deacons “in the background.”371
But for the growing Black membership of CORE, the practical
necessity of armed self-defense in the field was obvious. “As early as
1965 . . . delegates openly contested the . . . commitment to pacifism . . .
during CORE’s annual convention.”372 By 1966, Floyd McKissick had
succeeded James Farmer as National Director of CORE.373 Though
McKissick maintained a commitment to tactical nonviolence,374 his
ascension marked a dramatic shift of policy and his rhetoric was more
aggressive. He insisted, for example, that, “The right of self-defense is a
constitutional right and you can’t expect Black people to surrender this
right while whites maintain it.”375 For CORE’s pacifist, white members,
this broke the bargain. By the end of 1966, CORE had lost most of its
white support and transformed into an almost entirely Black
organization.376
The visceral draw of the self-defense impulse and the difficulty of
maintaining the strategic dichotomy against spillover into political violence
of Armed Resistance in the Civil Rights Movement, 29 J. BLACK STUD. 558, 558–78 (1999) [hereinafter
Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet] (concluding that many factors including class orientations,
leadership paradigms, organizing styles, and changing cultural climates were responsible for the
transformation of the views of CORE leadership).
367
“Farmer continued to reject the ostensible danger that the Deacons posed to CORE’s nonviolent stance. In reality though, by 1965, most CORE activists had abandoned philosophical
nonviolence.” Wendt, supra note 356, at 280.
368
Id. at 281–82.
369
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370
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(discussing CORE’s abandonment of nonviolence and the acceptance of self-defense as natural and
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are illustrated again in the events surrounding the shooting of James
Meredith in 1966. A veteran of the freedom struggle,377 with a
commitment to nonviolence, Meredith was ambushed by a white gunman
on the first day of his “Mississippi March Against Fear.”378 Interviewed
from his hospital bed, an angry Meredith made national headlines
declaring, “I’m sorry I didn’t have something to take care of that man.”379
In future travels through Mississippi, Meredith told reporters he would be
armed.380 In some sense Meredith’s statement conveyed a simple intent to
defend himself. But in context, the danger that it would incite political
violence is plain. That worry is underscored by the debate and decisions
that followed.
Despite the attack on Meredith, CORE vowed to continue the “March
Against Fear.” There was an obvious concern about the safety of the
participants and a corresponding worry that security measures would be
considered provocative.
During the organizational meetings, national Civil Rights
Leaders engaged in vigorous debate about armed selfdefense. This question, along with the debates about the role
of whites and the hesitancy of the federal government to
support the movement eventually split the frail coalition.
When Floyd McKissick, CORE’s new director, Martin
Luther King, Jr., of the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference and Stokely Carmichael of SNCC signed a
manifesto highly critical of the Johnson administration and
agreed to have the Deacons for Defense and Justice protect
the march, the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins and the Urban
League’s Whitney Young, Jr., angrily withdrew their
support.381
The alignment of King, McKissick, and Carmichael against Roy
Wilkins and Whitney Young illustrates the spectrum of circumstances
along which the strategic dichotomy might be deployed and the risk that
accompanies aggressive renditions of it. Wilkins and the NAACP had
comfortably exercised the careful conservative rendition of the strategic
377

In 1962 Meredith attempted to integrate the University of Mississippi. Wendt, supra note 356,

at 281.
378

Id.
James H. Meredith, Big Changes Are Coming, SAT. EVENING POST, Aug. 13, 1966, at 23–27,
available at http://reportingcivilrights.loa.org/authors/selections.jsp?authorId=135; Roy Reed,
Meredith Regrets He Was Not Armed, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1966, at 1; see also WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE,
supra note 121, at 135 (citing He Shot Me Like . . . a Goddam Rabbit, NEWSWEEK, June 20, 1966, at
30).
380
Supra note 380.
381
Wendt, supra note 356, at 281.
379
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dichotomy to support compelling cases of private self-defense. But the
“March Against Fear” controversy shows that the strategic dichotomy also
could be deployed more aggressively to sanction self-defense preparations
that pressed closer to the boundary of political violence. Those aggressive
renditions risked spillover to which more cautious leaders like Wilkins
were highly averse.
In the wake of the attack on Meredith, continuing protests, especially
those employing the Deacons as security, had enhanced political
significance and the potential for igniting political violence. On the other
hand, with a comrade wounded, members of the coalition had an
understandable concern about their personal safety. The diverging
calculations of King and Wilkins illustrate different appetites for the risk
inherent in aggressive deployments of the strategic dichotomy.
In a much more practical way, the words and deeds of Holmes County,
Mississippi farmer and SNCC activist, Hartman Turnbow distill the
importance of private self-defense and the basic impulse fueling the
strategic dichotomy. When racist terrorists attacked his home, Turnbow
“pushed his family out the back door and grabbed the rifle off the wall and
started shooting.”382 Turnbow saw this as perfectly consistent with the
non-violent philosophy of the movement declaring, “I wasn’t being nonnonviolent, I was protecting my wife and family.”383
Turnbow was not alone in this sentiment. After a shootout with
Klansmen, Mississippi activist Robert Cooper explained, “I don’t figure
that I was violent. All I was doin’ was protectin’ myself.”384 Charles
Evers depicts his brother Medgar’s concurrent commitment to political
nonviolence and private self-defense essentially the same way. During the
turmoil surrounding James Meredith’s attempt to integrate Ole Miss,
“Medgar and Myrlie were barricaded in at home . . . . Medgar was
nonviolent, but he had six guns in the kitchen and living room.”385 SNCC
activist James Forman, confirms that these episodes reflect broad
community norms. Commenting on Hartman Turnbow, Forman observed
that “[s]elf-defense—at least of one’s home—was not a concept new to
Southern blacks in 1963 and there was hardly a black home in the South
382
CARSON, supra note 220, at 89; CHARLES E. COBB, JR., ON THE ROAD TO FREEDOM: A
GUIDED TOUR OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS TRAIL 302 (2008).
383
COBB, JR., supra note 382, at 302. Turnbow was not dissuaded by the fact that armed selfdefense was an imperfect response. The attack came at 3:00 a.m. with a firebomb and then shots fired
into Turnbow’s home. Turnbow charged out, “I saw two white men and one of them no sooner he saw
me he shot at me. . . . I had my .22 already in position and I just commenced shooting at him right fast.”
The aftermath is not surprising. The only arrest made was of Turnbow himself, on the suspicion of
setting fire to his own home. MILLS, supra note 122, at 96.
384
Interview with Robert Cooper, in YOUTH OF THE RURAL ORGANIZING CULTURAL CENTER,
MINDS STAYED ON FREEDOM: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN THE RURAL SOUTH, AN ORAL HISTORY
94 (1991).
385
EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 117 (emphasis added).
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386

without its shotgun or rifle.”
For most of our history, the Black community has supported armed
self-defense by maintaining the strategic dichotomy in the face of
tremendous risks. The danger that self-defense would spill over into
political violence and destroy crucial white alliances was substantial. The
entire movement—the freedom of an entire people—was on the line. On
that measure, the traditional costs of armed self-defense387 were just as
great, or greater than, the costs today. Despite that risk, as a matter of
practice, philosophy and policy, the community upheld the self-defense
interest of individual Blacks who were the victims of criminal aggression
and state failure. Though the stakes have been tremendous, the community
traditionally did not ask individuals to surrender the self-defense resource
to advance group goals. The modern orthodoxy, on the other hand, does
exactly that by pressing a recipe for community safety that requires good
people to surrender the standard tools of self-defense.388
IV. THE MODERN ORTHODOXY: EXPLANATION AND CRITICAL
EVALUATION
From the very beginning, it has been evident that crucial alliances with
white progressives would suffer if the freedom struggle devolved into
political violence. Part II showed how despite that risk, Blacks deployed
the strategic dichotomy to maintain armed self-defense as a crucial private
resource. However, as the civil rights conflict boiled over, urban rioting
exacerbated mainstream worries about Black violence, and Black radicals
invoked self-defense in a broader sphere that threatened the traditional
boundary against political violence. This made the strategic dichotomy
harder to maintain conceptually and more costly politically.
Concurrently, alliances between conservative/integrationist civil rights
groups and white progressives became more important in the wake of
white backlash against Black radicalism and urban rioting.389 The newly
minted national gun control movement rested firmly within that
progressive coalition.
The conservative/integrationist wing of the
movement, with its focus on institutional methodologies of legislation and
litigation came to dominate the Black leadership. It is from this
386

JAMES FORMAN, THE MAKING OF BLACK REVOLUTIONARIES 376 (1985).
Success or failure of the entire movement was arguably on the line.
388
See Nicholas J. Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder
Problem, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 840 (2008) (discussing the removal of guns from the
population as a means to reduce gun crime) [hereinafter Johnson, Imagining Gun Control].
389
MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS, supra note 256, at 192–93 (“By the off-year elections of 1966
the degree of racial polarization in this country was such that openly to court the black vote was to
invite defections among one’s white constituents. Prematurely prophesied three years earlier, the
much-heralded ‘white backlash’ had indeed set in.”).
387
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perspective that the traditional support of Black self-defense is dismissed
with argument that “things have changed.” This Part will engage these
developments.
Section A details the evolution of the modern orthodoxy. Section B
argues that traditional Black support for armed self-defense is
fundamentally a response to state failure and impotence that continues
unabated.
A. The Rise of the Modern Orthodoxy
The modern orthodoxy is rooted in a particular strand of civil rights
advocacy and political strategy that survived competing approaches within
the Black freedom movement.390 The NAACP model is the exemplar of
that approach.
Although the NAACP was the dominant civil rights organization in the
early stages of the Civil Rights movement, by the 1960s four major groups
had emerged. “The result was the highly competitive situation . . . [where]
the so called Big-Four organizations—NAACP, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (“SCLC”), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (“SNCC”), and CORE—jockeyed with one another for
influence over the movement, as well as for the increased shares of
publicity and money generated by protest activity.”391 The philosophical
divisions between these groups and the decline of three of them help us
understand the modern orthodoxy.392
The ascension of the evolving NAACP model and its influence on the
modern orthodoxy is significantly attributable to the shifts toward more
radical approaches by competing organizations. Flirtations with radicalism
tested the utility of political violence.393 The failure of the radical
390

See id. at 36 (discussing the political process model).
Id. at 154 n.7. In the footnote, McAdam addresses the National Urban League, which some
have added to constitute the “Big Five.” Id. at 154 n.7, 185 (referencing Goldman who used the term
“Big Five”). McAdam argues that the Urban League was influential in “social welfare and business
circles,” but far less so “within the movement itself.” The organizations visibility within the “liberal
establishment” (foundations, academia, social welfare groups) may help to account for the prominent
role ascribed to it by many of the movement’s contemporary chroniclers who were largely drawn from
the same establishment.” Id. at 154 n.7.
392
RECORD, supra note 163, at 36 (“From its origins the NAACP was limited by the fact that its
leaders did not envision it as a mass organization; the ‘Talented Tenth’ orientation, epitomized—almost
caricatured—in the stately and aloof Du Bois dominated the top staff.”).
393
Radical advocacy within the Black freedom struggle is nothing new. Nor is the tension
between radicals and more traditional, conservative organizations. This is illustrated by the divide in
the 1920s between the NAACP and more radical Black labor organizations. In addition to A. Philip
Randolph’s Messenger organization, the African Black Brotherhood (Harlem) and the American Negro
Labor Congress (“ANLC”) in Chicago and later the League of Struggle for Negro Rights, all took a
more radical stance in the Black freedom struggle. SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 209. After 1930, “the
main channel for Communist activity among blacks became a new organization, the League of Struggle
for Negro Rights. The league was part of implementing a Communist party decision to pay more
391
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experiments validated a more conservative/integrationist approach. That
approach, with its focus on institutional action inside mainstream
boundaries, fuels the modern orthodoxy.
Akinyele Umoja argues that the civil rights groups of the 1960’s
evolved along different trajectories partly because their leadership came
from different strata within the Black middle class.394 He divides the
leadership into the categories established by Thomas Boston for
identifying different strata in the Black middle class—independent,
dependent, and conservative.395
At the “center” of the Black political life, the dependent
strata, while maintaining social ties and identification with
the aspirations of the Black masses are also obligated to
“pacify the anxieties of white society” from which it draws
political and financial support. This tension creates
vacillation in the dependent strata relative to militant
collective action.396
SNCC and CORE took the militant path. The NAACP, the Urban
League, and to a lesser degree SCLC,397 pursued coalition politics. There
was evidence of the divide early on. SNCC and CORE were often seen as
troublemakers by the Kennedy Administration.398
Contrasting
attention to work in the South. Within a year the Scottsboro case became a critical focus of that work.”
Id. at 210. The ANLC particularly aimed to build “a militant mass Negro organization” with a working
class leadership. Id. at 209. The strategic disagreement is made plain in the ANLC “Call to Action”
explaining why middle class leadership of organizations intent on mainstream coalition building was
not to be trusted. Id.
These leaders (property owners, landlords, real estate agents, preachers, prostitute
college professors, editors of middle-class magazines and newspapers, heads of
various “advancement” and “improvement” associations) have a stake in the system
under which the masses of Negroes are oppressed and exploited. They are therefore
not in favor of its abolition, but merely seek a fuller share in the exploitation of their
own people and a higher social status for their own class. Moreover they are
incapable of leading the struggle because they have neither a clear understanding of
the nature of the struggle (which is essentially a class struggle, and not as they
pretend, a purely racial struggle) nor the courage to prosecute it militantly enough to
insure success.
Id. at 210.
394
Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet, supra note 366, at 560.
395
Id. at 567 (citing THOMAS D. BOSTON, RACE CLASS AND CONSERVATISM 43–46 (1988)).
396
Id. at 567–68 (citing BOSTON, supra note 395, at 43–46 (internal citations omitted)).
397
SCLC diverged with King’s denunciation of the Vietnam War and declined as a force after his
assassination. Id. at 563.
398
Id. at 568.
SNCC and Core leadership did not enjoy amicable relations with Washington. In
fact, SNCC and Core were often seen as troublemakers by the executive branch
during this period. According to King’s biographer . . . John F. Kennedy was
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philosophies also were evident in the responses to Lyndon Johnson’s
request for suspension of demonstrations during the 1964 presidential
elections. 399 The NAACP, SCLC and the Urban League “all agreed to
honor President Johnson’s requested moratorium to support his reelection
efforts.”400 SNCC and CORE refused.401
“By 1966 both [SNCC and CORE] had endorsed armed self-defense as
a legitimate and viable tactic in the struggle to achieve civil and human
rights.”402 That strategy, by most accounts, was a failure and the radical
organizations
declined
and
withered.403
In
contrast,
the
conservative/integrationist groups continued to reject political violence in
favor of coalition politics.404
The response to Black radicalism and political violence of the 1960’s
confirmed the assessment of generations of Black leaders that political
violence would lead to white backlash.405 The strategic dichotomy was
muddied as Black radicals invoked “self-defense” as a rationale for overt
political violence.406
pleased that SCLC rather than SNCC was leading the 1963 desegregation campaign
in Birmingham . . . quot[ing] Kennedy as saying ‘SNCC has got an investment in
violence. . . . They’re sons of bitches.
Id.
399

Id.
Id.
401
Id.
402
Id. at 558.
403
See generally MICHAEL LEVINE, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: FROM 1619 TO THE
PRESENT 198–208 (1996). SNCC became overtly racially exclusive during the 1966 Atlanta project.
SNCC Leaders Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown became more widely known in the Black power
movement. Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet, supra note 366, at 558. Attempting to encourage more
expedient action on the part of the federal government after the Meredith March, King warned “I’m
trying desperately to keep the movement nonviolent, but I can’t keep it nonviolent by myself.” Id. at
563. CORE, a formally interracial organization founded on Gandian principles of nonviolence,
transformed into an almost entirely a Black organization. “CORE’s members and leadership were
predominately White middle class individuals prior to the 1960’s. By the summer of 1964, Core
membership was predominately Black.” Id. at 575. Today, CORE is notable as perhaps the only Black
civil rights organization to align itself with gun rights organizations. CORE President Roy Innis has
been a member of the board of directors of the National Rifle Association and CORE filed an amicus
brief supporting Shelly Parker and Dick Heller in the landmark decision District of Columbia v. Heller.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Congress of Racial Equality in Support of Respondent, District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
404
See Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet, supra note 366, at 561 (“SCLC leaders felt it necessary
to dissociate themselves from any retaliatory violence or form of self-defense by local activists and
movement supporters, for Black people in general to win the public opinion battle with White
segregationists. They believed that the use of force by Black people and the movement would only
serve to alienate White liberal and the general White population.”).
405
See, e.g., MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS, supra note 256, at 156–60.
406
For example, the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense rationalized some of their most violent
self-destructive efforts by explicitly grounding them on the rules and ordinances governing selfdefense. See id. at 207 (describing a Black Panthers press release which stated that the Party stands for
400
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This was a tipping point in the development of the modern orthodoxy.
There was a “growing disagreement within insurgent ranks over the proper
goals of the movement and the most effective means of attaining them.” 407
Lined up on one side were traditional integrationists who
continued to eschew violence as an unacceptable or
ineffective means of pursuing movement goals. Among the
Big Four, SCLC and NAACP shared this position. A further
distinction can be made between these two groups on the
basis of the principal method used to pursue integrationist
aims. With its reliance on noninstitutionalized protest
techniques, SCLC can be seen as constituting the “radical”
faction within the integrationist wing, while the NAACP, on
the basis of its continued emphasis on institutionalized forms
of protest, comprised a “conservative” integrationist faction.
Aligned in increasing opposition to the integrationists was
the so-called “black power” wing of the movement, with its
rejection of integration as the fundamental goal of black
insurgency and its approval of violence (either in self-defense
or as an offensive tactic), as an acceptable addition to the
movement’s tactical arsenal. The remaining two members of
the Big Four—CORE and SNCC—were in varying degrees
associated with this wing of the movement.408
The spillover risk that had always plagued the strategic dichotomy was
particularly acute in this context. Scholars of the Civil Rights and Black
Power movements, emphasize that although “self-defense had always been
a part of the movement . . . [a] shift from self-defense to proactive violence
contributed to the [latter] movement’s demise.”409
While there had been scattered black opposition to the strategy of nonviolence,410 it was not widely covered until Malcolm X leveled harsh
“revolutionary solidarity with all people fighting against the forces of imperialism, capitalism, racism
and fascism”).
407
Id. at 183.
408
Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
409
Yohuru Williams, Book Review, J.S. HIST. Vol. LXXII, No. 2, at 518, 519 (2006) (reviewing
CHRISTOPHER B. STRAIN, PURE FIRE: SELF-DEFENSE AS ACTIVISM IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2005));
see also MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS, supra note 256, at 208. The onset of Black power produced
sharp birth pangs for its principal advocates. Both CORE and SNCC were reduced to serious financial
straits as white sympathizers deserted in droves. This is not the unanimous view. Christopher Strain
argues that “the personal and largely apolitical issue of self-defense morphed into a highly public and
political issue for black Americans in the 1960’s . . . that any assertion of self, or self-protection, by
black Americans represented a blow against racism and bigotry . . . even though it was often an
individual act of defiance, free from formal coordination, collective action or overtly political aims.”
STRAIN, supra note 148, at 6–7.
410
Early on, the Black nationalist press questioned the utility of the nonviolent strategy and some
criticisms equated nonviolence with cowardice. Wendt, Protection or Path, supra note 218, at 325.
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411

public criticisms of Martin Luther King.
Even Malcolm’s incendiary
advocacy paid lip service to the strategic dichotomy. He pressed the selfdefense point, arguing that Blacks are “peaceful people” except in response
to aggressors. He explicitly invoked the Second Amendment and claimed
a fundamental and constitutional right to self-defense against criminal
attack. But in a final flourish Malcolm plunged fully into advocacy of
political violence. “The biggest criminal against whom Blacks need to
defend themselves”, he claimed was the state, “Uncle Sam.”412
Militant advocacy of political violence raised the difficulty and costs
of defending the strategic dichotomy and diminished its effectiveness.413
The influence of the radicals and the problem they posed for
conservative/integrationist support of the strategic dichotomy is illustrated
by the shift of Black activists in Cleveland from nonviolent protests of de
facto school segregation, to creation of the Medgar Evers Rifle Club
Community Self-Defense Organization.414
In contrast to Southern protective squads, the Medgar Evers Rifle Club
was not a response to overt racist threats and served no evident “protective
purpose.”415 Such a group could not be justified on the foundation of
traditional self-defense that the leadership had recognized and
accommodated through the strategic dichotomy. Now, the preparation for
violence spilled over into a less defined setting and could be construed as
threatening political violence.
Simon Wendt’s assessment of the Black Power movement underscores
the point. Advocacy of political violence “fostered violent race riots,
betrayed the integrationist and nonviolent vision of earlier activism” and
Also it is evident that nonviolence (like any opposition to racism) was not cost free. In the summer of
1956, one official of the White Citizen’s Council in Alabama explained the growth of his organization:
“The bus boycott made us . . . . Before the niggers stopped riding the buses, we had only 800 members.
Now we have 13,000 to 14,000 in Montgomery alone.” THOMAS R. BROOKS, WALLS COME
TUMBLING DOWN: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1940–1970, at 116 (1974).
411
Wendt, Protection or Path, supra note 218, at 325. It is difficult to know all of the reasons
that moved Black radicals to the seemingly suicidal strategy of political violence. Frustration, hubris,
and desperation may have all played a role. In many ways, radical advocacy of political violence was a
strategy of talk loudly and carry a small stick. However, a 1963 Brink and Harris Survey produced an
interesting response to the question: “Some people have said that since there are ten whites for every
Negro in America, if it came to white against Negro, the Negroes would lose. Do you agree with this
or disagree?” Only two in ten Blacks agreed. WILLIAM BRINK & LOUIS HARRIS, THE NEGRO
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 74 (1963).
412
Antihostile, MALCOLM X ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT (Harlem, 1964), YOUTUBE (Apr. 9,
2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cz3isgUZe5Y.
413
Wendt, Protection or Path, supra note 218, at 328. After his split with the Nation of Islam,
Malcolm X founded the secular Organization of Afro-American Unity, which advocated the creation of
Black controlled educational, cultural, economic, and political institutions and active armed resistance
to white violence. Id. at 325.
414
Id. at 326.
415
Id.
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416

was a strategic failure. Initially designated “The Black Panther Party for
Self-Defense” the Panthers pushed political violence under the umbrella of
self-defense.417 For them, self-defense included “strategic choices and
carefully posed challenges to the so-called legitimate forms of state
violence that had become all too regularly used within Black
communities.”418 The Panthers flouted the traditional distinction between
self-defense and political violence and the consequences confirmed the
fears of generations of Black leaders.
The Black Panther Party was decimated by federal, state, and local
response to its open campaign of political violence. Direct confrontations
with the state lead to incarceration and deaths of party members.419
Confirming the long-standing assessment, Huey Newton later
acknowledged in his memoirs that political violence was counterproductive
and brought the Panthers an unwinnable war with the state that destroyed
their white support.420
Splinter groups like the Black Liberation Party were even more overt
advocates and practitioners of political violence under the banner of selfdefense. The BLA’s avowed strategy included preemptive strikes against
police.421 The official response was predictable.422 The trajectory of these
416

Id. at 320.
Id. at 328–29.
418
Id. at 326.
419
Id. at 327.
420
Id. at 328.
421
MARYLAND STATE POLICE: CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, THE BLACK LIBERATION
ARMY: UNDERSTANDING—MONITORING—CONTROLLING 4 (1991). A core conviction of the BLA
was to take control of the community by killing police (both Black and white). Id. at 4, 12. The BLA
claimed credit for the murder of at least two policemen at a Harlem housing project and the attempted
murder of two others who were guarding the home of a lawyer who was prosecuting a case against the
BPP. KENNETH O’REILLY, “RACIAL MATTERS”: THE FBI’S SECRET FILE ON BLACK AMERICA, 1960–
1972, at 321 (1989). Assata Shakur (JoAnne Chesimard) provides an illuminating account. Senit
MINN.
(May
23,
2001),
Rahel
Debesai,
Assata
Olugbala
Shakur,
UNIV.
http://voices.cla.umn.edu/artistpages/shakur_assata.php. Shakur was convicted of murdering a State
trooper, then sprung from jail by members of the BLA. Id. She then fled to Cuba where she wrote an
autobiography that offers an insider’s account of the BPP and BLA. Id. See generally ASSATA
SHAKUR, ASSATA: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1987). Shakur’s assessment highlights the divide between
the strategy of radical resistance and coalition building. See ASSATA, supra, at 227 (“One day, in the
not too distant future, any Black organization that is not based on bootlicking and tomming will be
forced underground.”). John Castellucci offers a less sympathetic view of the BLA and similar
organizations, stating frankly that the “BLA went underground to kill cops.” JOHN CASTELLUCCI, THE
BIG DANCE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF KATHY BOUDIN AND THE TERRORIST FAMILY THAT COMMITTED
THE BRINK’S ROBBERY MURDERS 134 (1986).
422
There is an interesting parallel between the Black radical movements of this period and the
radical left. Laura Browder details the advocacy of armed political violence by various radical leftist
groups with a focus on radical women of the 1960s and 1970s. See LAURA BROWDER, HER BEST
SHOT: WOMEN AND GUNS IN AMERICA 136–37 (2006) (recounting the focus on tracing women’s use of
guns in the 1960s and 1970s as a means of placing themselves within an American tradition). Her
treatment of “Armed Women of the Far Right” reflects a similar self-destructive advocacy of political
417
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groups confirmed the futility of Black political violence.
In what Doug McAdam marks as a contraction of political
opportunities, the period 1966–1970 is crucial in the development of the
modern orthodoxy.423 Radical organizations were in decline.424 In the
North, urban riots marked a sort of failure of the civil rights leadership to
connect to the energy that fueled the violence. This failure to connect
made the surviving organizations even more dependent on external (white
progressive) sources of funding and support.425 Urban rioting diminished
Black political capital, prompted white backlash, and pressed the Blacks
more firmly into the camp of progressive allies.426
In this environment, it was practically and conceptually difficult and
tactically wasteful to expend the political capital necessary to sustain the
strategic dichotomy. When Black radicals flouted the strategic dichotomy,
the crucial question was whether more conservative organizations would
step in to defend it. This was an entirely new dynamic. The incentives and
opportunities to deploy the strategic dichotomy on behalf of a competing
group within the movement were minimal with dubious promise of payoff.
The radicals had sullied the strategic dichotomy with claims of equivalence
between political violence and self-defense. Increasing efforts by
conservatives/integrationists to sustain the dichotomy threatened to inflame
progressives and seemed less relevant to the floundering northern
movement.
There was an early marker of this in 1966. On August 21,
representatives from along spectrum of Black leadership appeared on the
nationally syndicated political talk show, Meet the Press, to address Civil
Rights.427 It was a pivotal and high profile airing of the strategic
dichotomy.
Opposing the radical implications of “Black Power” were Martin
Luther King of SCLC, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP and Whitney Young of
the Urban League.428 Defending it were James Meredith, Stokely
Carmichael of SNCC and Floyd McKissick of CORE.429 Carmichael had
deployed the phrase “Black Power” in June of 1966 in a Greenwood,
violence. See id. at 186–87 (discussing armed female activists of the far right and the effect of using
their sexual attention to attract male recruits) .
423
MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS, supra note 256, at 201–02.
424
Id. at 191.
425
Id. at 208–10
426
See id. at 194 (explaining how the “rac[e] issue tended to polarize the various components of
[the Democrats’] traditional urban coalition” and how the “white ethnics abandoned the party in
droves”); see also LEVINE, supra note 403, at 204 (stating that Blacks lost political allies as a result of
“white backlash”).
427
Meet the Press (transcript of NBC television broadcast Aug. 21, 1966), at 1, 2, available at
http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/meet-press#.
428
Id. at 2–3.
429
Id. at 3–4.
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Mississippi speech, initiating the resumption of the Mississippi March
Against Fear.430
The questioning acknowledged the traditional insistence upon a
distinction between self-defense and political violence. Host Lawrence
Spivak’s question to Floyd McKissick, the new Director of CORE, reflects
this mainstream acknowledgement of the strategic dichotomy: “There is a
difference between self-defense and non-violence. . . . Everybody believes
in self-defense. . . . Am I to understand then that you and Dr. Martin Luther
King really are not in disagreement on the principle and the philosophy of
nonviolence?”431
McKissick responded that “self-defense and nonviolence are not
incompatible,” but equivocated on whether he agreed with King about the
precise boundary between self-defense and political violence.432
Unable to draw a direct answer from McKissick, the panel put the
question to King.433 King’s cautious response reflected the circumstances.
Contrast King’s earlier characterization of self-defense in the Robert
Williams controversy as “moral,” “legal,” and perhaps earning blacks
support for the “courage and self-respect it reflects”.434 Now, in the
shadow of radical invocations of Black Power, King offered a barely
recognizable rendition of the strategic dichotomy that showed an obvious
concern about statements or actions that would prompt political violence:
I believe firmly in nonviolence. . . . I think a turn to violence
on the part of the Negro at this time would be both
impractical and immoral. Now, if Mr. McKissick believes in
that, I certainly agree with him. Now, on the question of
defensive violence, I have made it clear that I don’t think we
need programmatic action around defensive violence. People
are going to defend themselves anyway. I think the minute
you have programmatic action around defensive violence and
pronouncements about it, the line of demarcation between
defensive violence and aggressive violence becomes very
thin. The minute the nomenclature of violence gets into the
atmosphere, people begin to respond violently and in their
unsophisticated minds they cannot quite make the distinction
between defensive and aggressive violence.435
Spivak pressed the self-defense/political violence boundary again in an
430

WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 131.
Meet the Press, supra note 427, at 20–21.
432
Id. at 22.
433
Id.
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MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 5 The Social Organization of Nonviolence, in THE PAPERS OF
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 299, 302 (2005).
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Meet the Press, supra note 427, at 22.
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exchange with James Meredith. The result was a raw and open
endorsement of political violence that defied the distinctions Blacks
traditionally had worked to sustain through the strategic dichotomy.
Referencing Meredith’s criticisms of King’s nonviolent approach, Spivak
asked,
Mr. Meredith, don’t you think we ought to get straight on the
difference between nonviolence and self-defense? . . . I think
when Dr. King and others speak about nonviolence they say
that groups of negroes shouldn’t take [arms] . . . . I don’t
think that there are many of us who don’t believe in the right
of self-defense of [any] Negro against anyone who attacks
him. . . . When we talk about nonviolence, we are saying that
the Negro ought not in groups or alone take up a gun . . . in
order to take what he believes belongs to him.436
Meredith’s response was devastating to the long and careful efforts to
maintain the strategic dichotomy, rendering it an awkward tool with
dubious political utility:
MR. MERIDITH: [T]he Negro has never entertained the
idea of taking up arms against the whites . . . . But now I
think the Negro must become part of this mainstream and if
the whites—now you take Mississippi, for instance—now I
know the people that shot in my home years ago. They know
the people that killed all of the Negroes that have been
killed. . . . [T]he Negro has no choice but to remove these
men and they have to be removed.
MR. SPIVAK: Are you suggesting then that if several
Negroes are killed or any white men are killed and the law
does not punish them, as happens very often in the case of
white men too, that people ought to organize a[s] vigilante[s]
and go out and take the law into their own hands and commit
violence? You are not saying that, are you, Mr. Meredith?
MR. MERIDITH: That is exactly what I am saying. Exactly
MR. CARMICHAEL: If those won’t do it, who is going to
do it?
MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Meredith, do you mean to tell me that
you believe the Negroes in this country ought to organize,
take up guns . . . .
MR. MEREDITH: This is precisely, and I will tell you why,
436
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because the white supremacy is a system—
MR. SPIVAK: Well, Mr. Meredith, this doesn’t even make
sense against 180 million people. If you do it they are going
to do it.
MR. ROWAN: Mr. Carmichael, do I detect that you agree
with Mr. Meredith that the Negro may have to take up arms?
MR. CARMICHAEL: I agree 150 percent that black people
have to move to the position where they organize themselves
and they are in fact a protection for each other. . . . [I]f in fact
180 million people just think they are going to turn on us and
we are going to sit there, like the Nazis did to the Jews, they
are wrong. We are going to go down together, all of us.
MR. EVANS: Mr. Wilkins, I want to ask you, . . . about
[Carmichael’s] last statement, do you think it serves the
Negro or the white man, his purpose in any way, to threaten
that the ten percent of the Negro population can, if it has to,
drag down this whole country?
MR. WILKINS: I think Mr. Carmichael is—if he weren’t
where he is, he ought to be on Madison Avenue. He is a
public relations man par excellence. He abounds in the
provocative phrase. Of course, no one believes that the
Negro minority in this country is going to take up arms and
try to rectify every wrong that has been done the Negro race
if somebody doesn’t rectify it through the regular channels.437
It is easy to understand how in this environment the leadership would
become more circumspect in deploying the strategic dichotomy and about
its general approach to the question of black violence, even in self-defense.
With subtle distinctions harder to sustain, prudence demanded strong
condemnation of the dangerous advocacy of political violence as selfdefense being advanced by the black power movement.
For Wilkins, some have argued that the approach was tactical; that
donations to the NAACP quadrupled in the period 1966–1968 when the
organization was vigorously opposing the radical concept of “black
power.”438 Whatever the motivation, Wilkins plainly opposed the
aggressive, radical rendition of the strategic dichotomy.
Still, in other venues, Wilkins continued rhetorical support of a careful,
conservative version. In his keynote address at the 1966 NAACP
437

Id. at 44–47, 53.
Id. at 145 (“Almost quadrupling its income between 1966 and 1968, the NAACP undoubtedly
benefited from its adamant opposition to the new slogan.”).
438

1564

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1491

convention, Wilkins criticized the radical turn of SNCC, directly deployed
a traditional, conservative rendition of the strategic dichotomy, and
repudiated the radical aggressive rendition (first addressing SNCC’s new
public endorsement of self-defense and then repudiating the new black
power movement):
One organization [SNCC] which has been meeting in
Baltimore has passed a resolution declaring for defense of
themselves by Negro citizens if they are attacked. This is not
new as far as the NAACP is concerned. Historically our
Association has defended in court those persons who have
defended themselves and their homes with firearms. . . . But
the more serious division in the civil rights movement is the
one posed by a word formulation that implies clearly a
difference in goals. No matter how endlessly they try to
explain it, the term “black power” means anti-white
power. . . . It has to mean separatism. . . . It is a reverse
Mississippi, a reverse Hitler, a reverse Ku Klux Klan. . . . We
of the NAACP will have none of this.439
This was an important moment of converging trends. While the
militant strategy of “political violence as self-defense” was proving a
failure, coalition politics and the conservative strategy of institutional
change were paying off:
In marked contrast to the withdrawal of external support
experienced by SCLC, SNCC, and CORE, the NAACP
enjoyed a steep and steady rise during this period in its level
of outside funding. . . . [T]he NAACP came to be seen by
external support groups as virtually the only “acceptable”
funding option available. . . . In response, first to the
substantive radicalization of SNCC and CORE, and later to
King’s antiwar stance, many groups that had earlier
contributed to one of these three organizations shifted their
support to the NAACP. . . . By the end of the [1960s], this
dramatic redistribution of external support had helped to
reduce the once formidable Big Four to a single strong
movement organization. 440
Important institutional changes were also unfolding. President Lyndon
439
Roy Wilkins, Whither “Black Power”?, CRISIS, Aug.–Sept. 1966, at 353, 353–54; see also
WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 141 (discussing CORE’s 1966 resolution embracing selfdefense by deleting the organizations requirements that members “adopt the technique of non-violence
in direct action”).
440
MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS, supra note 256, at 213.
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Johnson advanced the War on Poverty with spoils to the Black
underclass.441
He pressed for and signed landmark civil rights
442
legislation
and appointed former NAACP Chief Counsel Thurgood
Marshall as the first Black to the post of Solicitor General and then to the
United Supreme Court.443 Concurrently, Johnson pressed for and signed
the Gun Control Act of 1968,444 lamenting that it was a “watered-down”
version of what he had proposed.445
The themes intersect in Johnson’s nomination of Marshall to the
Supreme Court. In preparation for Marshall’s confirmation hearings,
Johnson “put him on a national commission to study crime and violence in
American cities. The idea was to keep Marshall’s name in the news as a
sober, rational voice able to respond to black militants.”446 Throughout the
441

LEVINE, supra note 403, at 194.
See id. at 192 (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
443
David Coleman & Keri Matthews, Thurgood Marshall & LBJ: From the Johnson Tapes,
MILLERCENTER.ORG, http://millercenter.org/presidentialclassroom/exhibits/thurgood-marshall-lbjjohnson-tapes?ModPagespeed=noscript (last visited Feb. 28, 2013); see also Thurgood Marshall, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/osg/aboutosg/osghistpage.php?id=32 (last visited Feb. 23,
2013) (providing a biography of Marshall).
444
Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
445
Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Urging Passage of an
Effective Gun Control Law, 1 PUB. PAPERS 694, 694–95 (June 6, 1968); see also David T. Hardy, The
Firearms Owners’ Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 597
(1986) (examining how “the Johnson Administration advocated stricter firearms control with increasing
vigor”). The Johnson administration pressed Senator Dodd, who introduced the bill as S. 1, to push
more aggressively on moving the bill through the senate. Hardy, supra, at 597. In his 1968 State of the
Union Address, Johnson called on Congress “to stop the trade in mail-order murder, to stop it this year
by adopting a proper gun control law.” Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1
PUB. PAPERS 25, 30 (Jan. 17, 1968). After the 1968 GCA was enacted, Johnson criticized it as “a
watered down version of the Gun Control Law [he] recommended.” 1 PUB. PAPERS 14, 694 (1970). A
competing bill offered by others as S. 917 and amendments to Dodd’s bill were explicitly described as
being submitted on behalf of the Johnson administration. 113 CONG. REC. 2902, 3255.
One of the first signals of the rise of the modern orthodoxy occurs around this time in the form
of Roy Wilkins’s apparent allusion in 1967 to the ongoing work driving the Gun Control Act of 1968.
In questioning that reflects Robert Sherrill’s criticism that the Act was driven by a desire to control
black violence, see ROBERT SHERRILL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 280, 282–83 (1973), Wilkins
was asked by Robert Novak, “Would you be in favor of a massive effort to disarm the Negroes in the
ghettoes, just to try to prevent these open-shooting wars such as occurred in Newark last night?” Meet
the Press, supra note 427, at 9. Wilkins’s principle response was a standard rendition of the strategic
dichotomy: “I wouldn’t disarm the Negroes and leave them helpless prey to the people who wanted to
go in and shoot them up. . . . Every American wants to own a rifle. Why shouldn’t the Negroes own
rifles.” Id. But this response came after Novak pressed him about gun prohibition targeted specifically
at Blacks. His first parry, seemingly consistent with the views driving Johnson’s advocacy of new
federal gun controls, suggested a nascent support for the program of gun regulation that had been
stirring in progressive circles: “I would be in favor of disarming everybody, not just the Negroes.” Id.
It is unclear whether Wilkins was referring to nationwide disarmament or disarming everyone in riot
torn cities. Either way, the statement seems in tension with his many pronouncements in support of
armed self-defense and is an early signal of potential support in the Black leadership for stringent gun
control.
446
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 334 (1998).
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1960s and into the 1970s as Blacks registered to vote in greater numbers,
more Black representatives were elected to legislatures.447 Blacks gained
increasingly influential positions in the executive branch and Black
administrations came to power in various cities.448
This prevailing Black establishment faced a new reality. A product of
successful coalition politics and beneficiary of legislation forged by
progressive alliances, it disconnected from the tradition of Black selfdefense that itself was now sullied by the radicals’ blurring of the boundary
between private self-defense and political violence. With access to new
levels of power, the Black establishment now could plausibly view the
historic reasons for distrust of the state as having disappeared with their
own ascendency to power.449
This was precisely the time that the national gun control movement
emerged and was quickly ensconced in the progressive coalition.450 With
cities burning and black radicals preaching violent revolution,451 politicians
and editorialists called for stricter gun legislation as a way to disarm the

447

LEVINE, supra note 403, at 192–93.
Id. at 193–94, 211, 234. The new crop of Black mayors included: Richard Hatcher of Gary,
Indiana (in 1967); Kenneth Gibson of Newark, New Jersey (in 1970); Thomas Bradley of Los Angeles,
California (in 1973); Maynard Jackson of Atlanta, Georgia (in 1973); Coleman Young of Detroit,
Michigan (in 1973), Ernest R. Morial of New Orleans, Louisiana (in 1977); and Richard Arrington of
Birmingham, Alabama (in 1979). Id. at 234. For summaries of Black advances in Congress, as well as
in state and local political offices, see id. at 193, 222, 234–35. See also Progress Report 1967:
Political Victories Climax Year of Strife and Explosion in Nation’s Black Ghettos, EBONY, Jan. 1968,
at 118, 120–22 (highlighting 1967 African American achievements made inside and out of
government).
449
This marked a shifting of establishment priorities more than an empirically verifiable change
in conditions. Racist violence against and by Blacks continues to this day and puts innocents at risk in
ways that the state cannot prevent.
See generally Hate Map, S. POVERTY L. CTR.,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/hate-map (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) (displaying geographically
“1,018 active hate groups” identified in 2011 that “have beliefs or practices that attack or malign an
entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics”).
450
See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional Politics of
Gun Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715, 773–74 (2005) (arguing that after the Gun Control Act of 1968,
“a plausible organized resistance to the right to keep and bear arms splashed onto the scene,” leading to
the formation of the National Council to Control Handguns and the Coalition to Ban Handguns).
While National organizations explicitly advocating gun prohibition emerged only in the 1970s, gun
control proposals were by no means a new phenomenon. See, e.g., NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL.,
FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 251–52 (2012)
(highlighting gun control restrictions passed prior to the Civil War); see also ADAM WINKLER, GUN
FIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 207–11 (2011) (describing the
collaboration in the first half of the twentieth century between the NRA and prominent gun control
advocates to develop legislation such as the Revolver Act and the National Firearms Act). Of course,
those gun control efforts were seeking to prevent untrustworthy people from getting guns, not to ban
guns for everyone.
451
See, e.g., ALEXANDER DECONDE, GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL
176–77 (2001) (discussing the 1965 race riot in California and how it was described as “guerrilla
warfare, an uprising, or a revolt”).
448
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452

ghettos.
Black mayors, local state and national representatives and
appointees—having gained power, now facing the burden of exercising
it—embraced the progressive program of supply side gun control as an
answer to the crime and unrest afflicting their new domains.
From there, the modern orthodoxy took hold and flourished as supplyside gun control became an article of faith for progressives. By 1976, for
example, Maynard Jackson, the first black mayor of Atlanta,453 serving as
the Chairman of the National Coalition to Ban Handguns, urged that, “[t]he
United States should move immediately to ban the import, manufacture,
sale and possession of all handguns . . . .”454 Today, the worry that this
demands a level of trust in government that is incompatible with the Black
experience, practice, and policy is answered with the assertion that things
have changed.455 The next section will critique the view that changed
circumstances validate the modern orthodoxy.
B. Answering the Twenty-First Century Objection
One might agree that there is a strong tradition of armed self-defense
in the Black community and still reason that the modern orthodoxy is
justified on the view that “things have changed.” There is no dispute that
Black-on-Black crime by desperate young men in poor urban communities
is a scourge that prompts many to embrace the promise of supply-side gun
control. This view is pressed in detail by Michael de Leeuw, author of the
NAACP’s Amicus Brief supporting the District’s gun ban456 in District of
Columbia v. Heller.457 His essay in the Harvard Blackletter Law Journal
defends and carries forward the modern orthodoxy, arguing that in urban
districts with Black administrations, stringent supply-side gun laws should
be upheld as an exercise of community autonomy and that support for such
exceptions to the right to keep and bear arms should be an essential part of
the modern civil rights agenda.458 This is a more race-driven rendition of
Justice Breyer’s Heller dissent, which would permit local governments to
452

SHERRILL, supra note 445, at 283–90.
David M. Halbfinger, Maynard H. Jackson Jr., First Black Mayor of Atlanta and a Political
Force, Dies at 65, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A29.
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Maynard Holbrook Jackson, Jr., Handgun Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed, 8
N.C. CENT. L.J. 189, 189 (1977). “In [1989], the National Coalition to Ban Handguns changed its
name to the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence to reflect its view that assault rifles, as well as handguns,
should be outlawed.” KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN
AMERICA 112 (2006). The National Urban League continues as a member of the Coalition. Member
Organizations, COAL. TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.csgv.org/about-us/member-organizations
(last visited Feb. 23, 2013).
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See infra note 469 (discussing de Leeuw et al.).
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Brief of Amicus Curiae the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of
Petitioners at 25–29, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
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554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 136–37.
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impose more stringent limits on generally available firearms or outright de
jure bans in certain communities.459
There is, however, a mistake of focus in the objection that ‘things have
changed.’460 Even if it is true that Blacks no longer have to worry about
racist violence461 and malevolent governments (or more contestably their
agents),462 the objection ignores that the Black self-defense tradition is
459
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 722 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The impulse
to exalt the role of benevolent governments in this context is an understandable counterpoint to the
historic treatment of Black-on-Black crime as a non-issue by racist state and local governments. See,
e.g., POWDERMAKER, supra note 25, at 169–74 (1939) (arguing that malevolent and neglectful
governments forced Blacks to settle their own intra-group difficulties using violence that might have
been avoided by the imposition of the rule of law by a benign administrator).
460
The “things have changed” argument also might dictate a change in views about the death
penalty and prisoners’ rights. If Black administrations and Black police are now locking up Black
criminals that prey on Black victims, why should Blacks continue to worry about rights of the accused
in the same way we worried through most of our history (where the state was notorious for
misidentifying, viciously interrogating, mistreating and Black suspects and offenders)? The answer is
that the problems continue and have not been erased simply by the election of Black mayors; the same
is true for armed self-defense.
Finally, the leap from Black electoral success to the assumption that poor Black communities
should trust the Black security apparatus is a perilous one. The dynamic between police culture and
minority communities is a complicated one that is beyond the scope of this Article. But that
complexity is manifested in the ample evidence that Black mayors does not automatically equal
harmonious police-community relations. The recent indictment of New Orleans Police officers for
assault and murder of Blacks following Hurricane Katrina is a prime illustration of this. See Trymaine
Lee, Inquiries Give Credence to Reports of Racial Violence After Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010,
at A9 (“Several police officers and a white civilian accused of racially motivated violence have recently
been indicted [and convicted] in various cases, and more incidents are coming to light as the Justice
Department has started several investigations into civil rights violations after the storm.”). There, at
least one of the officers was Black. See Jarvis DeBerry, Black New Orleans Police Officers Help
(May
27,
2012),
Maintain
Blue
Wall
of
Silence,
TIMES-PICAYUNE
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2012/05/black_new_orleans_
police_offic.html (“Robert Faulcon, a black officer convicted in the Danziger Bridge case, got the
longest sentence given to an officer for Katrina-related crimes.”). While this alone is not an argument
for civilian armament, it undercuts trust in the collective security apparatus, which is an important
component of the gun control movement’s most aggressive anti-self-defense views.
461
This, however, is contestable, as evidenced by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks
modern episodes and groups that advocate racist violence. See What We Do, S. POVERTY L. CTR.,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-involved/what-we-do (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (“We track the activities
of hate groups and domestic terrorists across America, and we launch innovative lawsuits that seek to
destroy networks of radical extremists.”).
462
This, too, is contestable. See, e.g., Victoria Cherrie, NAACP Wants SBI to Look at Shootings,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 13, 2008), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2008/06/13/45145/naacpwants-sbi-to-look-at-shootings.html (describing the NAACP of North Carolina’s effort to enact state
legislation in response to police-involved shootings); Charles Ellison, Tensions Persist in Portland
Since Fatal Police Shooting of Unarmed Man, POLITIC365 (Sept. 6, 2010),
http://politic365.com/2010/09/06/tensions-persist-in-portland-since-fatal-police-shooting-of-unarmedBlack-man/ (noting local anger over perceptions of chronic police brutality in Portland, Oregon).

[M]any people in Portland are perplexed that large segments of Portland’s African
American community see the shooting death of Aaron Campbell through a racial
lens. A white Portland police officer shot Campbell, an unarmed black man, in the
back during a confrontation at an apartment building. Police and city leaders have
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fundamentally a response to the failure and limitations of government.463
It is true that the Black self-defense tradition emerged in a context where
much of the reason for this failure was overt hostility and official neglect.
But it is a mistake to presume that the reason for failure of government is
pivotal. From the perspective of people at risk, the reason is secondary.
The central thing is that they face a physical threat within a window of
state failure.464 The reasons for the state’s failure to protect these people
come under intense criticism for confusion at the scene. But Ingram and other
African Americans who live here say the Campbell shooting cannot be seen as a
singular incident: It confirms a deep-seated distrust of police and a fear that
interaction with them has the potential to turn violent.
Nikole Hannah-Jones, Black Experience Propels Anger in Police Shooting of Aaron
Campbell, OREGONIAN (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland
/index.ssf/2010/02/black_experience_propels_anger.html.
Then the Homer police showed up, two white officers whose arrival caused the
participants at the Black family gathering to quickly fall silent. Within moments,
Monroe lay dead, shot by one of the officers as his family looked on.
....
Yet the Feb. 20 Homer incident was not an isolated case. Across the nation, in four
cases in recent months, white police officers have been accused of unprovoked
shootings of African Americans in what civil rights leaders say are illustrations of
the potentially deadly consequences of racial profiling by police. In the mostly
white Houston suburb of Bellaire, a 23-year-old black man sitting in his own SUV
in the driveway of his parents’ home was shot and wounded on New Year’s Eve by
police who mistakenly believed he had stolen the vehicle. The case is under
investigation. In Oakland, a transit police officer has been charged with murder for
allegedly shooting an unarmed black man in the back while he was restrained and
lying face down on a train platform on New Year’s Day.
....
The evidence is not merely anecdotal. The most recent national analysis from the
Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that blacks and Hispanics
were nearly three times as likely as whites to be searched by police—and blacks
were almost four times as likely as whites to be subjected to the use of force.
Howard Witt, Race May Be Factor in Police Shooting of Unarmed Elderly Man, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13,
2009), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-race-shootingswebmar13,0,7686526.story; Press Release, NAACP of N.C, Stop the Epidemic of Police Shootings of
African Americans! Joint Statement on Charlotte Police Shootings (Jun. 2008), available at
http://http://carolinajustice.typepad.com/ncnaacp/2008/06/stop-the-epidem.html#more (highlighting the
series of Charlotte-area civilian shootings by police during the first five months of 2008).
463
For an assessment of my past scholarly work on the topic, see Nicholas J. Johnson, SelfDefense?, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL. 187, 194 (2006) (“At the instant the threat arises, government generally
is just an abstraction with nothing to say about the physical matters at hand, powerless either to impair
self-defense or for that matter to protect the victim.”). See also Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and
Passions: The Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 97, 118 (1997) (“The
state’s inability to stop imminent criminal attacks justifies, and indeed compels, a right to armed selfdefense to fill the gap.”).
464
I have previously addressed the assertion that opposition to gun control is the cause of this
government failure. See Johnson, Imagining Gun Control, supra note 388, at 851 (noting that even
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may have changed. But the core private interest in self-preservation within
that window and the tools to facilitate it have not.
In an earlier era, Thomas Fortune urged, “in the absence of law . . . we
maintain that every individual has every right . . . to . . . protect himself.465
Ida B. Wells advocated armed self-defense as a response to government
failure, noting the folly of trusting the government that was plainly not
strong enough to protect the exercise of the ballot.466 She advocated the
Winchester repeating rifle on the view that even if the Federal government
was not overtly hostile, it certainly was not equipped to protect Blacks
from imminent threats.467 In 1963, CORE workers complained to the stillpacifist national office, “[w]e cannot tell someone not to defend his
property and the lives of his family . . . .”468
In 1916, W.E.B. Du Bois picked up a gun to protect his home and
family. Nearly a century later, Shelly Parker was similarly besieged by
thugs in her Washington D.C. neighborhood. In both cases, within a
specific window, the state was no answer to the impending threat. We do
not begrudge Du Bois his gun. But Shelly Parker, under the full weight of
the modern orthodoxy, required intervention by the United States Supreme
Court to validate her right to armed self-defense. And even now, some
lament the Court’s decision as a tragedy for Blacks.469
This is a curious turn of events. It is as though the complexion of the
threat has changed our focus and concern entirely away from the
immediate victim. This may be natural for remote observers and public
officials pulled by disparate policy considerations and themes of
community victimization. Indeed, it is a predictable stance for those
plugged into mainstream, public institutions. But from the perspective of
the immediate victim, the color of the attacker makes not one whit of
difference and armed self-defense remains as important as ever.
Where government fails, the necessity of self-help continues. Black
electoral success does nothing to diminish the problem of imminence that
always has been the core of legitimate self-defense or the problem of finite
resources that renders public response to private threats even more
tenuous. The next two subsections argue that the failure and limitations of
the state, in the context of imminence and finite resources require a
when an outright prohibition of handguns in Washington D.C. overcame opposition and was instituted
prior to the Heller decision, the city failed at reining in gun crime).
465
Thornbrough, supra note 149, at 23.
466
JACQUELINE JONES ROYSTER, IDA B. WELLS BARNETT, SOUTHERN HORRORS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 70 (1997).
467
Id.
468
TYSON, supra note 143, at 291.
469
See, e.g., de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 148 (“[T]he possibility of a loosening of firearms
restrictions around the country in the wake of Heller should be of serious concern to civil rights
activists and lawyers.”).
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reassessment of the modern orthodoxy.
1. Government Failure Within the Window of Imminence
Self-defense is a universal exception to the state’s monopoly on
legitimate violence.470 Recognition of state impotence is built into the
doctrine through the imminence requirement. Self-defense is justified
where individuals encounter immediate threats to which government
cannot respond and private violence is necessary to avoid death or serious
bodily harm. 471 George Fletcher elaborates:
[T]he imminence requirement expresses the limits of
governmental competence: when the danger to a protected
interest is imminent and unavoidable, the legislature can no
longer make reliable judgments about which of the
conflicting interests should prevail. Similarly, when an
attack against private individuals is imminent, the police are
no longer in a position to intervene and exercise the state’s
function of securing public safety. The individual right to
self-defense kicks in precisely because immediate action is
necessary.472
State failure within the window of imminence is universal.473 Given
470
See David B. Kopel et al., The Human Right of Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 178
(2007) (“No government has the legitimate authority to forbid a person from exercising her human
right to defend herself against a violent attack or to forbid her from taking the steps and acquiring the
tools necessary to exercise that right.”). Validation of violence in self-defense is ancient. It is a
component of most civilized systems of government, to the point that in the U.S. system, even the
claim of the lowly slave was occasionally recognized. See Johnson, Self-Defense?, supra note 463, at
209 (describing that “in some instances, even the dehumanized slave was acknowledged to have some
of the basic prerogatives inherent in all God’s creatures”).
471
Imminence also impacts our views about the utility of handguns and storage requirements.
The handgun is both portable and easily accessible, both of which are important variables in responding
to imminent threats. Imminence also complicates the conversation about safe storage (storing loaded
guns, utilizing trigger locks, etc.).
472
George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
553, 570 (1996) (emphasis added). For more analysis of self-defense by the same author, see GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (2000).
473
Some may contest this on the view that the state certainly can affect the precursors of violent
aggression and prohibit certain types of weapons, thus at least eliminating the violence committed with
those weapons. The problem is that the supply-side controls that stem from this reasoning require
reductions of the gun inventory to levels approaching zero. That is simply impossible in a country with
300 million guns, a robust gun culture, and a contested constitutional right to arms.
The implications of the imminence problem are illustrated in another way. Assume for the sake
of argument that our government actually could make guns disappear. This would eliminate gun crime.
It would also exacerbate the imbalance of power in favor of the young, strong, and ruthless. The gun,
through its ease of use, equalizes the capacity to commit violence so that the old and weak are even
with the young and strong. In a world of contact weapons however, there surely will be no gun
violence, but query whether that is a better world. See, e.g., Brief for Southeastern Legal Foundation,
Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570

1572

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:1491

our history, one might expect Blacks to be particularly sensitive to this
failure, especially since the window of imminence is often larger in Black
neighborhoods where various challenges stretch public resources. So how
do we explain the shift of the modern orthodoxy away from the traditional
support of self-defense? Perhaps the reason is that failure of the state is
less galling today. Under slavery, Black Codes, and Jim Crow, when the
state intervened, it was often a menace rather than a benefit.474 Under
those circumstances, reliance on the state for personal security was more
obviously an absurd proposition.
Today, state failure is less pernicious and more in the nature of
inherent limitations. So it is possible for those ensconced in local, state,
and national bureaucracies to comfortably urge reliance on the state and
ignore the continuing failure of government within the window of
imminence. But if that is the explanation, then the modern orthodoxy is not
really a clear-eyed policy decision to trade off the costs of imminent
threats. Rather, private concerns about imminent threats are just glibly
ignored because the most egregious renditions of state failure have passed.
Failure of the modern orthodoxy to engage state failure in the context
of imminence is highlighted, by contrast, to the thinking about it in the
context of other issues on the progressive agenda. Progressives have
pressed the idea of state failure aggressively to expand the range of
legitimate self-defense in other contexts and in support of reproductive
rights.475
State failure is at the core of advocacy for expansion of self-defense for
battered women. One school of thought would actually eliminate the
imminence requirement in favor of a no “genuine alternatives” standard,
wherein state failure justifies self-defense, even absent an immediate threat
of death or bodily harm.476 Here, state failure is urged as the justification
(2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 405570 at *I (highlighting the Founders’ belief that without arms, the
strong would invariably dominate their weaker counterparts).
474
For a factual background on Black self-defense jurisprudence, see supra notes 18–99 and
accompanying text.
475
See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in the
Law of Evidence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 81, 94 (2001) (highlighting the reality that gender-specific suffering
by women is often ignored within the context of our culture as a whole); Paul Butler, By Any Means
Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REV. 721,763 (2003)
(arguing that civil rights advocates view discrimination as a “malign evil” and that “[j]ust war doctrine
allows a proportionate response”); Robert B. Chapman, Missing Persons: Social Science and
Accounting for Race Gender, Class and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 347, 409 (2002)
(noting that the bankruptcy system redefined the relationship between the government, individuals, and
their property); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s
Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (2003) (maintaining that
confusion stemming from courts’ just-punishment jurisprudence has complicated efforts to determine
the constitutionality of capital punishment).
476
See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination and the Social Contract, 57 U.
PITT. L. REV. 579, 609 (1996) (“[B]ecause of the absence of genuine alternatives . . . if she does not
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for a woman, who endures years of physical and emotional abuse, to kill
her abusive husband in his sleep.477 The juxtaposition is striking and
curious. While the modern orthodoxy discounts state failure within the
window of imminence, feminist advocacy invokes it as the primary reason
for expanding self-defense for battered women.
Notably, this feminist advocacy does not depend on any assertion that
the state is overtly hostile to the interests of women478 (decline of the
malevolent state remember, is central to the “things have changed” defense
of the modern orthodoxy). It is simply the fact of state failure that justifies
a broader range of legitimate self-defense by battered women. The
comparison to the modern orthodoxy is ironic. Progressive advocacy urges
dramatic expansion of self-defense by battered women, deeming the
reasons for government failure irrelevant. The modern orthodoxy in
contrast, would constrict armed self-defense simply on the view that
government failure is no longer malicious.
Other progressive commentators have pressed the issue of state failure
to justify the right to abortion. Robin West argues,
To whatever degree we fail to create the minimal conditions
for a just society, we also have a right, individually and
fundamentally to be shielded from the most dire or simply
the most damaging consequences of that failure. . . . We must
have the right to opt out of an unjust patriarchal world that
visits unequal but unparalleled harms upon women . . . with
unwanted pregnancies.479
In a society where physical attack is a real danger (especially in
communities where the risk is generally higher) and government is a
demonstrably incomplete response, West’s formulation is a solid
foundation for a robust right of self-defense using standard civilian
technology.480 It is odd that the modern orthodoxy—and perhaps
progressive thinking generally—seems more comfortable with West’s

resort to defensive aggression, she will inevitably suffer death or grievous bodily harm by the
assailant.”). For critiques of the utilization of principles of self-defense to expand rights on the
progressive agenda, see Johnson, Self-Defense?, supra note 463, at 187; Johnson, Principles and
Passions, supra note 463, at 97; and Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller
and the Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons and the Attitudinalist Critique, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1285 (2009).
477
See Zipursky, supra note 385, at 583 (arguing that in such an instance, the wife really only has
two options: kill or be killed).
478
This recall is the core of the objection under the modern orthodoxy that things have changed.
479
Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on Professor
Brownstein’s Analysis of Casey, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 961, 964–65 (1994).
480
Johnson, Principles and Passions, supra note 463, at 117.
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481

formulation in the abortion context.
When pressed, her critique of state
failure provides comparatively stronger support for armed self-defense.482
2. Finite Resources
Michael de Leeuw, Counsel for the NAACP as amici in Heller, argues
that in urban communities where Black voters have elected Black
administrations, gun prohibition should be respected as an exercise of
community autonomy.483 But Black electoral success does nothing to
diminish the limitations on state action that make self-defense a crucial
private resource.
Even the best-intentioned administrations must wrestle with practical,
fiscal, and political limitations. 484 It is fair to expect that racism will not
be the reason that Black administrations fail to fully protect Black citizens.
But racism is only one of many reasons for people to resist entrusting their
lives to the state. The modern orthodoxy does not really answer the
concerns of people like Shelly Parker and Otis McDonald, Black plaintiffs
who complained that government had disarmed them but was not able to
protect them.485 Engaging the issue explicitly in the context of those two
examples is distracting because of the myriad other implications of the
Heller and McDonald decisions.
But there are many other illustrations of the problem. Consider, for
example, the difficulties that plague the government and citizens of
Detroit. It is a story of decline, civic tragedy, and the full range of urban

481
See id. at 98–99 (asserting that our recognition of abortion rights and gun rights “allow what
might be crucial private choices in extreme personal crises”); Johnson, Supply Restrictions, supra note
476, at 1286 (stating that “there is a broad analytical intersection between abortion and gun-rights
claims”).
482
Johnson, Principles and Passions, supra note 463, at 117.
483
de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 133–34.
484
While failure of government in the context of imminent threats is a constant that cannot be
avoided, other government failures are episodic. The reasons will vary. Historically, Blacks had good
reason to expect overtly racist governments would not protect them. Today, such episodic failures are
more likely to result from limited resources.
In Tulsa, Oklahoma, a search for a missing six-year-old girl tied up police. So, a 911 call about a
drunk threatening gun violence waited for nine minutes before an officer could be located, and a report
of a woman being beaten waited twenty minutes before an officer was able to respond. Police
departments lament small increases in response time. But thirty-second shifts one way or another still
do not answer the basic problem that people must fend for themselves during the crucial moments
when the danger is at its peak. Do not forget that this data about response time does not incorporate the
time it takes to get to a phone, and the people who are injured or killed without ever making contact
with police. Id.; see also Crime-Ridden Camden, N.J., Cuts Police Force Nearly in Half, CNN (Jan.
18, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-18/us/new.jersey.layoffs_1_police-force-police-officerspublic-safety?_s=PM:US [hereinafter Crime-Ridden Camden].
485
Jon S. Vernick et al., Changing the Constitutional Landscape for Firearms: The US Supreme
Court’s Recent Second Amendment Decisions, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2021 (2011).
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486

challenges. In the middle of it is Johnette Bartham, a young Black
woman who saw opportunity in Detroit.487 She learned quickly that the
neighborhood where she invested $74,000 into a three thousand square
foot brick colonial placed substantial demands on residents.488
A neighbor said he would “look[] out for her” when she came home
from work.489 She “befriended a local policeman, who would drive by at
night to check on her.”490 But he was soon reassigned to another precinct.
After that, if she felt unsafe returning home late at night, “she would drive
to a major road, flag down a squad car and ask for an escort home.”491
Break-ins became routine she explains, “I was constantly being targeted in
a way I couldn’t predict, in a way that couldn’t be controlled by the
police.”492 One night she returned home around 1:30 in the morning to find
her front door broken open and what she thought was a robbery in
progress.493 “She rushed back to her car to call 911 and waited there for
police. They arrived at 4:41 a.m., according to their report.”494
In the past, the three-hour police response might have stemmed from
overt racist neglect. In modern Detroit that is not the explanation. Today,
the problem is resources. The police department is seven hundred officers
short.495 Chief Warren Evans has taken a triage approach, focusing on the
worst crimes and hoping he is prescient enough to make this distinction
with persistent accuracy.496
So how do we justify denying the standard tools of civilian selfdefense to people who live under such conditions? Johnette Bartham
survived to complain about a three-hour police response. But what if she
had faced an immediate threat? How do we deny her the option of a
handgun in her purse? Would you would want that option for someone
you cared about?497 If that is possible, then it is not obvious why
486
Alex P. Kellogg, Black Flight Hits Detroit, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704292004575230532248715858.html.
487
Id.
488
Id.
489
Id.
490
Id.
491
Id.
492
Id.
493
Id.
494
Id.
495
Id.
496
Id.; see also Crime-Ridden Camden, supra note 484 (reporting slower police response time in
Camden, New Jersey due to fewer police resources). Less than two years later, “police acknowledge
that they have all but ceded [Camden] streets to crime . . . [and] are already so overloaded they no
longer respond to property crimes or car accidents that do not involve injuries”. Kate Zernike, To Fight
Crime, a Poor City Will Trade in Its Police, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/201
2/09/29/nyregion/overrun-by-crime-camden-trades-in-its-police-force.html?hp.
497
Her story might have proceeded two ways. She might have pulled a gun, then had it taken
from her and used against her. She might have pulled it out and scared off an attacker, in which case
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weakening the right to arms to allow de jure gun bans in Black
neighborhoods or other aggressive renditions of the modern orthodoxy
should be “part of any civil rights agenda.”498
V. REASSESSING THE MODERN ORTHODOXY
Granting my assessment to this point, some will still object that the
modern orthodoxy is an essential and practical response to problem
captured by William Oliver’s striking summary.
The disproportionate rates of violent crime found among
African Americans have been described in numerous studies
and reports. For example, the FBI reports that in 1998,
African Americans, who constitute 13 percent of the general
population, were overrepresented among persons arrested for
murder (53 percent), robbery (55 percent), aggravated assault
(30 percent) and assault (34 percent).
A significant
characteristic of violent crime in the United States is that
most violent incidents tend to involve an interracial victimoffender relationship pattern. That is, individuals who
commit acts of violence generally commit these acts against
members of their own racial group. For example, in 1998, 94
percent of black murder victims were slain by black
offenders. Similarly in 1998, 87 percent of white murder
victims were slain by white.
....
The most revealing data regarding the disproportionate
impact that violent crime is having on African Americans,
particularly black makes is the data on homicide
victimization. According to the FBI, in 1998, black males
represented 38 percent of known homicide victims, followed
in descending order by white males (35 percent), white
she would be added to the 2–2.5 million people in Gary Kleck and Marc Gertz’s Defensive Gun Use
(“DGU”) count. Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of
Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995). She might have fired in
self-defense and avoided prosecution, but been traumatized by the aftermath or even the subject of
revenge attacks by the victim’s associates. She might have fired and killed an innocent person, either
with a stray bullet or because she mistook an innocent person for an attacker. The data suggest that the
non-shooting DGU is far more likely. Id. at 173. But beyond the statistical debate is a fundamental
question about the rights of the individual facing a deadly threat.
It is fair to object that guns are not a global long-term answer for the problems that afflict
neighborhoods like this. That is not my claim. The focus here is the immediate problem of imminent
threats. Would you want the option of a gun for yourself or a loved one if you had to move into
Jonnette’s house tonight?
498
de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 137.
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females (14 percent) and black females (9 percent). High
rates of homicide among African Americans also have been
reported in compilations of health statistics. According to
data compiled by the National Center for Health Statistics
(1998), black males had a homicide death rate of 52.6 per
100,000 in 1996, whereas white males had a homicide death
rate of 4.7 per 100,000.
As a group, violence researchers generally regard individuals
in the age range between fifteen and twenty-four as the most
murder prone. However, there are significant differences
between black and white males of this age in terms of their
homicide risk. For example, white males fifteen to twentyfour years of age had a homicide death rate of 6.4 per
100,000 in 1996, whereas black males of this age range had
a homicide death rate of 123 per 100,000, nearly twenty
times greater than similarly aged white males. Moreover, for
every age range, black males have higher rates of homicide
death than their white male counterparts of the same ages.
A significant trend in homicide patterns involves the
increasing youthfulness of homicide offenders and victims.
Young black males experienced dramatic increases in both
homicide victimization and offending rates in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. For example, the number of homicide
victims in the fifteen to twenty-four age group increased
nearly 50 percent between 1975 and 1992. Moreover, in
1987, homicide accounted for 42 percent of all deaths among
young black males. Persons between the ages of fifteen and
nineteen experienced the greatest increases in the rate of
death due to homicide in this period. Since 1991, homicide
rates have been declining among all race-sex subgroups in
the United States. However it is important to note that in
spite of the declining homicide rates among black males,
homicide remains the leading cause of death among black
males between fifteen and twenty four years of age.499
In the face of such accounts, the reflex to blame gun proliferation and
wish guns away is understandable. The modern orthodoxy translates that
reflex into policy with the promise that the right mix of statutory language
can solve the problem by pushing the gun inventory toward zero.
499
WILLIAM OLIVER, THE STRUCTURAL-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A THEORY OF BLACK MALE
VIOLENCE IN VIOLENT CRIME: ASSESSING RACE AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES (Darnell F. Hawkins, ed.,
2003) (citations omitted). The recent trend is reflected in his distillation of the problem.
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Endorsement of this approach by the Black political establishment implies
that it is or should be embraced by anyone who cares about the community.
This implication undergirds NAACP counsel, Michael De Leeuw’s
confident declaration that race targeted gun bans should be part of any
Civil Rights agenda.500 But closer critique reveals more diversity within
the community than one might surmise and the social science raises serious
substantive questions about the wisdom of the modern orthodoxy.
A. The Modern Orthodoxy and Community Attitudes
Even the roughest cut at the question reveals that the modern
orthodoxy has less following in the community than one might expect.
National polling by the Pew Research Center asked, “What do you think is
more important—to protect the right of Americans to own guns, OR to
control gun ownership?”501 Fifty-four percent of whites and 30% of blacks
said it was more important to protect gun rights compared to 66% of blacks
who said it was more important to control gun ownership.502 Respondents
were also asked a question that reflects one of the explicit strands of the
modern orthodoxy, “Should States and Localities be able to pass laws
banning handguns?”503 Sixty-four percent of blacks said yes and 30% said
no.504
Mid-sixty percent majorities are still consistent with the intuition that
many Blacks would favor gun control of some sort.505 But this is
substantially lower than Black allegiance to the Democratic Party, which is
generally in excess of 90%.506 This presents an interesting contrast with
the Black leadership where Democrats predominate.507 The gap suggests
that a significant swath of the community is at odds with the standard
position of the Black political establishment.
Pressing further into the details and the social science, the picture
becomes even more complex. High rates of Black victimization from gun
crimes actually cut two ways. In a population more at risk from violence,
one might expect to find both a desire to keep guns from criminals and a
parallel desire to possess guns for self-defense.
500

de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 137.
Gun Rights and Gun Control, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 2010), http://www.pewresearch.org/files/o
ld-assets/pdf/gun-control-2011.pdf.
502
Nicholas J. Johnson, Gun Control’s Racist Origins, LIBR. OF L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 7,
2012), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2012/12/07/gun-controls-racist-origins/.
503
Id.
504
Id.
505
Id.
506
Id.
507
Support for gun rights is articulated by the occasional Black Republican (Ken Blackwell and
Condolezza Rice, for example). But at the grass roots, the percentage of Blacks that support
Republicans is far lower than the percentage that supports gun rights. Id.
501
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We see this starkly in the period that gives rise to the modern
orthodoxy. A concern about violent crime and unrest during the 1960’s
was one driver of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the rise of the modern
gun control movement.508 It also sparked an unprecedented period of
firearms acquisition:
One of the major findings of The National Commission on
the Causes and Prevention of Violence established by
President Lyndon Johnson after the urban violence of the
1960s was that firearms became increasingly available late in
that decade. . . . In brief, the sale of handguns quadrupled and
the sale of long guns doubled during the 1960’s. The
Commission found that in many cities a sharp increase in gun
sales and registrations followed a riot. In Detroit, for
example, the number of handgun permits issued by the police
increased by a factor of five between 1965 and 1968.509
The same phenomenon is evident in assessments focusing specifically
on Black community attitudes. Paula McClain conducted a finely grained
study examining the “fear and loathing” hypothesis that “firearms
purchases are motivated by fear of crime, violence, and civil disorder.”510
She cautioned against findings based on national data, which “makes
comparisons between whites and blacks difficult because the size of the
black sample is usually extremely small. Hence, generalizations from the
sample could be distortions of real population parameters.”511
McClain examined perceptions of risk, patterns of gun ownership, and
attitudes toward gun regulation between blacks and whites at the
neighborhood rather than the national level.512 She surveyed blacks and
whites in distinct Detroit neighborhoods categorized by race and risk
factors—e.g., white high risk, black high risk.513 Her findings contradicted
studies that used national data. For example, early research based on
national data found that blacks were less likely to report having a gun in
the home.514 McClain found the rate of gun ownership between whites and
Blacks “relatively the same across neighborhoods studied, with the
508

See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2006), § 101, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat.

1213.
509
Reynolds Farley, Homicide Trends in the United States at 20, in DARNELL F. HAWKINS,
HOMICIDE AMONG BLACK AMERICANS (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 1986); see also Gary Kleck, Capital
Punishment, Gun Ownership, and Homicide, 84 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 882, 907–08 (1979) (discussing the
relationship between increased gun ownership and increased homicide rates in the 1960s).
510
Paula D. McClain, Firearms Ownership, Gun Control Attitudes, and Neighborhood
Environment, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 299, 300 (1983).
511
Id.
512
Id. at 302.
513
Id.
514
Id at 304.
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exception of whites living in black low risk neighborhoods”515 who
reported owning more guns than any other group.516
With regard to differential Black and white attitudes about gun
regulation, McClain found that the number of questions and specificity of
the questions made important differences:
The attitudes of the residents of the four kinds of
neighborhoods varied in regard to their support for or
opposition to various forms of gun regulation proposals. . . .
The policy position with the most support among the five
groups was that requiring individuals to obtain a police
permit before purchasing a firearm. At least three-fourths of
the respondents of all five groups were supportive of this
policy. The policy option with the least support among the
groups was the confiscation of all weapons except for those
of the police. The support for confiscation ranged from a
high of 26% among blacks in a high risk area to a low of
10.16% among blacks in a low risk area. . . .
Support for having the government sell firearms through
government-owned stores, much like liquor is sold in states
like Pennsylvania, also varied substantially. Blacks in high
risk neighborhoods are again the least supportive–19.4%. . . .
With few exceptions, individuals in the five groups appeared
to be almost evenly divided in their support for and
opposition to the regulation of only handguns. In most
neighborhoods at least 40% of the people questioned
supported handgun regulation and at least the same
percentage opposed it. . . .
The indication that the supportive responses vary depending
on the policy option is a significant finding. It is significant
because previous studies, which have primarily utilized the
permit question, have consistently found that a majority of
people support gun control. . . . The variability in the
responses to the other questions, however, clearly calls into
question the reliability of a one-item indicator as a measure
of gun control attitudes. . . .
From an index of gun regulation attitudes, the results differ
widely from previous studies. Blacks in high risk
neighborhoods have a more favorable attitude toward some
515
516

Id.
Id. at 305.
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form of regulation than do whites in high-risk
neighborhoods—52.7%
and
34.9%,
respectively.
Conversely, a greater proportion of whites in high risk
neighborhoods oppose regulation (46.5%) than do blacks in
similar risk neighborhoods (37.8%).
There also appears to be a difference in the attitudes of
blacks and whites in low risk neighborhoods. Blacks, once
again, appear to favor regulation in a greater proportion than
do whites (40.4% and 34.7%, respectively); however, the
difference is not as great as between blacks and whites in
high risk areas.
Interestingly, whites residing in
neighborhoods defined as black low risk favor regulation in
approximately the same proportion as do blacks. Thus the
results of the computed gun regulation index show that urban
residents are less overwhelmingly supportive of gun
regulation than is suggested by studies that use the one-item
indicator.517
Other studies focusing specifically on Black attitudes show that a
significant cohort of Blacks favors prohibition or other strong limits on the
criminal subculture but disfavor blanket prohibition that would impede
self-defense by trustworthy people. A study by Brennan and Lizotte,
found that Blacks disfavored gun bans at higher levels than whites, even
though they favored measures like permits and registration at levels higher
than whites.518 This comports again with the intuition that many people
who fear of violence will want guns to protect themselves and also favor
laws promising to keep guns from criminals.
This is just a snapshot of the social science. I do not claim that it is
dispositive. But it does confirm the intuition that Black criminality might
drive Black demand for lawfully owned guns just as readily as it fuels
support for the supply control policies of the modern orthodoxy. This
suggests a diversity of attitudes about firearms policy that is
underrepresented by Black political establishment and obscured by
overwhelming Black allegiance to the Democratic Party.
B. Competing Critiques of Black Criminality
It is a mistake to conclude that the modern rate of violent crime is an
517

Id. at 307–08 (emphasis added).
Pauline G. Brennan, Alan J. Lizotte & David McDowall, Guns, Southerness, and Gun Control,
9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 289, 304 (1993). The Pew Study, on the other hand, found that 38%
of whites and 64% of Blacks thought states and localities should be able to pass laws banning
handguns. Public Divided over State, Local Laws Banning Handguns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.people-press.org/2010/03/23/public-divided-over-state-local-laws-banning-handguns/.
518
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unprecedented variable that easily explains the modern orthodoxy. The
fact is that the Black tradition of arms has long demanded a balancing of
the self-defense interest of good people in the community against high
costs of criminal violence and traditionally, the community has privileged
lawful self-defense.
A report sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health
reviewed a series of early studies showing that very high rates of homicide
victimization and violent crime among Blacks is not unprecedented:
The risk of homicide victimization in the black community
has traditionally been high in large urban environments.
Brearley, reporting on the level of victimization in selected
cities in 1925, substantiates this point. Victimization rates
were higher during that era than they are at present. It was
not uncommon to find victimization rates in excess of 100
per 100,000.519
These victimization data do not explicitly indicate the race of the
perpetrators, but the dismissive local government response is suggestive.
By 1925, southern cities were already renowned for the level
of violence present within the black community. Memphis,
in 1930, was described as the homicide capital of the nation.
The city fathers were said to explain this situation by
indicating “most of the murders were of negroes by negroes,
so the police and government could not be held
responsible.”520
The 1925 victimization rates in several cities exceeded the modern
rates summarized by William Oliver at the beginning of this section.521
The Black homicide victimization rate per 100,000 of population in
Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland were approximately 103, 113, and 101,
respectively.522 In Memphis, the rate was 129.523 In Cincinnati, it was
approximately 190.524 And in Miami, the reported rate was approximately
208 per 100,000.525
In 1958, preeminent criminologist Marvin Wolfgang published the
classic, Patterns in Criminal Homicide, which focused substantially on
519

HAROLD M. ROSE & PAULA MCCLAIN, CTR. FOR MINORITY GRP. MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAMS, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, GRANT #5 RO1 MH 29269-02, BLACK HOMICIDE AND
THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 174 (1981).
520
Id. at 175.
521
OLIVER, supra note 499, at 281–83.
522
ROSE & MCCLAIN, supra note 519, at 175.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Philadelphia during the period 1948–1952 and surveyed the findings of a
variety of earlier studies from across the country.526 Wolfgang reported
that during the four-year period of the study, Blacks were 18% of the
population but 73% of homicide victims and 75% of homicide offenders.527
Then, as now, Black males dominated the ranks of victims (77% of Black
victims) and perpetrators (80% of Black perpetrators).528 Wolfgang
surmised, without testing, that economic desperation contributed to the
high rates of violence, calculating that 90% to 95% of all offenders in the
study (Black and white) were “in the lower end of the occupational
scale.”529
The availability of guns was not a plausible explanation for
Wolfgang’s findings. The instrument most often used by Black murderers
was the knife.530 Stabbing accounted for 47% of the homicides of Black
victims.531 It is unclear how much this reflected the general trend, and
Wolfgang notes studies from several other cities where shooting was the
leading cause of Black homicides.532
Wolfgang noted that “no homicide figures were classified according to
color prior to 1921,” but summarized a variety of studies conducted after
data became available.533 A 1940 assessment of seven sections of the
southern United States with high homicide rates concluded that the murder
and manslaughter rate for Blacks was “twelve times that of whites.”534 A
study of Birmingham from 1937 to 1944 showed that Blacks represented
85% of homicide convictions and 40% of the population.535 In St. Louis
from 1949 to 1951, Blacks committed 73% of homicides and represented
18% of the population.536 Wolfgang cautioned that these data may be
skewed by the fact that conviction rates for Blacks were consistently
higher than for whites in the southern states surveyed.537
Outside the South, studies of victimization rates (race of the
perpetrator not specified) suggest a similar trend. During 1920 and 1925,
homicide victimization rates per 100,000 for Pennsylvania were
“considerably higher for Blacks than for whites both in urban and rural

526

MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 5 (Univ. Pa. 1958).
Id. at 31.
528
Id. at 35.
529
Id. at 37.
530
The penknife, switchblade, kitchen knife, and ice pick accounted for 45% of all weapons used
by Black perpetrators in criminal homicides from 1948 to 1952. Id. at 84.
531
Id.
532
Id. at 90–95.
533
Id. at 40.
534
Id. at 41.
535
Id. at 43.
536
Id. at 45.
537
Id. at 44.
527
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538

communities.”
In urban areas, whites had a homicide rate of 5.3
compared to 47.1 for Blacks.539 In comparison, the white rate was 3.4 and
the Black rate was 45.2 in rural areas.540 Between 1921 and 1930 in thirtyseven upstate New York counties, the homicide victimization rate per
100,000 for whites was 2.8 and 30.4 for Blacks.541 As shown in the
subsections below, squaring these historically exceptional rates of violence
and victimization with the modern orthodoxy and with my criticism here is
instructive.
1. The Black Tradition of Arms and the Violent Criminal Microculture
The first part of this article details a strong Black tradition of arms
responding to racist aggression and state failure. To the degree that high
homicide victimization rates reflect interracial conflict (the early
victimization studies do not reliably indicate the race of the perpetrator)542
fear of such encounters is consistent with the Black tradition of arms that I
have elaborated.543
Alongside that tradition, the dominant theme in the modern era is the
story of Black criminality and intra-racial homicide. The fact that high
intra-racial homicide rates are nothing new suggests that Black tradition of
arms has long required balancing between the legitimate self-defense
interests of good people against the costs of criminal activity. Even at the
exceptional rates detailed by Wolfgang, Beardsley, and others, Black
homicide is still fairly attributable to slim criminal microculture.
More than 100 years ago, Du Bois dubbed this microculture the
“submerged tenth.”544 In The Souls of Black Folk, he lamented the rise of
“a distinct criminal class” in the urban slums.545 In the sociological study,
The Philadelphia Negro, Du Bois tracked the activity of a Black criminal
538

Id. at 45.
Id.
540
Id.
541
Id.
542
Id. The early studies of the victimization rate do not reliably indicate the race of the
perpetrator. The victimization rate in the New York study was calculated from death certificates. We
are left to speculate on the race of the perpetrator.
543
The possibility that Black deaths from homicide have always been predominately from intraracial conflict suggests that fear of racist violence occupies a place in our collective psyche out of
proportion to the actual attacks. See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A
ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 62 (2009) (claiming that racist terror
groups generated fear and apprehension far out of proportion to their activities because “[o]ne or two
lynchings went a long way toward inducing docility among even a large group of people, for people
respond strongly to strong incentives”).
544
W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO 311 (1899); see LEWIS, supra note 31, at 206
(describing the people at the “bottom of the Seventh Ward heap” as a “class of criminals, prostitutes,
and loafers”).
545
W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks, in THREE NEGRO CLASSICS 329 (Avon 1965)
(1903).
539
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class that in many ways mirrored the modern Black criminal
microculture.546 He reported that life in Philadelphia’s Seventh Ward in
the late 1890’s was “hard noisy and deadly for too many of the lack people
there. On Saturday nights [the neighborhoods and bars] disgorged [the]
maimed and murdered clients and dwellers before morning.”547 Displaced
from economic opportunities by other races and ethnicities monopolizing
certain industries, “it was not surprising that many Seventh Ward Blacks
sought release in drugs and crime or savagely turned on each other out of
rage or a sense of hopelessness.”548 In commentary that rings consistent
with modern anxieties, Du Bois recalled his days in the “slums” of
Philadelphia, “where in the night when pistols popped, you didn’t get up
lest you couldn’t.”549
Black leaders from the Mississippi Delta on the Committee for Better
Citizenship agitated to “ensure greater punishment for black criminals who
committed offenses against blacks.”550 Delta civil rights leader and
staunch armed self-defense advocate T.R.M. Howard complained that
failure of the state to punish Black-on-Black crime was another indictment
of separate but equal, arguing that the “greatest danger to Negro life in
Mississippi is not what white people do to Negroes but what the courts of
Mississippi let Negroes of Mississippi do to each other.”551 In 1939,
Sociologist Hortense Powdermaker advanced a different assessment,
arguing that state malevolence and neglect exacerbated intra-group
546
DU BOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO, supra note 544, at 240–41, 248–50 (explaining that the
sudden increase in crime perpetuated by African Americans was due to their relatively late arrival in
cities and providing statistics about the rates of crime and types of crime likely to be committed by
African Americans).
547
LEWIS, supra note 31, at 186.
548
Id. at 187.
549
W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B. DU BOIS: A SOLILOQUY ON VIEWING MY
LIFE FROM THE LAST DECADE OF ITS FIRST CENTURY 195 (Int’l Publishers 1968); see Monroe N.
Woek, Crime in Cities, in NOTES ON NEGRO CRIME PARTICULARLY IN GEORGIA: A SOCIAL STUDY
MADE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY BY THE NINTH ATLANTA CONFERENCE
(W.E.B. Du Bois ed., Atlanta Univ. Press 1904), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.3
2000001728924;page=root;view=image;size=100;seq=1;num=1 (considering past rates of Black crime
and arrest rates in cities, which reached a high in Philadelphia of 150 arrests per every 1,000 Black
residents in 1864, and noting that “peculiar conditions of the Negro, past and present, tend to keep the
crime rate high”).
550
DAVID T. BEITO & LINDA ROYSTER BEITO, BLACK MAVERICK: T.R.M. HOWARD’S FIGHT FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC POWER 67–68 (2009).
551
Id. at 73 (citing Mississippi Regional Council of Negro Leadership, Prospectus, at 13–14).
Some modern commentators, in contrast, are highly critical of U.S. criminal justice system
incarceration policy. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, MASS INCARCERATION
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 96–98 (2010) (noting that in at least 7 states, African-Americans
account for 80% to 90% of all incarcerated drug offenders, and that in at least 15 states, Black men are
imprisoned on drug charges at rates from 20- to 57-times the incarceration rates of their white peers and
arguing that these disparities exist even though “[p]eople of all races use and sell illegal drugs at
remarkably similar rates”).
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violence by Blacks who were wary about entanglements with the white
power structure.552
Social scientists continue to debate the core impulse that drives people
to murder.553 But attribution of the Black homicide rate to a slim
microculture is consistent with research showing that most murders are
extreme aberrants with long histories of criminal activity and
psychopathology and violence. Delbert Elliot explained that “the vast
majority of persons involved in life-threatening violence have a long
criminal record with many prior contacts with the justice system.”554 The
aberrance of murderers is so solidly demonstrated in the literature that
Kennedy and Braga dub it one of the “criminological axioms.”555 Robert
Cottrol applied this critique explicitly to the black community and offered
a detailed assessment of the influences that may have shaped the Black
microculture of violence.556
The fact that the Black tradition of arms grew up alongside exceptional
rates of black homicide, is consistent with a decision that acts of the
criminal microculture do not justify impairing the legitimate self-defense
interest of the sober mature members of the community. Indeed the
dangers created by the criminal microculture actually strengthen the claims
of good people to standard tools of self-defense. On top of that, the failed
experiments in Washington D.C. and elsewhere show that making guns
illegal for the Parker/McDonald class557 do not and cannot stop the violent
microculture from getting guns.
2. Exceptional Black Criminality and Blanket Gun Bans
The modern orthodoxy does not expressly reject the thesis that
exceptional black victimization and criminality is attributable to a slim
microculture. But blanket gun bans, like those urged as core policy under
the modern orthodoxy, do carry the implication that the Black community
at large cannot be trusted with guns (and knives as well, if we integrate
Marvin Wolfgang’s study of Philadelphia). This is an unavoidable
implication of the view that targeted gun bans in certain Black
communities should be part of any civil rights agenda. To be fair,
552

POWDERMAKER, supra note 25, at 329–34.
See, e.g., infra note 561 (exploring the three views on the subject of violence: pure
nonviolence, violence exercised in self-defense, and violence as a tool of advancement, and stating that
“many Negroes are being tempted today” toward the impulse to use violence as a method to achieve
advancement).
554
Delbert S. Elliott, Life Threatening Violence Is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on
Prevention, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1081, 1093 (1998).
555
David Kennedy & Anthony Braga, Homicide in Minneapolis: Research for Problem Solving, 2
HOMICIDE STUD. 263–90 (1998).
556
Robert J. Cottrol, Submission Is Not the Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures of Criminal
Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1040–42 (1998).
557
See supra note 493.
553
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advocates of the modern orthodoxy would probably prefer that no one have
guns. But short of that, they are clearly willing to settle for targeted gun
bans just in places with large Black populations and aggressive criminal
microcultures. This is perverse.
Under the banner of civil rights, this policy would brand the entire
community with a badge of inferiority through a race-coded deprivation of
an established prerogative of American citizenship.
It resonates
disturbingly with early racist claims “that colored men were unfit for
citizenship”558 and rationalizations of Black Code gun restrictions targeting
Freedmen.559 The results from Washington D.C. already show that this
prescription only bars legal guns and does little to block illegal guns from
the violent micro-culture. So, for a negligible impact on the real target, the
policy stigmatizes entire urban enclaves as untrustworthy.560 This irony
invites questions that suggest the true appeal of the modern orthodoxy.
The promise of an easy answer—gun bans—to the exceptional rate of
violence among Blacks and especially among young black men is
politically appealing because it offers a seemingly straightforward solution
to a far deeper problem that in reality has no easy answer. Consider the
more serious attempts to explain the exceptional rate of Black male
violence summarized by William Oliver:
There exists very little consensus among criminologists and
other crime scholars regarding “the causes” of black male
violence.
Numerous explanations have been offered,
including acquired biological causes (e.g., head injuries);
social disorganization and inadequate socialization; poverty
and economic inequality; racial oppression and displaced
aggression; adherence to the norms of a subculture of
violence; joblessness and family disruption; the cheapening
of black life as a result of the imposition of lenient sentences
against blacks who assault or murder blacks; and
involvement in self-destructive lifestyles centered around
heavy drinking, drug abuse and drug trafficking, and street
gangs. Theoretical explanations of black male violence have
558

CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT
(2008).
559
See Cramer, supra note 134, at 20 (describing the Black Codes enacted after the Civil War that
prohibited blacks from carrying or possessing firearms or bowie knives without licenses to do so);
Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 134, at 1324 (describing the “Black Codes,” including laws limiting the
rights of freed blacks to testify against whites, as well as travel, assembly, and businesses restrictions
and others).
560
Michael de Leeuw and others who advance the modern orthodoxy focus almost exclusively on
the urban underclass and fail to account for the possibility of a still vibrant rural and even suburban
culture of arms among Blacks. The discussion in Part III, supra, suggested, but did not fully develop,
how the modern orthodoxy arose as a reaction to urban violence.
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generally emphasized the significance of structural factors or
cultural factors.561
Although they represent a minority viewpoint, some criminologists
maintain that racial differences in violent crime offending may stem from
genetic/non-acquired biological factors.562
This assessment leaves the leadership and public officials with two
choices. One is to acknowledge that there is no ready diagnosis, and
therefore no viable public solution to the problem (thus strengthening
private claims to self-help). The alternative is to claim there is a ready
solution to the problem, but it has failed because of the NRA or other
bogeymen who block stringent gun control.
A separate political appeal of the modern orthodoxy is that it avoids
stigmatization and class distinctions inherent the criminal microculture
critique.563 This boundary drawing will be especially problematic for the
black political class who may rightly worry that in communities with high
offender rates,564 any attempt to stigmatize the criminal class (people who
are not just isolated criminal actors, but also sons, fathers, and nephews),
will be inflammatory.565 Comparatively, calling for stringent gun control is
561
William Oliver, The Structural-Cultural Perspective: A Theory of Black Male Violence, in
VIOLENT CRIME: ASSESSING RACE AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES 280 (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 2003)
(citations omitted).
562
Id.
563
This is a politically uncomfortable, but potentially useful analytical step. Criminologist
Darnell Hawkins argues:

There is substantial evidence that much could be learned about black homicide and
other aspects of black life in the United States if more careful attention were paid to
differences among blacks as well as between black and whites. The incidence of
homicide among blacks, as among nonblacks, is significantly correlated with social
class. . . . [T]he study of homicide among blacks may benefit from a within-group as
well as a between-group analytic framework.
Darnell F. Hawkins, Introduction to HOMICIDE AMONG BLACK AMERICANS 3, 8 (Darnell F. Hawkins
ed., 1986).
564
That has led to just as much criticism of the criminal justice system as the behavior that caused
the incarceration. Witness for example, the recent widely acclaimed book from Michelle Alexander,
The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2012), arguing that traditional
limitations on felon’s rights is the new Jim Crow.
565
Careful politicians might navigate this by distinguishing between the full population of
offenders (which might be quite high) and the microculture of violent predators, which is quite small.
See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide? A
Review of International and Some Domestic Evidence, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 677 (2007)
(asserting that “murderers generally fall into a group some criminologists have called ‘violent
predators,’ sharply differentiating them not only from the overall population but from other criminals as
well”). On the other hand, a recent report indicated that nearly one in six residents of Newark, New
Jersey had been arrested at some point. Howard Husock, From Prison to a Paycheck, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 3, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443866404577565170182319412.
html. Newark Mayor Corey Booker’s focus on assisting ex-offenders and reintegrating them into the
work force is understandable as good economics and good politics. See id. (describing the Newark ex-
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the path of least resistance.
C. Firearms Policy and the Interests of Innocents
Regardless of how we choose to integrate the historic homicide trends
into our thinking today, those trends eliminate an important strand of the
claim that “things have changed.” This section focuses on the remaining
assumptions rooted in firearms costs and benefits.
Otis McDonald and Shelly Parker claimed that policies rooted in the
modern orthodoxy impaired their fundamental right to self-defense.
Protecting the interests of this class of innocents is a crucial gauge of
sound firearms policy in the black community. So what sort of regulation
leaves the Parker/McDonald class566 better or worse off?
It is plausible that they are better off under a zero gun environment.
That was the presumption the of Washington D.C. gun ban. The difficulty
is that this was an unworkable policy before Heller and unconstitutional
after it. The “no guns” equals “no gun crime” logic would be compelling
if it could be implemented; if for example, we were starting from zero and
deciding whether to have guns or not. The problem is that Americans
already own almost 300 million guns567 and have a deep cultural
attachment to them.
We know from international data that people defy gun bans at a rate
that produces 2.6 illegal guns for every legal one.568 This is simply the
average. In many countries the defiance ratio is far higher.569 And none of
those places have as robust a gun culture as the United States. The upshot
is that neither, Heller, McDonald, weak gun laws, nor NRA lobbying are
the principle obstacles to successful gun prohibition. The obstacle is that
Americans already own nearly half the private firearms on the planet and
have an exceptional cultural attachment to them.570 Whatever the dynamic
elsewhere, de jure prohibition really just means tilting the distribution of
firearms toward the worst people in the community.
The affiliated, compromise position of spot firearms bans only for
black communities is a demonstrably failed experiment. The proffered
excuse for this failure and for the extraordinary levels of gun violence in
Washington, D.C., despite its gun ban, was that criminals were getting

offender employment assistance program and the “importance of assisting ex-offenders, if only as part
of the crime reduction [Mayor Booker] sees as the foundation of Newark’s economic renewal”).
566
This is the class of law-abiding adults and excludes the microculture of aggressive young
criminals.
567
Johnson, Imagining Gun Control, supra note 388, at 843.
568
Id. at 853.
569
See id. at 854 (providing statistics on the defiance rate in England, China, and Germany).
570
Id. at 855–56, 853 n.77.
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571

guns from other jurisdictions.
The solution, proponents said, was
extension of D.C. style gun restrictions to neighboring jurisdictions. But
even before Heller, that was a pipe dream in America.572 Spot prohibition
failed in D.C. because anyone who was willing to break the law could get a
gun from the leakage out of the hundreds of millions already in the civilian
inventory.573 In practical terms, this core policy of the modern orthodoxy
amounted to de jure prohibition but de facto gun ownership by the criminal
microculture. Places like Washington, D.C. and Chicago that followed this
policy had nation leading gun crime. They were also places where the
Parker/McDonald class was essentially under siege.574
The policy sought by Parker and McDonald is continued stringent
rules formally prohibiting criminal micro class from owning guns and
allowing legal access to guns for non-criminals. This approach is
consistent with the Black tradition of arms. Objections to this approach
center on hazards and social costs of firearms. But those objections
overstate firearms costs and fail to account for the offsetting benefits of
lawful gun possession. The next two sub-sections critique those costs and
benefits.
1. Costs
a. Is Armed Self-Defense Ineffective and Uncommon?
One way of dismissing the self-defense interest of the
Parker/McDonald class is to say that their desire for defensive firearms is
misguided; that armed self-defense is ineffective, uncommon, or
counterproductive. Some advance the debunked factoid that you are 44
times more likely to hurt yourself or someone you love than to use the gun

571
This complaint has fueled federal legislative proposals like H.R. 452, the Gun Trafficking
Prevention Act. Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013, H.R. 452, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
Representative Carolyn McCarthy argues: “Guns are often trafficked from states with weaker gun laws
to states with stronger gun laws. . . . The ATF has identified several major gun trafficking routes,
including the I-95 ‘Iron Pipeline’ corridor between Miami and Boston.”
Gun Safety,
CONGRESSWOMAN CAROLYN MCCARTHY, http://carolynmccarthy.house.gov/gun-safety3/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2013).
572
See Johnson, Imagining Gun Control, supra note 388, at 852 (looking to New York City in
particular, and acknowledging “that tough municipal laws alone are not enough” and that “[t]he source
of some of the contraband guns . . . come from scofflaw dealers from other states”).
573
Roughly 500,000 guns are stolen each year. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND
VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 74 (Charles F. Wellford et al., eds., 2005).
574
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that prohibition policies always have been extreme
policy outliers, strikingly at odds with the national norms. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Second
Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 262–63 (2008) (citing Supreme
Court jurisprudence, including Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), where the Court struck down “a
highly unusual Colorado state constitutional amendment precluding state or local action banning
measures forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation”).
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575

for self-defense.
This conjures images of June Cleaver mistakenly
shooting Ward when he arrives home early from a business trip. The
image is false. The factoid comes from a study that only counted gun
deaths, most of which were suicides, and completely ignored the vast
majority of defensive gun uses. The data show that Americans defend
themselves with guns at a startling rate.
There have been 14 major surveys of defensive gun use (“DGU”). The
estimates range from highs above 2 million to lows in excess of 100,000.576
575
Arthur L. Kellermann & Donald T. Reay, Protection or Peril? An Analysis of Firearm-Related
Deaths in the Home, in THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE: YOU DECIDE 239, 243 (Lee Nisbet ed., 1990).
The 43-times more likely claim is a result of Kellermann and Reay counting 743 gunshot deaths in
King County, Washington, which includes Seattle, from 1978 to 1983. Id. at 240. For every case
where a gun in the home was used in a justifiable killing, there were 4.6 criminal homicides, 37
suicides, and 1.3 unintentional deaths. Id. at 242; see also Stevens H. Clarke, Firearms and Violence:
Interpreting the Connection, POPULAR GOV’T, Winter 2000, at 3, 9 (citing to the Kellermann and Reay
study and asserting that “[t]he inference from such studies is that guns in the home are far more likely
to be used in illegal or undesirable killings than in legitimate ones”).
Gary Kleck shows that the core mistake in Kellermann’s claim is the failure to include the
millions of yearly defensive gun uses where no one is shot and the gun is not even fired. See GARY
KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 128–29 (1991) [hereinafter POINT BLANK]
(asserting that the Kellermann and Reay study “unwittingly replicated” a study which was criticized
because merely accounting for “the number of burglars killed does not in any way serve as a measure
of the defensive benefit of keeping a gun”); Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime:
The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 181
(1995) [hereinafter Armed Resistance to Crime] (critiquing Kellermann and Reay’s approach of
comparing the “number of lives taken with guns with the number of criminals killed by victims”).
Gary Kleck finds that “fewer than 2% of fatal gun accidents (FGAs) involve a person accidentally
shooting someone mistaken for an intruder. With about 1400 FGAs in 1987, this implies that there are
fewer than 28 incidents of this sort annually.” KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra, at 122.
Also, the homicide numbers in the Kellerman study do not translate into a general risk factor for
the population at large. Generally, murderers are extreme aberrants who will already exhibit a variety
of other risk factors that make them outliers in the population. See supra text accompanying notes
436–38.
Gun control advocate Andrew McClurg, who finds suicides still a compelling reason for strict
gun control, makes a remarkable observation:

Most people are surprised to learn that annual firearm suicides routinely outpace
firearm homicides. In 1996, . . . 18,166 Americans committed suicide with a
firearm, substantially more than the 14,327 victims of homicide by firearm the same
year. Firearm suicides have exceeded firearm homicides in forty of the sixty years
between 1933 and 1992. For all our fear of being victims of a violent criminal
attack, “[i]f a randomly chosen person adds up the probabilities that each of the five
and one-half billion other people in the world will kill her, the sum . . . is still less
than the probability she’ll kill herself.”
Andrew J. McClurg, The Public Health Case for the Safe Storage of Firearms: Adolescent Suicides
Add One More “Smoking Gun,” 51 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 960 (2000) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting John Allen Paulos, A Better Chance You’ll Shoot Yourself than Be Shot by Another,
PUB. PERSPECTIVE, June–July 1995, at 17, 17).
576
There have been at least fourteen surveys regarding the frequency of DGU in the modern
United States. See Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, supra note 575, at 157 (asserting that
“[a]t least thirteen previous surveys have given a radically different picture of the frequency of DGUs”
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compared to the National Crime Victimization Survey). The surveys range from a low of 760,000
annually to a high of almost 3 million. In contrast, much lower annual estimates come from the NCVS,
a poll using in-person home interviews conducted by the Census Bureau in conjunction with the
Department of Justice. Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATS., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 (last updated Apr. 17, 2012).
These surveys define “defensive gun use” to include instances where an attack is thwarted without
discharge of the gun. See Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, supra note 575, at 169 (“Many
of the ‘gun crimes’ in the NCVS . . . do not involve the gun actually being used by the criminal. Thus,
the NCVS estimate . . . overstates the number of crimes in which the offender actually used the gun.”).
These non-shooting DGUs constitute the vast majority of the total. See, e.g., GUN CONTROL AND GUN
RIGHTS: A READER AND GUIDE 6–33 (Andrew J. McClurg et al. eds., 2002) (detailing the debate
regarding the effectiveness of guns for self-defense and providing statistics on the number of DGUs).
Critics say the NCVS figure is too low because the survey never directly asks about DGUs.
GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 152 (1997) [hereinafter KLECK,
TARGETING GUNS]; Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Defensive Gun Uses: New Evidence from a
National Survey, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 111, 115 n.8 (1998). The NCVS first asks if the
respondent has been a “victim” of a crime. See Cook & Ludwig, supra, at 128 (“It is worth noting that
the NCVS asks DGU questions only of those respondents who report a victimization.”). Critics charge
that this excludes successful DGUs where people do not consider themselves “victims.” Additionally,
critics charge, the NCVS only asks about some crimes and not the full range of crimes where a DGU
might occur. See, e.g., KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra, at 152–53 (Respondents “are not directly
asked about DGUs, but rather are only generally asked about anything they might have done for selfprotection. . . . [T]hey are merely offered an opportunity to volunteer mention of a DGU, but are never
put in a position of having to lie in order to deny a DGU.”).
Gary Kleck and Mark Gertz conducted an especially thorough survey in 1993, with stringent
safeguards to cull respondents who might mischaracterize a DGU story. Kleck and Gertz found a
midpoint estimate of 2.5 million DGUs annually. See Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime,
supra note 575, at 164. The Kleck and Gertz survey found that 80% of DGUs involved handguns, and
that 76% did not involve firing the weapon, but merely brandishing it to scare away an attacker. Id. at
175.
Marvin Wolfgang, one of the most eminent criminologists of the twentieth century and an ardent
supporter of gun prohibition, reviewed Kleck’s findings and observed:
I am as strong a gun-control advocate as can be found among the criminologists in
this country. . . . I would eliminate all guns from the civilian population and maybe
even from the police. I hate guns. . . .
Nonetheless, the methodological soundness of the current Kleck and Gertz study is
clear. . . .
The Kleck and Gertz study impresses me for the caution the authors exercise and the
elaborate nuances they examine methodologically. I do not like their conclusions
that having a gun can be useful, but I cannot fault their methodology. They have
tried earnestly to meet all objections in advance and have done exceedingly well.
Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Tribute to a View I Have Opposed, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 188, 188,
191–92 (1995).
Philip Cook of Duke University and Jens Ludwig of Georgetown University were skeptical of
Kleck’s results and conducted their own survey, the National Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms,
sponsored by a grant from the National Institute of Justice to the Police Foundation. That survey
produced an estimate of 1.46 million DGUs per year. PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN
AMERICA: RESULTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 108
(1996). Cook and Ludwig argue that their own study produced implausibly high numbers, and they
state that the NCVS estimate is more reliable. Id. at 102. For a response to Cook and Ludwig, see
Gary Kleck, Has the Gun Deterrence Hypothesis Been Discredited?, 10 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 65,
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The compromise estimate is around 700,000 DGU’s per year. And there
is no indication that this phenomenon excludes blacks. A significant
aspect of these DGU’s is that in the vast majority of them, no shots are
fired.578
Another objection is that armed self-defense just does not work; that
you will have your gun taken and used against you. This claim is generally
at odds with the DGU data and more textured research shows explicitly
that people actually are better off resisting than giving in.579 Data from the
National Crime Victimization Survey (“NCVS”) show that a victim’s
weapon is taken by the attacker in about 1% of cases where the victim uses
a weapon.580 The NCVS and other sources also show that “[t]here is no
sound empirical evidence that resistance does provoke fatal attacks.”581 In
a study of all of the NCVS data on robberies from 1979 to 1985, the
firearm offered the most effective form of resistance.582 Resistance with a
gun was the method most likely to thwart the crime and most likely to
prevent injury to the victim.583 The NCVS data show that “[t]he use of a
gun by the victim significantly reduces her likelihood of being injured” in

65 (1998) (arguing that “widespread gun ownership among noncriminals may exert various beneficial
effects, including the reduction of some kinds of crime through deterrent effects”). The National
Opinion Research Center (“NORC”) argues that Kleck’s figures are probably too high, and the NCVS
too low. The NORC estimates annual DGUs in the range of 256,500 to 1,210,000. Tom Smith, A Call
for a Truce in the DGU War, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1462, 1468 (1997). Gary Kleck notes
“[t]here are now at least 14 surveys, with an aggregate sample size of over 20,000 cases, and all of the
surveys indicate at least 700,000 DGU’s [per year].” Gary Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun
Use, in DON B. KATES & GARY KLECK, THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE 151, 159 (1997)
[hereinafter Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun Use].
577
Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun Use, supra note 576, at 159; see also JOHNSON ET AL.,
FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 450.
578
See Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, supra note 575, at 173 (“Only 24% of the gun
defenders in the present study reported firing the gun, and only 8% report wounding an adversary.”).
As previously indicated, the Kleck/Gertz survey found that 80% of DGUs involved handguns, and that
76% did not involve firing the weapon. Id. at 175.
579
See Jongyeon Tark & Gary Kleck, Resisting Crime: The Effects of Victim Action on the
Outcomes of Crimes, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 861, 902 (2004) (“[U]nless there are circumstances that clearly
indicate resistance will lead to significant harm, the evidence reported in this paper indicates that some
form of resistance should be the path generally taken.”).
580
Id.
581
Id. at 903.
582
Gary Kleck, Crime Control Through the Private Use of Armed Force, 35 SOC. PROBS. 1, 7, 8
tbl.4 (1988).
583
Id. at 7; see also Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, supra note 575, at 174−75
(reporting survey results showing that crime victims who deployed a gun in self-defense “rarely lose
property and rarely provoke the offender into hurting them”); Gary Kleck & Miriam DeLone, Victim
Resistance and Offender Weapon Effects in Robbery, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 55, 73−77
(1993); William Wells, The Nature and Circumstances of Defensive Gun Use: A Content Analysis of
Interpersonal Conflict Situations Involving Criminal Offenders, 19 JUST. Q. 127, 152 (2002) (citing
studies showing that individuals who use a gun for self-defense and survive the incident usually do so
uninjured).
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situations when the robber is armed with a non-gun weapon. Whether
the robber has a gun, or has no weapon, victim gun possession does not
seem to affect injury rates.585
Another rendition of the firearms costs objection is you will hurt
yourself or have an accident. This plays out in advertising of the most
tragic types of events—children who get access to guns and shoot
themselves or a playmate.586 Perceptions of this risk are often wildly
inflated. On a recent panel before an audience of top-flight lawyers and
judges, one of the speakers conducted an informal survey, asking for
ballpark estimates about the number of children below the age of 14 killed
in firearms accidents annually. By a show of hands, a few people said one
million. A handful said 500,000. Nearly half the room said 100,000.
Most of the room said at least 50,000. Virtually everyone said at least
10,000. Several months later at a lunch with six New York lawyers, I
asked the same question with roughly the same distribution of answers.587
The actual number of such tragedies for 2010 was about 40.588
The fatal gun accident rate for all ages is at an all-time low today,589
while the per capita gun supply is at an all-time high.590 The annual risk
level for a fatal gun accident is around 0.22 per 100,000 population—about
the same risk level as taking two airplane trips a year, or getting a
whooping cough vaccination.591
584
Lawrence Southwick, Jr., Self-Defense with Guns: The Consequences, 28 J. CRIM. JUST. 351,
362 (2000).
585
Id. at 361−62.
586
See, e.g., Gun Accidents Kill 500 Kids a Year, MOMLOGIC (Aug. 1, 2008),
http://www.momlogic.com/2008/08/protect_your_kids_from_guns.php (recounting the story of a
toddler who fatally shot himself after finding a gun in his parents’ car and listing five other similar
tragedies to support the assertion that such accidents are not unusual).
587
One person estimated one million deaths. Two said around 100,000. One said 50,000.
Everyone agreed that it was at least 10,000. The National Safety Council reported that for children in
age range 0–19 years, the total number of firearms-related deaths for 2007 was 3,067 if homicide,
suicide, and unintentional injuries are included. NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 143 (2011)
[hereinafter INJURY FACTS]. These 3,067 firearms-related deaths are broken down into 138
unintentional deaths, 683 suicides, and 2,161 homicides, 25 due to legal intervention, and 60 for which
the intentionality of the deaths was not determined. Id. Viewed by age group, 85 of the total firearmsrelated deaths were of children under 5-years-old, 313 were children 5–14 years old, and 2,669 were
teens and young adults 15- to 19-years-old. Id.
588
Id.
589
See id. at 46−49 (reflecting that unintentional gun deaths in 2009 were lower than any other
year after 1903 in both nominal and per capita terms).
590
See Jurgen Brauer, The US Firearms Industry: Production and Supply, at 45 (Small Arms
Survey, Working Paper No. 14, 2013) (estimating U.S. domestic non-military supply based on
government data).
591
See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 5 (1993) (reporting a risk of dying equal to 0.1 in 100,000 for persons who take one trip
via airliner in a given year and a rate of 0.5 in 100,000 for persons who take 5 trips in a year, allowing
one to extrapolate that 2 flights in a year equates roughly to a 0.2 in 100,000 mortality risk).
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Accidental non-transport-related drownings facilitate far more child
fatalities than firearms accidents.592 Indeed, swimming pool accidents
account for more deaths of children under 10 years of age than all forms of
death by firearm (accident, homicide, and suicide) combined: “The
likelihood of death by pool (1 in 11,000) versus death by gun (1 in 1
million-plus) isn’t even close.”593
b. Don’t More Guns Just Equal More Gun Crime?
The modern orthodoxy says that easier access to guns explains the
exceptionally high rate of homicide in some black communities.594 But
that defies the reality. The fact is that urban areas where disproportionate
Black murder rates center—have stricter gun laws, fewer guns, and more
gun crime than rural areas where there are far more guns, easier access to
guns, and less gun crime.595 Among young black males, the gun homicide
and victimization rates are higher in urban areas (where gun regulation is
stricter and gun ownership is lower) than in rural areas (where gun
regulation is looser and gun ownership is higher). Kates and Mauser distill
the details
Per capita, African-American murder rates are much higher
than the murder rate for whites. . . . [O]ne might assume gun
ownership is higher among African-Americans than among
whites, but in fact African-American gun ownership is
markedly lower than white gun ownership. . . .
Per capita, rural African-Americans are much more likely to
own firearms than are urban African-Americans. Yet,
despite their greater access to guns, the firearm murder rate
of young rural black males is a small fraction of the firearm
murder rate of young urban black males. [The murder rate of
young urban African Americans is roughly 600% higher than
that of their rural counterparts.]
These facts are only anomalous in relation to the mantra that
more guns equal more death and fewer guns equal less death.
592
NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 20, 143 (stating that 739 children aged 0- to 14-yearsold died in unintentional drownings in 2007, versus 65 that died from unintentional firearms incidents
over the same year).
593
LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 543, at 149−50.
594
Recall, though, that Marvin Wolfgang’s early Philadelphia study found that knives were the
dominant instrument of Black murderers during the four-year period of the study. WOLFGANG, supra
note 526, at 84.
595
David Sherfinski, States’ Crime Rates Show Scant Linkage to Gun Laws, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
25, 2013, at A1 (citing analysis of the effects of gun-control laws on crime rates by Kleck and
Patterson, which concluded that such laws generally do not result in a pattern of discernable impact on
crime rates).
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In contrast, these facts accord with the earlier point regarding
the aberrance of murderers. Whatever their race, ordinary
people simply do not murder. Thus preventing law-abiding,
responsible African-Americans from owning guns does
nothing at all to reduce murderers, because they are not the
ones who are doing the killing. The murderers are a small
minority of extreme antisocial aberrants who manage to
obtain guns whatever the level of gun ownership in the
African American community.
Indeed, murderers generally fall into a group some
criminologists have called “violent predators,” sharply
differentiating them not only from the overall population but
from other criminals as well. Surveys of imprisoned felons
indicate that when not imprisoned the ordinary felon
averages perhaps 12 crimes per year. In contrast, “violent
predators” spend much or most of their time committing
crimes, averaging at least 5 assaults, 63 robberies, and 172
burglaries annually. A National Institute of Justice survey of
2,000 felons in 10 state prisons, which focused on gun crime,
said of these types of respondents: “[T]he men we have
labeled Predators were clearly omnibus felons . . .
[committing] more or less any crime they had the opportunity
to commit . . . . Thus, when we talk about ‘controlling crime’
in the United States today, we are talking largely about
controlling the behavior of these men.”
The point is not just that demographic patterns of homicide
and gun ownership in the African-American community do
not support the more guns equal more death mantra. More
importantly, those patterns refute the logic of fewer guns
equal less death. The reason fewer guns among ordinary
African-Americans does not lead to fewer murders is because
that paucity does not translate to fewer guns for the aberrant
minority who do murder. The correlation of very high
murder rates with low gun ownership in African-American
communities simply does not bear out the notion that
disarming the populace as a whole will disarm and prevent
murder by potential murderers.596
The general data on violent crime and the gun inventory also refute the
more-guns-equals-more-gun-crime thesis. Over the last seventy-five years,
the number of guns per 100,000 of population has grown from about
596

Kates & Mauser, supra note 565, at 676−78 & n.95 (citations omitted).
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34,000 per 100,000 to 100,000 per 100,000. Over the same period, the gun
homicide rate per 100,000 has oscillated from around three per 100,000 to
highs of around 6 per 100,000. Over the last decade, with gun ownership
at record levels, gun homicide has been trending down. It was 3.7 per
100,000 in 1999. In recent years, the gun crime rate and violent crime rate
have declined consistently.597 Over this same period, the number of guns
in the civilian inventory has continued to grow to its now record level of
approximately 323 million firearms.598
There is also a telling rebuke to the more-guns-equals-more-gun-crime
thesis in the debate about concealed carry of firearms in public discussed in
more detail below. The core dispute in that debate centers on the studies
by John Lott and other economists concluding that concealed carry laws
cause reductions in crime, yielding billions of dollars of benefits in avoided
costs.599 A variety of researchers have attempted to refute Lott’s claims
about the benefits of guns in the public space.600 But the striking thing is
that the more guns more crime thesis is not even on the table.601 This is a
far cry from the starting objections that concealed carry laws would lead to
carnage in the streets, with otherwise law-abiding people suddenly
becoming murderers.602
2. Benefits
a. Armed Citizens as a Disincentive
Several measures show the benefits of firearms ownership. A national
study of gun use against burglaries was conducted in 1994 by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).603 This study concluded that
over the previous twelve months, there were nearly 1,900,000 episodes
597
See ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 13, 67−69 (2006)
(highlighting data that says the homicide rate peaked in 1991, before declining markedly to a level
lower than any annual rate since 1967, and that both the aggravated assault with a firearm and armed
robbery rates have followed a very similar pattern).
598
JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 450.
599
JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL
LAWS 276 (3d ed. 2010).
600
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime”
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1296 (2003) (arguing that expansion to the data set used by Lott
results in evidence that cannot plausibly support that concealed carry laws are likely to reduce crime).
601
See Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun
Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715, 751−54, 762–63 (2005) (discussing the recent wave of state
legislation mandating nondiscretionary licenses to carry concealed firearms within the historical
context of such laws to show that the United States is generally no longer seriously considering
banning handguns).
602
Id. at 752, 757−61 (aggregating positive responses to the enactment of concealed carry laws in
various states to show that “the nightmare scenario” of gunfights erupting between otherwise peaceful
civilians for petty reasons has not been a reality).
603
Robin M. Ikeda et al., Estimating Intruder-Related Firearms Retrievals in U.S. Households,
1994, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 363 (1997).
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where someone in the home retrieved a firearm but did not see an
intruder.604 There were roughly 500,000 episodes where the armed
householder actually saw the invader and, in roughly 98% of those
episodes, the householder believed the gun was instrumental in chasing
away the intruder.605
Only 13% of U.S. residential burglaries from 1973 to 1982 were
classified as “hot” burglaries, meaning the attempt was made against an
occupied residence.606 The avoidance of hot burglaries and the tilt toward
daytime invasions is generally attributed to criminals’ fear of confronting
an armed resident.607
In a study of 105 active burglars, researchers found that “[o]ne of the
most serious risks faced by residential burglars is the possibility of being
injured or killed by the occupants of a target. Many of the offenders we
spoke to reported that this was far and away their greatest fear.”608
The story is different outside the U.S. Burglars in other nations seem
to be operating under different incentives. For one thing, there seem to be
more hot burglaries, as indicated by a 1982 British survey reporting a hot
burglary rate of 59% of attempted burglaries.609 The Wall Street Journal
summarizes:
Compared with London, New York is downright safe in one
category: burglary. In London, where many homes have
been burglarized half a dozen times, and where psychologists
specialize in treating children traumatized by such thefts, the
rate is nearly twice as high as in the Big Apple. And burglars
here increasingly prefer striking when occupants are home,
since alarms and locks tend to be disengaged and intruders
have little to fear from unarmed residents.610
In the U.S., home invaders are more at risk of being shot in the act than
of going to prison, and it is reasonable to expect that being shot is a
604

Id. at 367.
Id.
606
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 4 (1985).
607
GEORGE RENGERT & JOHN WASILCHICK, SUBURBAN BURGLARY: A TALE OF TWO SUBURBS
33 (2d ed. 2000) (finding that late night burglaries were unpopular because it was too difficult to tell if
anyone was home and most burglars avoid confrontation with residents of homes they break into at all
costs); see also JOHN E. CONKLIN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 85 (1972) (reporting
from a study of Massachusetts inmates that some gave up burglary because of “the risk of being
trapped in the house by the police or an armed occupant”).
608
RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, BURGLARS ON THE JOB: STREETLIFE AND
RESIDENTIAL BREAK-INS 112 (1994).
609
PAT MAYHEW, RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY: A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA
AND ENGLAND AND WALES (1987).
610
Kevin Helliker, Pistol-Whipped: As Gun Crimes Rise, Britain Is Considering Cutting Legal
Arsenal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1994, at Al.
605
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611

stronger deterrent than being incarcerated.
Hot burglaries also carry an elevated risk of assault. In 1985, the U.S.
rate of hot burglaries was 13%, compared with an average of 45% in three
low gun-ownership nations.612 Criminologist Gary Kleck estimates the
number of assaults would increase by 545,713 if U.S. burglars were
equally likely to enter occupied premises.613 This would raise the overall
American violent crime rate 9.4%.614 David Kopel argues that because
burglars do not know which homes have a gun, people who do not own
guns enjoy substantial free-rider benefits because of the deterrent effect of
the knowledge that many people have guns.615
In a survey of convicted felons conducted by James Wright and Peter
Rossi for the National Institute of Justice, 34% of the felons reported
personally being “scared off, shot at, wounded, or captured by an armed
victim.”616 Nearly 40% had refrained from attempting a crime because
they thought the victim might have a gun.617 Fifty-six percent said that
they would not attack some one they knew was armed and 74% agreed that
“[o]ne reason burglars avoid houses when people are at home is that they
fear being shot.”618
Wright and Rossi concluded, “the highest concern about
confronting an armed victim was registered by felons from
states with the greatest relative number of privately owned
firearms.”619 the major effects of partial or total handgun bans
would fall more on the shoulders of the ordinary gun-owning
public than on the felonious gun abuser of the sort studied
here. . . . [I]t is therefore also possible that one side
consequence of such measures would be some loss in the

611
JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA
14 (1983); see also Kleck, supra note 576, at 12.
612
KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 575, at 140.
613
Id.
614
Id.
615
David B. Kopel, Lawyers, Guns, and Burglars, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 345, 363–66 (2001); see also
David B Kopel, Comment to Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns & Burglary, in EVALUATING GUN
POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 109, 109–16 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003)
(responding to criticism of the theory that guns provide a deterrence to burglary). Contra Philip J.
Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns & Burglary, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND
VIOLENCE 74, 104 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (arguing that the “[p]revious evidence
[suggesting that gun ownership deters burglars] is indirect, anecdotal, or based on flawed data . . . [and
concluding that a] hot-burglary victimization rate tends to increase with gun prevalence”).
616
JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF
FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 155 (expanded ed. 1994).
617
Id.
618
Id. at 146.
619
Id. at 151.
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crime-thwarting effects of civilian firearms ownership.

There is other evidence of firearms benefits in the consequences of
targeted firearms policy. In October 1966, the Orlando, Florida Police
Department started a highly publicized firearms safety training for
women.621 Women in the city had been buying guns at an increased rate
after a dramatic increase in sexual assaults.622 The police department did
not discourage them, but wanted to help them be safe and proficient. Over
the next year, the incidence of rape dropped by 88%.623 Burglary fell by
22%.624 There is no evidence that any of the women in the program was
involved in a shooting. Researchers concluded “[i]t cannot be claimed that
this was merely part of a general downward trend in rape, since the
national rate was increasing at the time. No other U.S. city with a
population over 100,000 experienced so large a percentage decrease in the
number of rapes from 1966 to 1967 . . . .”625 That same year, rape
increased by 5% in Florida and by 7% nationally.626
Economist John Lott argues that one of the most substantial drivers of
crime reduction is the proliferation of shall issue concealed carry licenses
to law-abiding people. More guns in the hands of honest people in public
spaces, says Lott, deters criminals and generates billions of dollars of
benefits per year in avoided costs of crime.627 Lott’s assessment matches
the intuition that a shift in the distribution of guns in the public space
toward more guns in the hands of the law-abiding makes criminal activity
more risky, less profitable and less likely to occur. Lott’s claims have
drawn criticisms and rebuttals. In 2004, a panel of the National Academy
of Sciences assessed Lott’s claims.628 The majority of the panel concluded
that the data was inadequate to conclude whether right to carry laws
increased or decreased crime.629 One panel member, political scientist
620

Id. at 238.
Gary Kleck & David J. Bordua, The Factual Foundation for Certain Key Assumptions of Gun
Control, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 271, 284 (1983).
622
Don B. Kates, The Value of Civilian Handgun Possession as a Deterrent to Crime or a
Defense Against Crime, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 113, 153 (1991).
623
Kleck & Bordua, supra note 621, at 284.
624
Id. at 286.
625
Id. at 284.
626
Kates, supra note 622, at 153. One set of commentators argued that the drop in Orlando rapes
was statistically insignificant, as it was within the range of possible normal fluctuations. David
McDowall et al., General Deterrence Through Civilian Gun Ownership: An Evaluation of the QuasiExperimental Evidence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 541, 545–47 (1991). However, these authors’ statistical
model was such that even if gun-based deterrence had entirely eliminated all rapes in Orlando in 1966–
1967, the model would still have declared that result to be statistically insignificant. KLECK,
TARGETING GUNS, supra note 576, at 181.
627
LOTT, JR., supra note 599, at 276, tbl.10.6.
628
Id. at 301.
629
Id.
621
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James Q. Wilson, filed a dissent, concluding that the evidence presented by
Lott supports the conclusion that right to carry laws drive down the murder
rate.630 Wilson had supported gun control measures in the past,631 and
gained fame as the originator of the “Broken Windows” theory of crime
control.632 Wilson concluded that “the best evidence we have is that [right
to carry laws] impose no costs but may confer benefits.”633
b. A Race-specific Assessment
The studies summarized above are broad measures that do not specify
distinct racial trends. There is, however, a study of this issue in the
specific context of the black community. The Rose and McClain study
from 1981 started with data sets about black homicides.634 It then traced
the victims and offenders and interviewed people who knew them, people
familiar with the episode, and the parties involved (including perpetrators
or survivors of the altercations).635 The results show how armed selfdefense by the Parker/McDonald class could be good policy.
In a sample of selected American cities, Rose and McClain found that
“[r]obbery homicide is the most frequently occurring pattern among
stranger homicides in our sample cities, where it accounts for
approximately two-thirds of all stranger homicides.”636 But the next
finding is surprising: “[y]oung adult black men who are robbery homicide
victims are more often persons described as the robber than the robbed.
This pattern appears to prevail in each of the primary sample cities . . . .”637
This pattern was not unbroken. In Detroit, for example, “between 1970–72
the majority of the victims were identified as robbers, but in 1973 and 1974
the robbed exceeded the robbers in total annual victimizations.”638
The next assessment is vital for our purposes: “[g]iven the higher
percentage of robber homicide victimizations in the early years of the
interval, one might assume that targets posing a higher homicide risk for

630

Id at 301–02.
See James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 20, 1994, at 47
(advocating more searches and seizures of guns illegally carried or possessed while opposing new
restraints on legally purchased guns).
632
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
MAG.,
Mar.
1982,
available
at
Safety,
ATLANTIC
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465 (theorizing that maintaining
and patrolling urban neighborhoods will reduce crime).
633
James Q. Wilson, Dissent to NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A
CRITICAL REVIEW 270 (2005).
634
ROSE & MCCLAIN, supra note 519, at 2.
635
Id. at 13.
636
Id. at 115.
637
Id.
638
Id. at 116.
631
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the offender were abandoned in favor of safer targets.”
Note that the
idea of hardening targets against the aggressive microculture is the core
theme of arguments that an armed citizenry is a disincentive to crime.640
The researchers concluded that over a six-year period in Detroit, the
robbery homicide was nearly as likely to result in the death of the robber as
the robbed and that “[t]he defensive efficiency of those who are successful
in thwarting a robbery attempt probably exceeds that of the criminal justice
system.”641
This is difficult territory. One can imagine why policy makers would
not embrace these data or advance affirmative policies exploiting this
trend. But from the perspective of the Parker/McDonald class—people
living in the midst of clear threats and state failure—these data are a
welcome affirmation of the benefits of private firearms in the hands of
good people. The Rose and McClain study underscores that message with
this summary:
The previous evidence illustrating the riskiness of becoming
a victim if choosing to engage in robbery is a point seldom
made. One must exhibit caution not to overstate the case,
considering the low clearance rate for this offense. Yet it
appears that robbers are indeed sensitive to the risk
associated with the choice of robbery targets. This is evident
in the changing ratio of commercial to non-commercial
targets. Young black males who are insensitive to the risks
associated with the choice of a robbery target clearly increase
the probability that they will become homicide victims.642
The Rose and McClain study suggests that not only is there a distinct
criminal microculture within the community, it also suggests that the
criminal class responds to disincentives that make violent crime more
risky. Based on the broader data it is fair to believe arming the
Parker/McDonald class is one of those disincentives.643
639

Id.
See LOTT, JR., supra note 599, at 215 (explaining the “crime hazard model” in which potential
criminals will respond to the actual increased risk they face from an armed citizenry).
641
ROSE & MCCLAIN, supra note 519, at 117.
642
Id.
643
My claim that firearms policy in the Black community should privilege the Parker/McDonald
class of innocents is open to at least two fair objections. Besides the Parker/McDonald class, there is
another important class of innocents who are put at risk by firearms externalities—things like cross fire,
stray shots, and accidents for which self-defense is no answer. This group actually overlaps with the
Parker/McDonald class, but treating it separately would give the maximum credit to the claim that this
interest is a fair counterweight to my claims about the self-defense interests of the Parker/McDonald
class. Balancing those interests would involve for example, comparisons between DGUs and accidents
and a variety of other comparisons. The DGU numbers, for example, range into the millions. The
accidental death numbers are in the hundreds. People will contest exactly how those inputs should be
640
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I have not attempted a comprehensive assessment of social science.
That will require far more time and many more viewpoints. My aim here
is only to demonstrate the case that arms in the hands of the
Parker/McDonald class can generate results that compete easily with the
modern orthodoxy’s combination of promising symbolism and practical
failure.
VI. CONCLUSION
My Uncle, Howard Jefferson Crump, was President of the Greenbrier
County, West Virginia NAACP from 1954 through 1979.644 I was around
ten years old when he told me about using his pistol to fight off a racist
attack. He was proud of the institutional gains achieved by the NAACP.
But where we lived, the modern orthodoxy never resonated. For rural
people, the limitations of the state tend to be more obvious.
Those limitations were glaringly apparent in 1963, when Howard’s
brother, my Uncle Clarence, turned up dead in the creek behind my house.
Although I have no memory of it, my mother says that a playmate and I
were the first to discover the body. The culprit was never identified. The
open question was whether Clarence was carrying his pistol? Was it taken
from him? Was the assailant someone he trusted?
People objected when the death was ruled accidental. But no one
complained that the police should somehow have protected Clarence.
Country people understand that it would be pure magic for the police to
happen along some shady path the very same instant a violent threat
calculated. And some will suggest other types of comparisons. It is also relevant that these data are
drawn from the general population. It may turn out that particular black urban communities will be
exceptional in ways that are not reflected in the overall data.
One might also highlight that one of the negative externalities of even a virtuous armed citizenry
is that some percentage of guns owned by good people will be stolen and sold into the black market. I
count in this category the arguably distinct worry about the shared access gun, owned legally, but taken
and used by some untrustworthy member of the household.
What these concerns dictate about policy is open for fair debate. Some will argue that the black
market already is full of non-perishable guns. The more pointed question is whether the concern about
gun theft is a justification for geographically targeted gun bans that some have urged—i.e., effectively
a revival of the D.C. and Chicago bans. The answer may be a practical one. We know those bans
failed. We might decide that these worries are compelling arguments for sharper focus on safe storage,
theft reporting, and innovations like frangible ammunition. And the government interest in those things
might be stronger in some places than others.
These policy questions are open to fair debate. But these points of detail only underscore the
broader weakness of the modern orthodoxy. The failed blunt gun bans advanced as core policy under
the modern orthodoxy return us to the core normative question: Why should the black community
subordinate the claims and interests of the Parker/McDonald class to an agenda that is fundamentally at
odds with the state and the traditional stance of the community and the leadership on armed selfdefense? As it stands, the modern orthodoxy fails to answer that question.
644
West Virginia Civil Rights Day: Honorees 2004:, FROM WHENCE WE CAME,
http://www.wva.state.wv.us/civilrights/pasthonorees.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
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appears. Among the preachers, teachers, deacons, and working class
church people who populated my early life, firearms were ubiquitous.645
They still are.
Empirical work on the risks and utilities of gun ownership in the black
community is incomplete. But the glib assumption that the modern
orthodoxy is the only authentically black viewpoint on the gun issue is
unsustainable. There are sound reasons in our tradition and in our current
circumstances for blacks to pull away from the political inertia of the
modern orthodoxy and toward an open-minded re-engagement of firearms
policy.

645
Included in this group were my grandfather, Reverend Nathaniel Johnson, Sr., and my father
Reverend Nathaniel Johnson, Jr. From about age ten, my regular job on Sundays, when we visited my
grandparents for dinner, was to reload and “test fire” the rifle that my grandmother kept behind the
kitchen door. When she died at the age of ninety-four, she left behind that rifle, the pistol she kept in
her nightstand, and two shotguns.

